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October 1, 2007 |  4 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

Asking the Wrong Questions on Iran

Tony Karon: The West should not be asking whether Tehran will build nuclear weapons in the future, but rather how the regime can be persuaded that it doesn’t need them.

Imagine that US troops invading Iraq four years ago had discovered two warehouses full of VX and mustard gas shells, or a refrigerator full of anthrax. Although the case for war made by the Administration would have been “proved,” Iraq would be no less of a strategic calamity for the United States today.

Flimsy evidence of WMD in Iraq was clearly not the only problem of the Administration’s case for war. The flaw was in the premise—largely accepted in the prewar US public discussion, though not in Europe—that the existence of certain weapons in an adversary’s arsenal necessitated an invasion.

Now, many Washington hawks are demanding that the US bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran is racing to build nuclear weapons, they allege, posing a mortal threat to the West and Israel. Once again, the possibility of an adversary possessing WMD capability is offered as grounds for war.

There is no evidence that Iran is actually building a nuclear weapon. We know that Iran is building a nuclear energy infrastructure which would put nuclear weapons capability easily within reach, and that the Iranian authorities have not been entirely transparent in dealings with the IAEA. But the professional assessment of IAEA chief Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei is that despite some unresolved concerns, Iran’s nuclear program is not a “clear and present danger.”

The Administration denies it wants war, favoring instead a “diplomatic solution.” But by this it still means that Tehran surrenders to Western demands to cease uranium enrichment, which is allowed under the NPT for civilian purposes but is also a key building block of nuclear weapons. If Iran doesn’t back down, say hawks, then military action becomes a “last resort.”

But that’s only if you accept the logic of Senator John McCain’s statement that “the only thing worse than war with Iran is an Iran with nuclear weapons.”

Iran would likely respond to any US strike though direct and proxy attacks that could claim thousands of American lives in Iraq and elsewhere over the next decade, disrupt world oil supplies and doom US efforts to win support in the Muslim world for the foreseeable future.

That may be why more rational voices reverse McCain’s equation. Last week, General John Abizaid, former US commander in the Gulf, made clear that the US could, in fact, live with a nuclear-armed Iran, just as it lived with nuclear-armed rivals during the Cold War. Claims that Iran is committed to a doomsday confrontation fly in the face of Tehran’s behavior until now, and are often based on apocalyptic statements by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose provocation of the West is driven by his ongoing power struggle with domestic rivals. anticipation of a tough reelection battle in 2009.

It is often forgotten that in Iran’s theocracy, President Ahmadinejad has no more authority over national security decisions than House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has over Washington’s.

The more important question ought to be why Iran would seek nuclear weapons, and how it could be persuaded—as North Korea has been—that it doesn’t need them. The strategic rationale that might prompt Tehran to seek a nuclear deterrent is obvious: Three of its arch-rivals, the US, Israel and Pakistan, have such weapons, and North Korea’s demonstration of nuclear weapons capability forced the US to finally offer recognition and security guarantees to Pyongyang.

The attempt by Iran’s leadership in 2003 to reach agreement with the US on all issues of conflict was a reminder of the pragmatic interests-based foreign policy of the Tehran regime. If the country’s nuclear power plants were targeted in a bombing, Tehran’s retaliation would likely make it far more dangerous to the US and its allies for many years to come than even an Iran that had nuclear weapons within reach.

The only way to diminish the danger of confrontation with Iran is to directly address the conflict between Iran and its rivals through a grand bargain. US policy over the past five years has dramatically expanded Iranian influence in the Middle East, and global security demands that relations between the West and Tehran become less unpredictable.

Iran has shown itself to be ready to engage in a comprehensive dialogue; it is the Bush administration that has, so far, demurred.


Tony Karon is a senior editor at TIME who comments on international affairs on his web site Rootless Cosmopolitan. A longer version of this article is available as a posting at Mr. Karon’s web site.


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Lior  Petek

October 1, 2007

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I would like to comment especially on one (unconvincing) argument, because it seems to me that it is quite popular and common both in society and among think tanks:

"Claims that Iran is committed to a doomsday confrontation ... are often based on apocalyptic statements by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ... It is often forgotten that in Iran’s theocracy, President Ahmadinejad has no more authority over national security decisions than House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has over Washington’s."

What makes this argument logically inconsistent is that it stops short of asking what would happen if Nancy Pelosi denied the Holocaust and encouraged Israel's destruction. Would the American administration not pressure her to apologize and to revoke her statements in order to demonstrate that it does not agree and does not want to be associated with this position? I think it would as would be the case in any country's government that does not agree with the position of somenone with less political authority (see, for instance, what happened in Germany when Martin Hohmann called Jews a "Tätervolk": www.tagesschau.de/inland/meldung270492.html). />
So the question remains: Why then no one in Iran with more political authority than Ahmadinejad confronts him the same way if not for the very reason that they actually agree with his stance?
 
Lior  Petek

October 3, 2007

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I forgot to comment on yet another oft-cited, but logically inconsistent way of reasoning stated more or less explicitly in the text:

"There is no evidence that Iran is actually building a nuclear weapon. ... The more important question ought to be why Iran would seek nuclear weapons ... The strategic rationale that might prompt Tehran to seek a nuclear deterrent is obvious: ... Israel ... [has] such weapons"

The problem with this reasoning is that it uses a higher evidence threshold for Iran than for Israel. Of course, one is allowed to doubt (contrary to several indicators) that Iran wants to build nuclear weapons, but then one must, consequently, also doubt that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. Because for both Iran's intention and Israel's possession there are only indicators and not evidence. So either one is cautious with regards to widespread beliefs or one accepts them. But one cannot be cautious with regards to widespread beliefs (that Iran wants to build nuclear weapons) concerning Iran, on the one hand, and accept widespread beliefs (that Israel has nuclear weapons) concerning Israel, on the other. Indeed, the very reason for Israel's official nuclear ambiguity is said to be that it deters its enemies (because they don't want to risk finding out if Israel really has nuclear weapons), but that it nevertheless gives its enemies no excuse for building nuclear weapons as a defensive response (because it might well be that Israel has no nuclear weapons at all, which would make them seem aggressive).

To sum it up, a serious scholar, journalist, politician, etc. always has (out of logical consistency) to apply the same evidence threshold to all countries.
 
Robert  Shawley

October 11, 2007

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Dear Lior,

I agree 100% with your first commentary - but am, for reasons of logical consistency, not so sure about the second statement you make. Let me explain:

You say the same evidence threshold should be applied to all countries - yet the fact remains that Iranian nuclear ambitions and Israeli nuclear possession are in fact not one and the same thing - thus applying the same threshold and criteria is illogical. When we talk about what Iran wants to do with its nuclear program, we are speculating on future actions which, in turn, are based on speculations on future attitudes.

This is a questions that can not be compared with the question of whether Israel possesses a nuclear weapon or not. The answer to this question can be found in the past (and plenty of evidence does, in fact exist to strongly suggest, albeit not decisively proof, that Israel possesses around 300 nuclear weapons - see http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html). Much more importantly, however, it concerns the absence or not of a material thing - nuclear weapons - which are either there or not.

Saying that evidence of possession of nuclear weapons should have the same threshold as evidence of speculated future attitudes is therefore not logically consistent.

Furthermore, attitudes are much more amenable to influence than the existence of a thing. A security guarantee by the US to Iran could very well have a very pacifying effect on Iran's foreign policy stance - whereas the same cannot be said to hold true for Israel giving up its nuclear weapons (if it has any). Furthermore, if Ahmadinejad would be seen by the Iranian public to sabotage a US security guarantee for reasons of personal gain (he currently gets the little popularity he still enjoys by presenting himself as a defender of Iran against the US and Israel), he would be out of a job quicker than he can say 'nuclear enrichment' - I think even the Mullahs, whose objectives remain a mystery to me most of the time, would not be happy with such an action.
 
Lior  Petek

October 13, 2007

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Dear Robert,

I appreciate your agreement with my first comment as I do your questioning of my second one.

Let me start first with my acknowledgment that I was indeed not as much conscious as I should have been about the difference in nature between the (ideal) existence of attitudes / interests / intentions, on the one hand, and the (material) existence of physical objects, on the other hand. So thank you for calling my attention to this point.

However, after I have consciously thought about the implications your argument has for mine I still do not see I have to fundamentally qualify my argument, because from my point of view the difference between the two is somewhat overdifferentiated (when it comes to evidence thresholds).

First, your argument implies that a material thing can be easier disclosed than an ideal thing because of our ability to see material things but not ideal things. While your argument in this way is convincing when you are in a room with a person, your eyes will not get you far when you are confronted with the endless hiding possibilities for nuclear weapons that the size of a nation state offers (especially underground). With ideal things such as intentions it is the same, just the other way around. There you have not endless possibilities (either you want to build a nuclear weapon or you don’t), but even with knowing that there are just these two possibilities you cannot verify an intention since we cannot look into one’s mind. So both the verification of the existence of material and ideal things is (within the size of a nation state) very difficult.

The same story of different natures but same conclusions goes for the influence distinction you have made. In this case you are right when you claim that it is easier and quicker to move from having the intention to not having it (but, of course, only once you have convinced the other to give up the intention, which can be in international politics an extremely lengthy process) than it is to move from possessing something to no more possessing it (when we are talking about nuclear weapons). However, on the other hand, because of this very fact the change in the existence of an ideal thing can be easier and quicker reversed than it can with material things. So if you take both aspects of influence into account (the time it takes to influence and the time it takes to reverse the influence) ideal and material things are very much the same thing when it comes to the postulate of a shared evidence threshold.

Finally, concerning your evidence placement of the supposed Israeli possession of nuclear weapons in the past and the supposed Iranian intentions to build nuclear weapons in the future I think it is somewhat overdifferentiated. As a matter of fact, possessing a material something and having an intention are both located in the present time. So one can speculate about Israeli possession by looking at past events the same way one can do about Iranian intentions.
 

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