Secretary General Rasmussen acknowledged in his keynote speech at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin that modern piracy at the Horn of Africa is a “serious challenge.” However, the threat of maritime banditry is not confined to that region. According to the International Maritime Bureau, this form of organized crime remains a substantial threat in areas such as the Malacca Straits and off the Niger delta. A total of 306 attacks on vessels world-wide were recorded during the first nine months of 2009 alone (already surpassing the 2008 total of 293). NATO should not make the mistake of neglecting other piracy-prone regions. What used to be maritime hit-and-run robberies has in some areas escalated into regular ‘shipnappings,’ yielding ever higher ransom payments and more potential victims.
Piracy is not a new phenomenon. The Gulf of Aden is a special case due to the fact that it is a major choke point of international trade, and because modern piracy is structurally different in its approach and implementation (i.e. ships are being attacked while at full speed, often using sophisticated weapons, unlike the romanticized exploits of Jack Sparrow). In order to safeguard vital maritime highways, anti-piracy operations need to be adequately equipped. However, it will be fatal to focus efforts only at the Horn of Africa, while disregarding maritime crime elsewhere. Furthermore, reducing the threat of piracy to just Somalia is short-sighted, since the stability of a whole region is at a crossroad.
Geopolitical implications cannot be disregarded: NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield is only one of a number of missions, task forces and international efforts in the area; yet, it suffers from the inability of some member states to provide the operation with sufficient man-power. Anti-piracy operations off Somalia are part of a larger ‘great game’ in the Indian Ocean, where nations and alliances struggle for influence, ports and partners in order to secure resources, lanes of communication, and the freedom of the seas. NATO must bear this in mind for its strategic thinking.
More emphasis should be put on the maritime security dimension of other challenges, such as energy security. In general, sea lanes of communication and choke points - or bottlenecks, where trade passes through slowly due to a high volume of traffic and/or difficult navigation - will be critical resources for the West in this century. After all, some 90 percent of the world's trade is being transported by ships.
Security concerns include a vast number of potential threats and targets beyond piracy. Maritime terrorism could yield major attacks, such as the USS Cole (2000) and M/V Limburg (2002) in Yemen; or minor threats like the destruction of locks, the application of waterborne improvised explosive devices, insertion of rogue divers, or even trained mammals. Regardless of the low probability of maritime terrorism (only a handful have been recorded since the end of the Cold War), we should not be lured into disregarding or minimizing the threat.
Furthermore, cyber attacks on critical maritime infrastructure such as ports, locks, undersea cables and naval installations can pose a serious challenge no longer confined to science-fiction. Climate change could cause the rise of sea levels, potentially devastating heavily populated coastal areas. As a threat multiplier, the resulting forced migration of people would enhance chances of conflict over resources and access. This underlines the need to further develop our way of thinking, and to take into consideration the importance of maritime security.
NATO’s new strategic concept offers a unique opportunity to underline the maritime dimension of the alliance’s role in the world (dis-)order of the 21st century. After all, the name “North Atlantic Treaty Association” implies that the water dividing (and often joining) two continents is more than just one of the seven seas. The Atlantic is a cultural bridge between the member states and a security arch that nations on both shores can identify with. As such, to borrow a military term, the alliance comes “from the sea,” and should make an extra effort to include this into its future strategic DNA.
This is the fruitful ground that NATO needs to cultivate in its assessment of future threats and conflicts. New "out of area" operations are very likely to entail maritime components, in addition to current territorial defense operations, such as in the Mediterranean or Black Seas. The NATO maritime immediate reaction forces (IRF) reflect the post-Cold War strategic and organizational path forward, which must take into account the different maritime threats of this century. As an alliance, all member states need to develop a broader understanding of the value of maritime security. This cannot just be reflected by new offices and positions, but also needs to be underscored in the new strategic document. Sea power is more than naval armament; sea power is also “maritime thinking,” which continues to be a central strength of the Alliance.
Only if makers and shapers of NATO’s future take into account this important dimension of security, the new document can serve as an identity-forming force. This may be, in Rasmussen's own words, “an overwhelming task” – but it is certainly not impossible to master.
Sebastian Bruns is project leader at Haus Rissen Hamburg, where he is in charge of the maritime security, Model United Nations and consultancy on local politics programs.
Related Material on Atlantic Community:
- Juliette Dixon: Land Ahoy! Fight Piracy on Somali Coastline
- Memo 16: Somalia: Prosecuting Pirates and Ensuring a Viable Economy
- Georgios Drossinos: Piracy Challenges International Theory
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