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The September 11 attacks resulted in a large and unprecedented commitment from the Alliance, which rapidly readjusted to meet this new dramatic challenge: within a very small period of time terrorism reached the top of NATO’s agenda. Undoubtedly, significant progresses have been made in almost a decade of dedication - the Alliance has built up a remarkable structural and strategic partnership schemes to fight terrorism, and positive achievements have been made. The question is: Is a hard-power alliance such NATO, created to face state-based military threats, suited for the fight against terrorism? On a more practical level, several obstacles and impediments seem to jeopardize NATO’s efforts.

The very nature of terrorism seems to limit NATO. The terrorist threat is highly asymmetric, demanding an asymmetric response which obviously cannot be provided by a mass military power such as NATO. Disrupting the increasingly fragmented terrorist menace is not a main military problem since NATO remains, at its core, a military organization unable to play more than a specific limited role in thwarting this scourge. Despite the fact that 9/11 shifted terrorism from its essentially domestic dimension to a global security concern, it is still widely believed that the primary responsibility to combat terrorism lies with individual states. This implies that the bulk of actions are undertaken at a bilateral level between state law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. In Europe in particular, terrorism is perceived as a crime, which can be best dealt with through counter-crime procedures and methods rather than militarily action. In this regard, transatlantic discrepancies on how to deal with the phenomenon hamper the extent to which the Alliance can expand its role. While the US supports a “war approach”, promoting a massive mobilization of assets and funds, even at the expense of individual freedoms - as the Patriot Act has outlined - most of Europeans consider it inappropriate to confront terrorism in terms of war, rather opting for a “risk management approach”. From the US perspective, pre-emptive measures are much more emphasized, compared to the widely espoused European view which yields to defensive measures and gives high priority to the use of “soft power”, namely relying on political, legal, diplomatic, economic and cultural efforts. Lasting divergences exist among European Allies, as they do not hold a common perception of the threat, nor do they have a completely united front on how to respond to terrorism. This is mainly due to different historical backgrounds regarding terrorist incidents, Muslim communities’ integration and varying anti-Americanism attitude.

When it comes to intelligence sharing, perhaps this is the first line of defense against terrorism, but within the NATO framework it still appears somehow fragile. Firstly NATO has no mandate for intelligence gathering nor does it possess its own intelligence sources - except when NATO forces are deployed – thus inevitably relying on member states information. The Alliance’s intelligence apparatus is hence devoted to interpreting information but cannot produce raw intelligence usable to prevent terrorism. Despite the increased “need to share rhetoric” following 9/11, there are significant cultural and technological barriers to translating this need into a core function. Not the least of which is distrust among intelligence services, which in the past used to work against each other. Bearing in mind that intelligence cooperation is essentially about building confidence in long term efforts, it should not be a surprise that the bulk of data sharing still occurs bilaterally. Far from being achieved, the multilateral intelligence-sharing approach rather seems to lead to global networking; however, the maintenance of bilateral relationships is currently preferred.

Operationally speaking, the only counter-terrorism operation NATO is currently involved in is Active Endeavour (OAE), aimed at patrolling Mediterranean and monitoring shipping in order to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity. Despite the fact that the number of warships involved was progressively pared back, the operation is limited by several factors. First and foremost, the boarding of a suspicious vessel can only be a “compliant boarding” – in all the other cases NATO forces can merely follow the vessel and alert the port of destination, whose authorities will proceed to inspection. Additionally, the operation depends greatly on the Automatic Identification System transmitter, which only ships over 300 tons are compelled to use. Identifying any smaller vessel is therefore unlikely and complicated. OAE is then hampered by the shortage of refueling ships, which are constantly under heavy demand for domestic needs. Taken as a whole, NATO’s role in the Mediterranean is predictably incomplete and constrained. NATO’s presence in the basin has become a well-known fact; consequently it is a disincentive for potentially illegal activities, including terrorism. Its role, however, should not be over-emphasized as one of combating counter-terrorism: it essentially represents a deterrent.

In almost a decade of fighting terrorism, the Alliance has shown its role here is highly limited and that it will not become a primary means of combating international terrorism. That said, its support for the campaign against terrorism is certainly of crucial importance, especially in providing a framework of coordination, granting a forum of discussion and offering a platform in which strategic information can be shared. Taking into consideration the financial constraints the Alliance is experiencing, NATO’s primary goal should be capitalizing on existing assets and better utilizing the established network of partnerships, particularly the MD (Mediterranean Dialogue) and ICI (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative). Efforts should certainly be undertaken to improve the intelligence-sharing process and deepen the cooperation, especially in the Arab region, where NATO shares a number of security interests and threats. In pursuing the requisite comprehensive approach, the Alliance should concentrate primarily on the military aspect of counter-terrorism. All other issues related to law enforcement, immigration, financial control, et cetera – major issues in the fight against terrorism - are well beyond NATO's area of competency and should be handled outside the Alliance.

Claudia Bernasconi holds a Master Degree (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Roma Tre, Italy. She also completed an Internship at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College. Her major fields of interests include: terrorism, transatlantic security and related issues.

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This article was submitted for the atlantic-community.org's competition: "Empowering Women in International Relations." It coincides with the 10th anniversary of the UN Resolution 1325 which calls for increasing the influence of women in all aspects of peace and security.

The contest is sponsored by the U.S. Mission to NATO and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

You can find out more about the competition here.