Although Russia at the moment appears very self-confident, there has been an underlying question in Russian foreign policy, from the beginning of the Russian Empire's involvement in European affairs through the Soviet era up until today: Is Russia part of Europe? Its rulers wanted to make Moscow the Third Rome, the centre of an empire to rival both the original Romans and the Byzantines, entrenched on European soil but also reaching out across the Asian steppe. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this "physical" empire finally came to an end. Nevertheless, the idea lived on. Russian foreign policy since the early 1990s has been strongly influenced by the concept of Russia's "near abroad" - the idea that Russia's newly independent former Soviet republics still form part of its sphere of influence.
Consequently, expanding European and American influence in Georgia, Ukraine and the Central Asian republics is looked upon very suspiciously by Russian policy-makers. Even more so since former Soviet republics like Estonia and Lithuania joined both NATO and the European Union and others, like Georgia and Ukraine, would like to do so. Only if the West respects Russia's concern for what it considers its Russian brethren in countries like Estonia or Ukraine, be it genuine or used as a political tool, does an honest and prolonged cooperation between Russia and the West have any future.
With its reserves of oil and, more importantly, natural gas, Russia can indeed be seen as what some analysts call a "resource superpower" - a power Russia sometimes uses to drive its political agenda and to bring in line countries it deems to have come too close to the European sphere of influence. In the past, Russia has used this supplying power as leverage against regimes in Ukraine, Georgia and even its ally Belarus. On the other hand, Russia has a vested economic interest in Western Europe. In particular, Germany is a very good customer of Russian natural gas.
Nevertheless, there is a fear that Europe, and Germany especially, will look for new suppliers of natural gas and oil, supplementing, or maybe even in part replacing, the Russian supply. This is why Russia has actively sought to undermine the planned Nabucco pipeline connecting Caspian natural gas and oil deposits to Europe via Turkey, thereby bypassing supply lines controlled by Russia.
In the end, though, Russia is in need of global stability as much as the West is. It is in Russia's vested interest to not destabilize Afghanistan further, as it already faces Islamist insurgencies and ethnic riots in its "near abroad" in Central Asia as well as "at home" in the North Caucasus. The insurgency in the North Caucasus is also partly driven by conflicts in the Middle East, as seasoned so-called "foreign mujahideen" fighters often make the circuit through Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan to the North Caucasian republics.
What Germany Can Do
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Germany rapidly developed economic as well as political ties with both Russia and Germany's direct eastern neighbors. Indeed, Germany was a leading advocate for the European Union's first Eastern Enlargement, bringing Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic countries and Hungary into the European fold, while maintaining good economic ties with Russia. In recent years, relations between Germany and its eastern neighbors have soured slightly. For instance, a German-Russian pipeline deal bypassing Eastern European transit countries has created problems. The Eastern European countries remain deeply distrustful of Russia as a result of their past history as a battleground between the Russian and various Western European empires.
Germany, with its foreign policy tradition of "Wandel durch Annäherung" (change through rapprochement) is in a unique position to foster a strengthening of ties not only between Russia and the Eastern European countries, but also between Russia and Europe as a whole. Germany needs to address underlying insecurities and suspicions, both in Europe and in Russia. In 2009, President Barack Obama officially "reset" the relations between Russia and the United States, turning over a new, blank page in the relations between the two powerful states. Germany can do the same for Russian-European relations.
A Plan for Action
1. Continue looking for alternative suppliers – but quietly
It is generally accepted that it is important for Germany to depend not only on Russia for its natural gas. Consequently, alternative supply routes such as the Nabucco pipeline, of which Germany's RWE is a partner, should be seriously considered and officially supported by the German government, thus drawing natural gas from suppliers such as Azerbaijan, Iraq and various trans-Caspian countries. Moreover, investment in new technologies such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), transport, and terminals needs to be strengthened. However, these strategies should not be widely advertised so as to not unnecessarily incense Russia. It is well known that politicians like Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin oppose the Nabucco project and promote a Black Sea pipeline under Russian aegis instead. The German government should be it clear to its Russian counterpart that a search for supplementary suppliers does not mean a turn away from Russia.
2. Foster rapprochement between Russia and its Eastern European neighbors
One of the reasons why an over-reliance on Russian natural gas become an issue in the first place were the so-called "gas wars" between Ukraine and Russia. In the past, German governments like that of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder preferred to talk directly to the Russian government on issues affecting countries like Poland or Lithuania – a move that was strongly criticized not only in Warsaw or Vilnius. There is still a lot of resentment and suspicion, some justified, some not, both in Russia and in its neighboring countries. Germany should work with its Eastern European partners like Poland and the Baltic countries and engage them in a constructive dialogue with Russia by listening to their grievances and trying to address them together in the European Union. Deals hammered out between Russia and Germany alone do not carry the same legitimacy as those that were achieved with Polish, Estonian or Latvian cooperation.
3. Promote respect for Russia's sphere of influence
While it is understandably hard for European governments to accept what is seen as Russia's meddling in the internal affairs of countries like Ukraine and Georgia, the European countries should address the real grievances Russia points out, for instance with regard to minority rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries. Germany above all should promote respect for Russia's concern for its former "brother countries", especially in areas like Central Asia, where Russia can better stabilize the situation than the European Union. The EU in general, and Germany in particular, need to toe a very thin line between defending the sovereignty of member states and of countries like Georgia and unnecessarily antagonizing Russia by not addressing important issues in former Soviet Union countries.
4. Support the development of a robust Russian civil society
German civil society actors like the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung or the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung already have a large presence in Russia, supporting local organizations through seminars and advocacy. Beyond the pale of political organizations, however, Germany should seek to promote a larger understanding between the German and the Russian population in general. Germany already has deep bonds with its direct neighbors France and Poland, consisting of pupil and student exchanges and cultural ties between institutions and civil society groups in both countries. A Russian program similar to those already in place would be a good first step to bring German and Russian societies closer together and to foster a more democratic civil society in Russia.
5. Give Russia a clear European perspective
Just a few months ago, a group of German defense experts led by former defense minister Völker Rühe wrote an open letter in Germany's news magazine "Der SPIEGEL" calling for NATO membership for Russia. While this proposal has been heatedly debated and in the end discarded by both NATO and Russian officials, Russia recently joined a NATO summit for the first time. Germany should work together with its partners to further engage Russia in European affairs, not only in NATO, but also in the European Union. Questions like energy security, answers to the financial crisis or safeguards against terrorism are Europe-wide problems and to include Russia in the consultations would be to offer an outstretched hand to its leaders.
The way forward
Many, or maybe indeed most, of the policy recommendations contained in this article cannot be fully realized with the next year or indeed the next five to ten years. However, Germany as an important European actor has more soft than hard power at its disposal, and threats and sanctions will not force a resurgent Russia to comply with Europe's demands.
Russia needs to be faced on a level playing field – and Germany's most attractive proposition is an invitation into a greater European community. Suspicions still linger on both sides, some unjustified, some justified, but Europe, and especially Germany, needs Russia as a strong partner, not adversary, to weather the challenges and overcome the obstacles of the next decade.
Europe is better off with Russia's cooperation in matters like Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear program or the Arab-Israeli conflict - precisely the challenges that both Europe and the United States have not been able to resolve on their own. If Germany now leads the way with a comprehensive program to slowly bring Russia back into the European fold, future generations are sure to reap the benefits of a truly united Europe.
Marcel Lewicki is a student of Political Science and Law at the University of Munich.
This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student
competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the
U.S. Mission to Germany.
Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Russia and the West" here.



November 16, 2010
Benjamin Hanke, Universität Leipzig, Silver Contributor (37)
I very strongly agree with most of your proposals, which, having now read all the submitted articles, seem to me to represent an excellent summary of our group's collected viewpoints. The one proposition that really stands out though, and that most sparked my interest, is your final one. Giving Russia a clear perspective of full integration into the Western security architecture and - if I'm reading you correctly - Europe is indeed a suggestion sure to invite controversial debate.
As you noted, the idea of Russia joining the NATO was recently dismissed by both sides. I think that on Moscow's part, this decision wasn't a rejection of further rapprochement towards Europe, but rather a manifestation of the doubts in NATO's future. Perhaps the oncoming Lisbon summit will dispel these and answer some of the questions about the organization's future relevance that have accumulated in recent years. For the time being though, the Russian government's dismissive view of NATO remains. Instead of joining a reconceptualized NATO, Moscow appears to follow an approach aiming to weaken the traditional transatlantic bond: deepened cooperation with the US as equal major powers on one side, and actual integration into Europe on the other. The Russian government's proposal of a new European security architecture could be seen as the most visible expression of that strategy to date.
Europe is at a crossroads, but make no mistake: the directions leading off the way traveled so far are trails at best. Even if NATO continued to spin aimlessly in search of its new role - which stands to be seen - the European states would not be prepared to give up the most important symbol of their historic connection with America. Russia needs to realize this, and realize also that its goal of a new European security architecture is only possible in cooperation with America. Conversely, this also offers a future perspective for the transatlantic alliance: bringing Russia into the boat could reconnect European and American interests. A further integration of Russia into European structures beyond the sector of security may follow.