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November 16, 2010 |  10 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

Change Through Rapprochement: Russia in a Greater Europe

Marcel Lewicki: Many important issues currently facing the West such as energy security and terrorism, can be resolved more easily with the help of Russia. Germany should play a key role in drawing Moscow closer to Europe in order to do so.

 

Although Russia at the moment appears very self-confident, there has been an underlying question in Russian foreign policy, from the beginning of the Russian Empire's involvement in European affairs through the Soviet era up until today: Is Russia part of Europe? Its rulers wanted to make Moscow the Third Rome, the centre of an empire to rival both the original Romans and the Byzantines, entrenched on European soil but also reaching out across the Asian steppe. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this "physical" empire finally came to an end. Nevertheless, the idea lived on. Russian foreign policy since the early 1990s has been strongly influenced by the concept of Russia's "near abroad" - the idea that Russia's newly independent former Soviet republics still form part of its sphere of influence.

Consequently, expanding European and American influence in Georgia, Ukraine and the Central Asian republics is looked upon very suspiciously by Russian policy-makers. Even more so since former Soviet republics like Estonia and Lithuania joined both NATO and the European Union and others, like Georgia and Ukraine, would like to do so. Only if the West respects Russia's concern for what it considers its Russian brethren in countries like Estonia or Ukraine, be it genuine or used as a political tool, does an honest and prolonged cooperation between Russia and the West have any future.

With its reserves of oil and, more importantly, natural gas, Russia can indeed be seen as what some analysts call a "resource superpower" - a power Russia sometimes uses to drive its political agenda and to bring in line countries it deems to have come too close to the European sphere of influence. In the past, Russia has used this supplying power as leverage against regimes in Ukraine, Georgia and even its ally Belarus. On the other hand, Russia has a vested economic interest in Western Europe. In particular, Germany is a very good customer of Russian natural gas.

Nevertheless, there is a fear that Europe, and Germany especially, will look for new suppliers of natural gas and oil, supplementing, or maybe even in part replacing, the Russian supply. This is why Russia has actively sought to undermine the planned Nabucco pipeline connecting Caspian natural gas and oil deposits to Europe via Turkey, thereby bypassing supply lines controlled by Russia.

In the end, though, Russia is in need of global stability as much as the West is. It is in Russia's vested interest to not destabilize Afghanistan further, as it already faces Islamist insurgencies and ethnic riots in its "near abroad" in Central Asia as well as "at home" in the North Caucasus. The insurgency in the North Caucasus is also partly driven by conflicts in the Middle East, as seasoned so-called "foreign mujahideen" fighters often make the circuit through Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan to the North Caucasian republics.

What Germany Can Do

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Germany rapidly developed economic as well as political ties with both Russia and Germany's direct eastern neighbors. Indeed, Germany was a leading advocate for the European Union's first Eastern Enlargement, bringing Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic countries and Hungary into the European fold, while maintaining good economic ties with Russia. In recent years, relations between Germany and its eastern neighbors have soured slightly. For instance, a German-Russian pipeline deal bypassing Eastern European transit countries has created problems. The Eastern European countries remain deeply distrustful of Russia as a result of their past history as a battleground between the Russian and various Western European empires.

Germany, with its foreign policy tradition of "Wandel durch Annäherung" (change through rapprochement) is in a unique position to foster a strengthening of ties not only between Russia and the Eastern European countries, but also between Russia and Europe as a whole. Germany needs to address underlying insecurities and suspicions, both in Europe and in Russia. In 2009, President Barack Obama officially "reset" the relations between Russia and the United States, turning over a new, blank page in the relations between the two powerful states. Germany can do the same for Russian-European relations.

A Plan for Action

1. Continue looking for alternative suppliers – but quietly

It is generally accepted that it is important for Germany to depend not only on Russia for its natural gas. Consequently, alternative supply routes such as the Nabucco pipeline, of which Germany's RWE is a partner, should be seriously considered and officially supported by the German government, thus drawing natural gas from suppliers such as Azerbaijan, Iraq and various trans-Caspian countries. Moreover, investment in new technologies such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), transport, and terminals needs to be strengthened. However, these strategies should not be widely advertised so as to not unnecessarily incense Russia. It is well known that politicians like Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin oppose the Nabucco project and promote a Black Sea pipeline under Russian aegis instead. The German government should be it clear to its Russian counterpart that a search for supplementary suppliers does not mean a turn away from Russia.

2. Foster rapprochement between Russia and its Eastern European neighbors

One of the reasons why an over-reliance on Russian natural gas become an issue in the first place were the so-called "gas wars" between Ukraine and Russia. In the past, German governments like that of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder preferred to talk directly to the Russian government on issues affecting countries like Poland or Lithuania – a move that was strongly criticized not only in Warsaw or Vilnius. There is still a lot of resentment and suspicion, some justified, some not, both in Russia and in its neighboring countries. Germany should work with its Eastern European partners like Poland and the Baltic countries and engage them in a constructive dialogue with Russia by listening to their grievances and trying to address them together in the European Union. Deals hammered out between Russia and Germany alone do not carry the same legitimacy as those that were achieved with Polish, Estonian or Latvian cooperation.

3. Promote respect for Russia's sphere of influence

While it is understandably hard for European governments to accept what is seen as Russia's meddling in the internal affairs of countries like Ukraine and Georgia, the European countries should address the real grievances Russia points out, for instance with regard to minority rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries. Germany above all should promote respect for Russia's concern for its former "brother countries", especially in areas like Central Asia, where Russia can better stabilize the situation than the European Union. The EU in general, and Germany in particular, need to toe a very thin line between defending the sovereignty of member states and of countries like Georgia and unnecessarily antagonizing Russia by not addressing important issues in former Soviet Union countries.

4. Support the development of a robust Russian civil society

German civil society actors like the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung or the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung already have a large presence in Russia, supporting local organizations through seminars and advocacy. Beyond the pale of political organizations, however, Germany should seek to promote a larger understanding between the German and the Russian population in general. Germany already has deep bonds with its direct neighbors France and Poland, consisting of pupil and student exchanges and cultural ties between institutions and civil society groups in both countries. A Russian program similar to those already in place would be a good first step to bring German and Russian societies closer together and to foster a more democratic civil society in Russia.

5. Give Russia a clear European perspective

Just a few months ago, a group of German defense experts led by former defense minister Völker Rühe wrote an open letter in Germany's news magazine "Der SPIEGEL" calling for NATO membership for Russia. While this proposal has been heatedly debated and in the end discarded by both NATO and Russian officials, Russia recently joined a NATO summit for the first time. Germany should work together with its partners to further engage Russia in European affairs, not only in NATO, but also in the European Union. Questions like energy security, answers to the financial crisis or safeguards against terrorism are Europe-wide problems and to include Russia in the consultations would be to offer an outstretched hand to its leaders.

The way forward

Many, or maybe indeed most, of the policy recommendations contained in this article cannot be fully realized with the next year or indeed the next five to ten years. However, Germany as an important European actor has more soft than hard power at its disposal, and threats and sanctions will not force a resurgent Russia to comply with Europe's demands.

Russia needs to be faced on a level playing field – and Germany's most attractive proposition is an invitation into a greater European community. Suspicions still linger on both sides, some unjustified, some justified, but Europe, and especially Germany, needs Russia as a strong partner, not adversary, to weather the challenges and overcome the obstacles of the next decade.

Europe is better off with Russia's cooperation in matters like Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear program or the Arab-Israeli conflict - precisely the challenges that both Europe and the United States have not been able to resolve on their own. If Germany now leads the way with a comprehensive program to slowly bring Russia back into the European fold, future generations are sure to reap the benefits of a truly united Europe.

Marcel Lewicki is a student of Political Science and Law at the University of Munich.

This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the U.S. Mission to Germany.

Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Russia and the West" here.

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Comments
Benjamin  Hanke

November 16, 2010

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Dear Marcel,

I very strongly agree with most of your proposals, which, having now read all the submitted articles, seem to me to represent an excellent summary of our group's collected viewpoints. The one proposition that really stands out though, and that most sparked my interest, is your final one. Giving Russia a clear perspective of full integration into the Western security architecture and - if I'm reading you correctly - Europe is indeed a suggestion sure to invite controversial debate.

As you noted, the idea of Russia joining the NATO was recently dismissed by both sides. I think that on Moscow's part, this decision wasn't a rejection of further rapprochement towards Europe, but rather a manifestation of the doubts in NATO's future. Perhaps the oncoming Lisbon summit will dispel these and answer some of the questions about the organization's future relevance that have accumulated in recent years. For the time being though, the Russian government's dismissive view of NATO remains. Instead of joining a reconceptualized NATO, Moscow appears to follow an approach aiming to weaken the traditional transatlantic bond: deepened cooperation with the US as equal major powers on one side, and actual integration into Europe on the other. The Russian government's proposal of a new European security architecture could be seen as the most visible expression of that strategy to date.

Europe is at a crossroads, but make no mistake: the directions leading off the way traveled so far are trails at best. Even if NATO continued to spin aimlessly in search of its new role - which stands to be seen - the European states would not be prepared to give up the most important symbol of their historic connection with America. Russia needs to realize this, and realize also that its goal of a new European security architecture is only possible in cooperation with America. Conversely, this also offers a future perspective for the transatlantic alliance: bringing Russia into the boat could reconnect European and American interests. A further integration of Russia into European structures beyond the sector of security may follow.
 
Shakhboz  Akhmedov

November 16, 2010

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Dear Marcel,

I think, your Plan of action, excluding some points, is rather feasible.

Rapproachement of Russia with its Eastern neighbours is, likeley, to be the first step in engaging in European affairs. Softening the relations between Russia and the Baltic countries including Eastern European ones already means the respect promotion for Russia’s “vested” sphere of influence. That, in its turn, eliminates the probable security dilemma which is the main driver of today’s tensions not only between Russia and the West. Wide-range employment of soft power to foster a more democratic civil society, through various educational and social funds, could definitely serve as a solid ground for further development.
I strongly support your view of giving Russia a clear European perspective in terms of energy security as well as whole European security issues.

However, I have one question. What do you mean by “looking for alternative supplier – but quietly”? Don’t you think, trying to find a new source of energy in a silent manner would probably lead to cooldown of mutual trust?
 
Marcel  Lewicki

November 16, 2010

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Dear Benjamin,

thank you very much for your feedback! I agree with you that bringing Russia closer to Europe will, in one way or another, lead to a heated discussion in both the EU and NATO. I also agree with yout analysis of Russia's motives - weakening the transatlantic bond by separately negotiating with the US and Western Europe.
By "European perspective" I don't per se membership in NATO - if that ever happens, that is something than can be discussed 10 years from now or so. This is even more so true for the European Union, which, after the Lisbon Treaty, will first have to find a common denominator on how to deal with Russia and the post-Soviet world (amongst a myriad of other things) before it can conceive further enlargement. Key to this process will be a facilitation of rapprochement between Eastern Europe and Russia.

However, Russia's cooperation can be very useful even when it is outside of NATO and the EU. The fact that Russia chose to join a NATO summit for the first time (even though it is not a member) is indicative of the new approaches we can take to integrate Russia into Europe. There are also numerous other organisations, such as the CoE and OSCE (now more or less moribund in its FSU operations because of a Russian veto), where dialogue between Russia and the West can be intensified.

I don't believe in the concept of a "privileged partnership", as proposed for Turkey by a couple of conservative politicians, but although the Russian and Turkish positions are similar - on the "edge" of Europe, sometimes a part of it, sometimes not -, Russia is not Turkey. Whereas Turkey still wants to join the EU and is a NATO member, Russia has made it clear that, for the time being, joining NATO will not be an option. That does not mean that Russia cannot participate in common peacekeeping operations with NATO forces (say, a proposed UN-led peacekeeping force for South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh), be integrated into a possible future European oil and gas community or help with resolving international conflicts like the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Iranian nuclear crisis. Especially the European Union already has many instruments at its disposal to engage Russia further in Europe - say, Common Spaces; they should be used and improved.

Dear Shakhboz,

thank you for your comments. It is true that any attempt to diversify Germany's (and Europe's) energy supply, away from Russia towards suppliers such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan or Iraq, will come with a political price tag. Russia has tried to woo (or indeed force) countries on the Black Sea littoral away from non-Russian projects connecting these suppliers to Western Europe. However, I believe that assuring Russia that it is not going to be replaced as a energy partner (something that is impossible anyway at the moment) and reaching out to it on the other hand will soften the blow. By "quietly" I mean the German government should not go about and declare that Russia is an unreliable partner and thus, alternatives are needed - basically a policy statement against Russia -, but to clad supporting for supplementary suppliers in a more diplomatic language and to not make a point of advertising it openly. It is only reasonable for a country to diversify its energy supply - Russia probably won't complain if Germany buys less gas and strengthens its commitment to renewable energy.
 
Matthias  Conrad

November 16, 2010

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Dear Marcel, dear all,

I share Benjamin’s view that your article very neatly sums up the majority of themes that we have been discussing this week. I very much like the tone and your article is very concise. Two short remarks:

You wrote that Georgia and Ukraine would like to join NATO. While this is true for Georgia, it is not for Ukraine. Despite the almost desperate attempts by Viktor Yushchenko’s government to join the Alliance – he never quite convinced the majority of the population. But that is just a footnote…

Russia’s future in Western institutions: I think there is to some extent room for maneuvering but it is limited. In terms of security, NATO is not an option. First of all, the Alliance does not want Russia in as it is afraid of suffering the fate of the OSCE that has become somewhat disabled due to consensus finding mechanisms. Secondly, from a Russian perspective NATO is too much discredited not only since the Russo-Georgian war. After all, NATO remains the “hostile bloc” sneaking up to Russia’s borders. Russian newspapers give ample evidence of that. Ironically, this is paralleled by very good working relations with NATO member states and even with NATO itself (cf. the list of joint military exercises). It seems sometimes that both sides enjoy each other’s existence as “most favorite enemies”.
As for the EU: There is more potential. Prospects for the relaxation of the visa regime, more access to the European market – there is much room for improvement. Still, Russia is not willing to give in to EU conditioning as p. e. Romania or Bulgaria have done. After all, Russia does not want to become a member of the European Union. The standstill of the negotiations between Russia and the EU on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) shows quite well that Russia is willing to flex its muscles if it does not perceive its interests to be accounted for. Therefore, I argue – contrary to Benjamin – in favor of de-linking issues in the negotiations if we are to achieve progress. The political elite in Russia keeps stressing that the naive romanticism of the 1990s is past when Moscow dreamed to be part of the "common European home". I think that - at least for the moment - we have to find a pragmatic solution to this disillusionment with the West.

 
Guli  Babadjanova

November 16, 2010

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Dear Marcel,

Thank you for this comprehensive insightful article which truly contains almost all the essential points of our proposals.

Indeed, Russia and the West both need each other. Energy, as you point out, is a significant factor in this cooperation. Let me express two points of concern in regard to energy security between Russia and Europe.

Firstly, some Eastern European countries may still “remain deeply distrustful” towards Russia, but this does not terminate them from importing Russian natural gas and oil. In fact, Czech Republic depends on a little less than 80% of its imported natural gas from Russia, Poland – 90%, and all the three Baltic republics – 100% (cf. EU Commission for Energy). Eastern European states well understand that their interests are tied to Russian energy resources. Strengthening cooperation and further integrating of Russia into some European institutions may as well be in their interests. Your second thesis, namely the rapprochement between Russia and the Eastern Europe might effectively utilize this economic cooperation as a ground for further collaboration.

Secondly, a search for alternative energy suppliers other than Russia, especially in the post-Soviet region, is to raise Russia’s allertness due to its desire to safeguard the status of leading producer and exporter of energy-resources. It would also be quite uneasy to physically fill the projected Nabucco-pipeline with necessary gas-capacity from Caspian region, given their supply obligations to Russia, and insufficiency of available gas. In other words, not silencing but rather involvement of Russian cooperation in this dialogue could bring productive results at the same time preserving mutual trust. Agreement on the possible dissemination of energy exports to fill gas-pipelines could be negotiated among the producers.

Your acknowledgement of the importance of the civil society would promote further cooperation on societal level, serving a strong guarantee of Western-Russian ties in the long-term.
 
Philipp Johannes Große

November 16, 2010

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Dear Marcel,

I rather agree with your analysis and the policy recommendations based on your observations. Especially the part on the Russian minorities in the Baltics is worth mentioning: Their sometimes unfair treatment and unsatisfactory integration into society gives Russia a lever for instant conflict, anytime there is need for it. The same nationalist assertiveness we see in Russian politics is far too often reflected in public discussion in the Baltic countries. The resulting rows over language and cultural traits overshadow the need for cooperation in all the fields we have listed in our papers. But what can Germany do to support resolution of this kind of conflict as you propose in section 2 of your proposals? After all, it's hard for us to grasp the rationale behind national or even nationalist feelings - probably one reason why recent German governments did not only bypass Eastern Europe in dealings with Russia but also failed to understand the resulting souring of relations.

Regarding your thoughts on Russia's integration into Europe's institutional framework, I'd like to repeat my concern about full membership. As Benjamin rightly points out, for a power of Russia's size NATO-membership gives little benefit, as it can project power on its own. On the other hand we see cooperation in limited areas of security - for example in Afghanistan. Given Russia's demographic challenge, which may soften its taste for use of military means, we can expect a chance for deeper cooperation between Europe and Russia - in the end, most European countries face ageing populations as well and will be forced to move spending from defense to health care and pensions. We will be able to afford security only if we share more responsibilities.

However, what will be America's role in this different European security arrangement? The United States stand a greater chance of coping with demographics but will be challenged by new powers in Asia. In this situation we can't expect continued support just for sentimental reasons. Europe will have to offer something in return, which will be harder as it already is. Over the next 10-20 years we may still be able to do just that and relief the United States from some of its military obligations in Europe's. This will help to get full support should we really need it and underline the element of partnership between Europe and the United States.

Your comment on my article rightly points out that everything military is a tough sell to German voters. Still, support for stronger cooperation with our partners within the concept of territorial defense will be more likely accepted than the Afghanistan campaign. The upcoming reform of Germany's armed forces will shrink the total number of troops but hopefully increase operability of the remaining units. The Afghan experience in mind we can reasonably expect for future European missions to be of smaller scale and scope. They will focus on strategic aims that are almost impossible not to meet (whether they are effective is a different question) - I don't think nation-building will be a core business of Europe's military forces. This in mind, we will have the professional resources for regular training exercises and patrols. This will be noticed by Russia's military leadership, all the more if we can agree on mutual monitoring missions, while being rather low-level in overall number of troops and equipment and thus avoid exploitation by Russia's political leaders for propagandistic purposes. As I stressed before, this is a matter of insurance which in my opinion is worth paying the political price in form of Russia's disapproval.
 
Ntambaazi Williams George

November 17, 2010

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Dear particiapants,

I sincerely commend all your well thought after and very insightful ideas. Iam really benefiting from a deep grasp of transatlantic issues. I particulary liked plan of action No.4 as argued quite convicingly by Marcel. Germany should support the development of a robust Russian Civil Society. I can not more than agree especially if this strategy is at the grassroot levels.

If we are to agree that Germany largely credited for having far better democratic credentials then it can can systematically help reshape the Russian internal and probably external policies while avoiding meddling directly in its internal affairs. It can improve the credibility of Russian voluntary sector by way of engaging some of its voluntary organizations in different validation programmes. Apart from the advocacy work that organizations like KAD or FES are engaged in, a continued strategy of interdisciplinary exchange of educating young Russian students here and Germanys in Russia does wonders. If there are intensified efforts to set up western modelled institutions in Russia to facilitate students return, then with time a better mutual understanding between the Germany and Russian population will be on course.

 
Alexandra  Vasileva

November 17, 2010

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Dear Marcel,

I very much like your clearly-structured, well-written article, and particularly its calm, differentiated tone. I think that this way of dealing with Western-Russian tensions can prove very fruitful on the political level, too – non-emotional, non-normative rhetoric and a focus on the possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation on the same level.

I like all of your proposals, however, some of them do not seem to me concrete enough (see below, incentives). I see possibilities to jointly elaborate on some of your good ideas (most of which all of us agree upon, I guess) in our policy memorandum.

I am particularly fond of the idea of showing respect of Russia and its “spheres of influence”, and of abstaining from creating the impression that Russia is being edged out (i.e. seeking alternative energy supply routs). I subscribe to a similar idea insisting on the importance of framing the relations between Russia and the West in terms of “wise” discourses, which are more likely to foster rapprochement than the kind of rhetoric prevailing now.

I think you are very right that Russia should be more involved into the European (or Western) space in all senses – identity, security, civil society, economy. Theoretically this would be in the mutual interest of both countries. However, I see two obstacles. It is possible that currently the rapprochement is more in Europe’s interest than in Russia’s (at least this is what the official Russian discourse signals) – or at least that Europe does not offer enough incentives that would make rapprochement for Russia more attractive and (!) compatible with Russia’s understanding of foreign politics. (On the example of civil society dialogue – instead of “teaching” Russian citizens democracy - provide some incentives that would sensitise Russia for the benefit of such dialogue.)

So problem number one – who is more interested in the rapprochement? The European vested interest is clear – you unmistakably state it in your article. Concerning Russia - although belonging rather to Europe than to Asia, Russia does not seem to make a definite European choice: as some other discussants note, Russia conceives of itself as a Eurasian power, and hardly wishes to be part of Europe (EU). Viewed from the perspective of Russia’s returning great power rhetoric, correctly noted by Guli, integration with Europe (in whatever sense) might be perceived as “subordination”. A signal for this is Russia’s denial to be part of the ENP.

This leads me to my second point – insufficiency of clear incentives. Although Russia does not seem to be keen to come too close to Europe – the situation may (and should!) change if Russia is offered clear incentives, such as visa-free travel or a free trade zone. In your article I was missing proposals of concrete incentives behind the policy recommendations. I give you some examples: civil society dialogue; common neighbourhood (how to walk this thin line you are speaking about? In my article a similar question remains unanswered, too, so we could jointly think about concrete solutions); energy supply - how to avoid being misinterpreted by Russia when supporting Nabucco?

Overall I want to thank you for providing a very sharp analysis both of the status quo in the relations and of possible solutions to problems. I see many intersections with my idea of changing discourses, which is a policy recommendation rather on the meta-level and can perfectly accommodate all other proposals. I am also happy to see your “arms-wide-open” approach which includes trust, respect of Russia’s interests and sensitivity to its grievances. I think this could indeed turn out to be a very successful approach to overcome the current deadlocks. Every country is more likely to cooperate as soon as it has the feeling of being listened to and taken seriously.

 
Marcel  Lewicki

November 18, 2010

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Dear all,

thank you very much for your warm words and of course your insightful feedback! I've thought a lot about the issues you pointed out and I hope I can answer some of the questions that have popped up. But besides that it was really a pleasure reading your articles and following and participation in the discussions, and of course especially finding fresh ideas and keen analysis.

I'll just go through the comments from the top (this might end up being a really long post, I'm sorry in advance! Also, a word of warning: do NOT use Windows Editor for writing long comments, as you might just end up having to do all the breaks again.. ;-)).


Dear Matthias,

thanks for your comment about Ukraine, of course you are right about Janukovich's stance on NATO membership. For Yukashenko it was probably less for concrete security reasons (contrary to the Baltic states' successful membership bid and Georgia's unsuccessful one) than as a political tool, sort of a fast-track dervice, to political integration into the West that he so desperately seeked.

Speaking of NATO, I do agree, as I have pointed out earlier, about Russia not joining NATO (at least not in the near future or even in fifteen years). I like your notion of "most favourite
enemies", I think that explains the NATO-Russia hate-love condrunum in a nutshell. But as with most dyfunctional couples, a couple therapy might be in order, where facts - the mostly good working relationship you described - are brought in line with rhetoric - which, as you noted, remains at times very hostile. If we convince Russia, or if Russia lets herself be convinced, that our intentions are noble and that we do not intend to encroach on its zone of interest in any meaningful way, a major stumbling block may be out of the way.


Dear Guli,

you are absolutely right that in Eastern Europe, political points-of-view are divorced from
economic considerations. While the Polish president and his Baltic counterparts use every
opportunity to criticise Russia, they still almost exclusively buy Russian gas. The same is
true, of course, in the reverse for the Russian leadership. When Chancellor Merkel met with the Dalai Lama, the Chinese leadership was fiercely critical, but it did not (and could not) freeze trade with Germany. That shows us that words only go so far, the actual economic motives might be totally different.

Of course, possible economic co-operation between Russia, Eastern Europe and Germany aside, that leaves us with a small reverse psychology problem when it comes to my proposal to look for alternative suppliers for Russian oil and gas. If rhetoric does not impair economic relations, actually doing something about it, but losing the bellicose rhetoric might have big consequences on Russo-German relations. While this is a dilemma I believe that, as its dependence on Russian gas is Germany's only lever it can pull when it comes to Russia, it should not be discarded. New oil and gas fields are being explored every day in the Caspian Sea and the proposed pipeline projects will also connect Iraqi oilfields directly to refineries in Europe, bypassing Russia.
I think your proposal to include Russia in the consultations has indeed many merits - the
question is if it will reduce Europe's dependence on Russia as a supplier, something Russia definitely isn't keen on, but something Europe has to accomplish from an energy security point-of-view. I think it's definitely important to include Russia in a common European energy security dialogue, but - same as with NATO - Russia should not (yet) become a full-fledged
member.


Dear Philipp,

thanks for your feedback! You make a very interesting point refering to the language rows
especially in the Baltic countries. I observed that on a smaller scale when I was working in
Georgia - most Cyrillic signs were taken down, to be replaced with English-language signs (which, it being Georgia, did not happen while I was there, leaving me with a plethora of signs written in the beautiful but difficult Georgian alphabet to contend with..), Russian is no longer mandatory in schools, but the quality of English instruction is rather bad, especially in rural areas. For me this meant I could not communicate with most people below 25, neither in Russian nor in English.. a good example of how language policies should not be conducted by a government, no matter how intent it is on Western integration.

As strange as such things seem to us Germans, I think it is that aloofness that makes Germany (in theory) a perfect mediator to broker deals between different, rather nationalist countries. The discourse in Russia often fiercely distinguishing between русские (ethnic Russians) and россиянин (Russian nationals of any ethnicity) is matched by similiar discourses especially in Baltic countries - discourses that need to change if rapprochement is to succeed. Especially inside the European Union (where Germany can actually apply pressure) Germany should use its influence to support Russophone minorities in Eastern European countries - all the while pointing out that it expects similiar efforts to be taken in Russia. The problem is of course that Germany - and indeed Europe - does not have any real leverage to force Russia to implent such a policy, although that applies to any German or European policy vis-à-vis Russia.

As I pointed out earlier, I agree on Russia's NATO membership. That has been widely discussed, thanks in part to the SPIEGEL article and discarded by both sides for the time being. Nevertheless, I believe there are ways to engage Russia in a potential European security architecture outside of or in partnership with NATO institutions. For some, like the ruckus about the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, Europe needs US support, so I concur with you that maintaining the trans-Atlantic bond is very important. Right now, Europe, and especially Germany, might not seem as the most reliable partner to the US, with regards to numerous 'caveats' to its mission in Afghanistan.

I agree with you that territorial defence might be closer to the German population's heart than "adventures" in Afghanistan; but let's not forget that Germany's commitment in Afghanistan isn't only nation-building and helping Afghanistan, it's - and was from the beginning - a policy statement that Germany will stand by America in its darkest hour. Thus, the Afghanistan operation could not credibly be terminated before the last US troops leave the country, probably in 2014, without incurring a high political cost.


Dear Alexandra,

Thank you for your comments! I hope I can adress some of the issues you pointed out. It's
indeed very instructive to find out who would benefit most from closer integration of Russia.

Of the two explanations you propose I am incline to follow the second one - that Europe has not as of yet provided enough incentives to Russia. That the EU wanted to include Russia in the ENP (which, as you pointed out, Russia did not accept) seems a little foolish to me - in the Russian mindset it puts Russia on the same level as Moldova or Georgia. Russia wants to be dealt with separately, on a level playing field, not subordinated and put on the same shelves as its former vassals. The introduction of the Common Spaces was an attempt to mend fences with Russia, to give it the station and it deserves in the minds of the Russian leadership. I believe there are two strains in Russian foreign policy, one wanting to reclaim Russia's place as one of the worlds foremost great powers, and one advocating Russia's rooting in Europe.

Right now, we're experiencing a fusion of these two identities - on the one hand Medvedev is reaching out to Europe to construct a "new security architecture", on the other hand Russia still supports breakaway states in the South Caucasus and actively destablises a democratically elected government in Georgia. Nevertheless, Putin wanted his war in Chechnya to be recognised as part of the "War on Terror" and George W. Bush did him that favour, possibly to garner support for his own plans. Even in its great power rhetoric, Russia seeks the approval - or at least the respect - of other countries, most notably of course the US, but also Europe.

The European Union has numerous instruments at its disposal of which you already named a few of the most important in your very interesting article. Waiving visas, a possible free-trade zone, maybe harmonised financial regulations, easing the flow of capital between Russia and Europe, help in stabilising the rouble, a Common Energy Market. Looking at the acquis, there are a myriad possibilities on where Europe's and Russia's priorities converge. And this does not only extend to the depths of trade law, but also to very real security threats. Russia does not want (or could not allow) NATO to fail in Afghanistan, and stability and security in Central Asia is in both NATO's and Russia's interest. A common strategy for solving the Kyrgyz internal conflict and fighting the insurgency in neighbouring Uzbekistan would be a good starting point, as is a common position on Iran's nuclear programme. There are numerous fires to be put out in Central Asia alone where the West and Russia's interests converge. Moreover, if Russia and NATO succeed in finding common solutions for common security problems, untangling the more difficult knots such as South Caucasus, where Russian and Western priorities do not align, might be easier. I believe there are incentives aplenty, but Europe needs to have a clear plan where its relationship with Russia should go before it can proceed.
 
valentine anatolevich akishkin

November 19, 2010

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I should like to put in a brief word of complement to all these young people who have demonstrated an exceptionally healthy and intelligent approach to a matter that in light of today’s realities requires a fresh and unprejudiced insight. Being a Russian, I was taken back by the well endowed and fruitful resource of reasoning that the participants foresee would serve to harmonize Russian European relations. I should leave it to them to argue it out and brainwave the solutions. They seem well equipped, earnest in their judgment and prepared to take over the forthcoming challenges. I wish them all luck and a better world.

Best wishes from Siberia Valentine Akishkin

 

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