As the US-led ISAF coalition is winding down its engagement in Afghanistan, relations with the crucial regional player Pakistan have hit rock bottom. Last December Defense Secretary Panetta was the latest American official to state the obvious truth that the US must improve its relationship with Pakistan to win the war in Afghanistan. But this will not happen as long as Washington continues to emphasize the use of financial aid as a carrot, or thinks that Islamabad can somehow be made to follow the American agenda. US policy fails to address the legitimate security concerns that have motivated Pakistan's Afghanistan policy for decades. The only way to get Islamabad on board is to understand and meet its worries through a regional peace treaty.
Pakistan's concerns are twofold. Firstly, Pakistan is obsessed with its arch-enemy India. It therefore wants to deploy a maximum amount of force along its eastern border and cannot afford a second rival at its western flank. Secondly, Pakistan fears the emergence of Pashtun nationalism. These people live in Afghanistan and Pakistan, separated by the Durand Line that Great Britain drew as a colonial power and which now constitutes the border. An ethnic movement might call for secession of western Pakistan and thereby break the country apart.
These concerns also explain Islamabad's past Afghanistan policy. In the 1980s it supported the Mujahedin to prevent a Soviet presence at its border. In the 1990s it supported the Taliban. They are Pashtun but more interested in religion than nationalist secession. Moreover, their pariah status barred them from advancing any claim to self-determination in international forums.
The current Afghan government combines the two guiding fears of Pakistan's foreign policy. President Karzai, resentful and suspicious toward Islamabad for its support of the Taliban in the 1990s, accepted Indian military and financial assistance after he came to power. Pakistan thus faces the prospect of encirclement by its mortal enemy and her ally. Karzai also refuses to recognize the Durand Line. This opens up the possibility that he will encourage or inspire Pashtun nationalism, or use his international credibility as a US ally to call for their self-determination. Moreover, in the mindset of Pakistan, India could also support Pashtun separatism. This would provide New Delhi with the leverage to end Pakistan's support for the insurgency in Kashmir in a quid pro quo deal.
To rally Pakistan behind a solution for Afghanistan, the US must address Islamabad's two concerns. It is best to do this sooner rather than later and it is crucial to the survival of Kabul after 2014. Only as long as America is substantially involved in Afghanistan does it have sufficient influence over President Karzai. The commitment must be in an unequivocal and legally binding, as Pakistan thinks that the US has been an unreliable partner in the past.
The first issue could be solved in the following way. Afghanistan must pledge neutrality with regard to other South Asian states and terminate its military cooperation with India. In compensation the US and other Western states should increase aid to Kabul. Money would be better spent this way than in aid to Islamabad. Pakistan's support cannot be bought for a few billion dollars because its policy is driven by deep seated fears and not a desire for profit. To give the pledges some substance, it should be formulated in a binding treaty between Kabul, Islamabad, Washington, and perhaps other relevant states such as Russia or the EU members.
Some subtlety is required to solve the boundary dispute. Karzai cannot directly recognize the Durand Line. This would be too painful for him as a Pashtun and undermine his domestic support. A solution would be to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice under the aforementioned treaty. That Pakistan would win the case is clear. Under the rule of uti posseditis international law does not change colonial boundaries after independence. While the case proceeds there would be a window of opportunity, roughly until ISAF leaves in 2014, to stabilize Afghanistan without Pakistani support for the insurgents. A more stable Afghanistan could handle the possible domestic political fallout of the ICJ decision and Karzai would not lose face.
To rely on the jurisdiction of tribunals in The Hague might be an anathema to American foreign policy. After the ICJ declared American use of force against Nicaragua illegal in 1986, Washington withdrew its recognition of compulsory jurisdiction. Together with Turkey it is the only NATO member not party to the International Criminal Court. But to win in Afghanistan, the Obama administration must be able to work with the confines of the court. It would be part of a feasible solution that addresses Pakistan's legitimate concerns.
Marno de Boer is a military historian and security specialist currently pursuing an L.L.M. in international conflict & security law at Utrecht University.
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January 26, 2012
Pamir Sahill, AAUNI, Prague, (6)
His analysis and policy approach to the conflict seems peaceful but not viable and practical. Moreover, his analysis is not objective and impartial. One can clearly feel soft-corner for Pakistan- a state which is the epicentre of terrorism and has a huge Military Business (MILBUS).
This is historically not correct that Pakistan feared (or now fears) Pashtun nationalism. Pakistan in very clear terms is in fact a geography (and not a state) which is under full control of Punjabi army and its notorious intelligence agency ISI. Thus, Pakistan doesn't allow any sort of nationalism- be it Pashtun, Baloch, Saraiki or Sindhi- in order to retain power in hands of generals. In Balochistan, a separatist-nationalist movement had begun in 1948 when Pakistan took over control of this autonomous, independent State from hands of Balochs. After that major uprising was crushed by military force in 1970s and then in 2000s (which still continues). Pakistan's generals have created a National Security State in the name of 'arch-enemy' India and keep deceiving its people in the name of Islam and try to keep so-called integrity intact.
In 1980s when US started supporting Mujahidin against Red Army in Afghanistan, Pakistan adopted its Strategic Interest policy towards Afghanistan because Afghanistan had centuries old relations with India. To keep Kabul weak and fragile and under its control, Pakistan created seven Mujahidin groups who became a reason of civil war in 1990s and Taliban emerged. Pakistan supported Taliban and invited renowned terrorists like Zawahiri, Osama etc. to Afghanistan and made this country a launching pad for global terrorism.
Author writes that Islamabad thinks Washington is not a reliable ally. It is completely flawed argument because right from the years of Jihad in Afghanistan, Islamabad was working on its two-faced strategy and this continues. In the garrison city of Pakistan, generals kept Osama bin Laden for 6 years and cheated global community that was united against terrorism.
Whether Afghanistan remains neutral, weak and peaceful or not, Pashtun nationalism and other nationalist movements in Pakistan will grow, erupt and evolve. Nationalism is a completely internal phenomenon of Pakistan as Punjabi generals are exploiting other nations living in the country. Was it Afghanistan or India supporting Saraikistan movement in Southern Punjab? Who was behind Jai Sindh movement in Pakistan? Why Bhutto family was killed by Punjabi generals? And who exactly is supporting Baloch nationalist movement?
As far as Kashmir's dispute is concerned, Pakistan has played a very visible role in destabilizing India through its proxy, hard-line Islamist militant groups like LeT, LJ, and SSP etc. Kashmir is of vital importance for Punjab's agriculture as the source of almost all Punjabi rivers is Kashmir and this dispute has never been a dispute of Muslims under cruel Indian rule but a strategic dispute.
Issue of Durand Line is also more than a century old and is not going to be resolved through regional peace treaty.
The one and only solution- that is key to regional and global peace- is to pressure Pakistan's army to such an extent that it is no more able and capable to intervene and interrupt democratic process in Pakistan. Army should be forced by global community to end supporting global and domestic militant and terrorist groups. All military aid should end abruptly and global powers should work hard to establish a true federal system in Pakistan where no nation has any sort of grievances.
Democracy and rule of law are key to regional peace and this can be established through weakening Realist armies in the region.
Durand Line Issue can be resolved in a very easy way, and that is to establish a mini-Schengen zone in the region around Durand Line (proposed by a scholar in France originally).
And, as a sovereign State, Afghanistan has a right to have any sort of cooperation and relation with any country in the region and no one can stop it from doing so. Neutrality is something else and Afghanistan has always been neutral.
Many thanks.