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As an innovative approach to building peace and security, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan were very much a response to unanticipated circumstances. They were largely new in structure, although elements of the PRT model were earlier seen in conflicts such as Vietnam.

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 provided for the deployment in Afghanistan of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Given that Afghanistan lacked a credible national army or police force, ISAF was seen as essential to dealing with a looming security vacuum in rural areas.

Unfortunately, the politics of contributor countries undermined the Bonn strategy. This, and the logistical difficulties of deploying PRTs all over the large and distant Afghanistan, meant that ISAF was deployed just to Kabul. It was only after two years, and much lost momentum, that ISAF expansion beyond the capital was authorized by United Nations Resolution 1510 in October 2003.

It was during these two years, when ISAF expansion was blocked, that minds turned to other ways of establishing an international presence in the countryside: the PRTs became the device of choice. Ironically, their military components are now linked back to ISAF, which itself is under NATO command.

The task of replacing ISAF as a source of security was always a difficult one. But as time has gone by, one point has become increasingly clear - there is no single ‘PRT experience'. Instead, a range of factors come into play which shape what PRTs can achieve, and in what ways.

As time has gone by, one point has become increasingly clear - there is no single ‘PRT experience'

First, PRTs vary according to location, and the specific security and development needs in a particular area. The experience of the New Zealand PRT in Bamian has been very different from that of the Canadians in Kandahar.

Bamian province is geographically encapsulated, relatively ethnically homogeneous, and well run by a local administration where Afghanistan's only female governor enjoys strong community support. This relatively low-threat environment means the PRT has successfully provided ambient security and has largely avoided being drawn into activities which are properly those of the Afghan authorities.

In Kandahar, by contrast, the population and the PRT are exposed to attacks by Taliban militants reportedly operating from safe havens in Pakistan. The local administration has had a very patchy record of achievement. And local politics is marked by intense rivalries between different forces aspiring to power.

As a result, the Kandahar deployment has proved far more difficult to manage than that in Bamian. This is reflected in the relative casualty rates. More than 40 Canadian soldiers have been killed. New Zealand's deployment has not seen a single death from hostile attack.

Second, PRTs vary according to the practices and military cultures of contributing states. The problem of ‘national caveats' on the ways in which forces might be used has long been a serious concern for commanders in Afghanistan. These caveats reflect significant differences in the world-views of contributing states. They are manifested in both their militaries' organizational cultures, and in what they see as appropriate roles for their PRTs.

For example, some militaries are committed to using kinetic force to establish a credible, robust presence. For others, this might reflect both a failure of imagination and a reluctance to use negotiation as a way of achieving concrete objectives.

But even within a single state PRT, a change of leadership can significantly affect how a PRT operates. Individual PRT commanders bring different levels of knowledge of the Afghan environment and different understandings of what the task of the PRT should be. Some throw themselves with gusto into the experience - others wish to get out of the country as quickly as possible.

Third, PRTs vary according to how effectively they engage with local leaderships and populations. Successful PRTs need to bring positive change in their environments. Even if well-run, a PRT will have done little to foster continuous reconstruction if it does not lay the foundation for stable local development.

By now it is a common place observation that development of this kind requires serious engagement between outside actors and internal forces. Again, there is quite a degree of variety.

In rural Afghanistan, personal ties tend to shape people's behaviour more than links between formal organizations. This benefits PRTs which can leave personnel in place for longer periods, as they can cultivate these kinds of informal ties.

It also helps PRTs who have staff with relevant language skills. PRTs operating in the north, where Persian is more widely used, have an advantage over those in the south where Pashto is more common: Persian is relatively easy to learn, whereas Pushtu is exceptionally difficult.

There are further coordination complications arising from the nature of the PRTs' tasks. For example, PRT leaderships tend to be much closer to provincial administrations than to the central authorities. This can create problems when provincial administrations are not fully attuned to the central government's priorities - particularly as strategic reconstruction priorities are formally set through consultation between donors and the Afghan government.

Continue reading the full article in NATO Review.

William Maley is professor and director, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, the Australian National University. He is author of Rescuing Afghanistan (2006) and The Afghanistan Wars (2002).

Also, see the video giving details on how ISAF is structured and operates.

In this video, NATO civilian spokesman, Mark Laity, describes the purpose, evolution and running of the NATO-led ISAF operation. He also describes how ISAF Provincial Reconstruction teams (PRTs) provide a link between security and development in Afghanistan.