At first glance, recent developments on both sides of the Atlantic seem to bode for a significant improvement in EU-NATO relations. Key member states of both organisations have recognised the advent of a security environment which demands immediate and pragmatic transatlantic governance based on multiple approaches.
On one hand, while the United States still has a strong interest in maintaining influence in European security co-operation and some Americans with political clout remain hostile to ESDP’s existence, the government has come to view ESDP as a value creator rather than a current threat to NATO.
Indeed, due to hard-learned lessons on the ground, the US has placed more weight on civilian crisis management as part of security solutions and has begun to appreciate ESDP’s civilian capacities as both a model and operational resource. At the same time, France, ESDP’s long-time banner-waver, has taken the strategy-transforming step to rejoin NATO military structures and has recently stocked up its ISAF contingent. One would expect that these developments considerably ease pressures on fundamental inter-institutional relations and make room for still heated but more practical discussion of security roles and cooperation.
Despite the reduction of these basic tensions, however, relations between the two organisations will remain stalled without significant additional political efforts. Due to the complex web of Cyprus-Turkey-EU issues, intelligence-sharing between the EU and NATO essentially ceased when Cyprus joined the EU in 2004.
When one gains an overview of the consequences of this self-made “intelligence wall”, it quickly becomes clear that the EU and NATO cannot discuss virtually any short or long-term issues in a formal context. And while informal meetings have occasionally occurred, these have not been regular and have at times been blocked or cancelled due to objections of certain member states.
In practice, this means common strategic planning at regular intervals is off the table though ESDP and NATO face the same security threats. On-the-ground cooperation in countries where both NATO and ESDP missions are present is ad-hoc and requires painstaking negotiation. This ad-hoc requirement both exposes troops to unnecessary risk and, as Cornell University scholar Stefanie Hofmann points out, renders it impossible to evaluate achievements and shortcomings and develop best practices for future missions. Finally, even joint exercises have proven difficult to impossible to organise.
Despite these consequences, solutions remain frustratingly elusive. There are two main avenues for resolution, and the road to be taken may depend on opportunity and the development of the Cyprus negotiations.
A first option would be a “grand bargain” which resolved not just the NATO-ESDP question but also the underlying issues of the Cyprus conflict and possibly Turkey’s EU accession status. This seems unlikely to occur as the result of a desire to improve EU-NATO relations alone, but could become a possibility if there is resolution on one of the two other fronts.
The second possibility would be to continue issue-based negotiations isolated from the Cyprus conflict and Turkish accession issues. Such a deal might include an offer for Turkish associate membership in the EU’s Defence Agency, smaller carrots on accession talks, and bi- and multilateral side payments. The second option may seem more realistic, but has up to this point also proven unattainable. Most likely, real progress on an issue-based agreement would require significantly increased pressure from those NATO and EU member states in the position to yield a meaningful level and combination of carrots and sticks towards their reticent counterparts.
The international security environment has arguably become more rather than less threatening over the past few years due to increased instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and unresolved concerns on nuclear proliferation. Experts predict that rather than growing less dangerous, the future will hold new security challenges in addition to those posed by terrorism, failed states and proliferation due to the pressures of global warming, population growth and a race for resources. Placed in this light, it is clear that the NATO-ESDP intelligence wall is not a mere nuisance, but a major and pressing security liability if transatlantic and European partners are to work together to address and mitigate threats in the existing NATO framework. Should conditions for a “grand bargain” fail to materialise in the near future, it will be high time that member states in a position to force movement on an issue based-solution enhance their diplomatic efforts and get a deal done.
Jesse Kalata holds a B.A. in international relations at the Boston University and a M.A. in european studies at the University of Tübingen. She is currently pursuing her M.A. in international relations at the University of Cambridge.
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July 8, 2009
Olaf Theiler
At NATO, there is not a single day without stumbling over the blockages on NATO-EU relations. Operational issues like Afghanistan, Kosovo or Piracy and even the support for the AU in Darfur are constantly hampered by the difficulties of co-ordination and co-operation with the EU. NATO's efforts to improve its own contribution to a Comprehensive Approach are to remain fruitless without a smooth and daily working relationship with the EU. The Mediterranean Dialogue could profit and even the complex NATO-Russia relations are at least partly linked to NATO-EU relations simply due to the fact of the overlapping membership issue. These impressions are mirrored by the mentioning of the need to improve NATO-EU relations basically in each and every NATO Communiqué.
On the other hand, a comparable level of pain in In the EU’s daily work seems to be completely missing. Security issues are still only of marginal importance to staff in EU’s Council and Commission. This seems also to be the case for the national Foreign Ministries, where the need to improve NATO-EU relations is also felt only at the NATO side of the floors.
The sad fact is that the problem is considered as a high level priority only in the institutions that are least able to achieve any progress here. The homework has to be done in the EU and by the EU experts in Capitals, by exactly the people not feeling the pain at all. As long this situation is not changing, as long fishing quotas in the Mediterranean are seen as more important than sufficient troop protection for EU Policeman in Afghanistan, there will be no improvements in NATO-EU relations despite all the more than reasonable complaints and, sadly, despite all efforts of Turkey to take NATO hostage in order to make their point related to the EU and Cyprus.