Nuclear arms control and disarmament will be among the top issues on the
political agenda now and in the foreseeable future. It is an issue of
crucial strategic importance for Europe, and so one on which Europe
should articulate its own views. At the same time, this year will
determine whether US President Barack Obama's vision of a nuclear free
world will remain a distant but achievable hope, or whether it must be
abandoned. No one should today be under any illusions; even if all the
world's nuclear weapon states (NWS) rally behind the vision of a world
that will eventually be free of the threat of a nuclear conflict,
nuclear weapons will continue to exist for two decades at least, and
even that would require the most favourable conditions for disarmament
during all that time.
There are general reasons why 2010 is such a key year.
The
agreement signed in early April in Prague between Russia and the US
on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and possibly on further
cuts was accompanied by the publication in the US of the Obama
Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identifying the nuclear
capabilities the President wishes to preserve for the next four years.
Then there is the NPT review conference on the adapting the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation treaty to our rapidly changing world, and in front of
many policymaker's minds is the hope that before the year is out, 2010
will bring clarity on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes.
There
are today more than 23,000 nuclear weapons, some 40,000 fewer than
during the height of the Cold War, the total yield of these weapons is
nevertheless greater than 150,000 Hiroshima-size nuclear explosions.
Nuclear disarmament is therefore still urgently needed, and moves by
prominent politicians in the US and in Germany have produced the
US-led Global Zero initiative and the setting-up of the International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND)
sponsored by Australia and Japan and co-chaired by former Foreign
Ministers Yoriko Kawaguchi and Gareth Evans.
Nine-tenths of
nuclear weapons are owned by the US, Russia, France, the UK and China,
all signatories of the NPT, while between them India, Pakistan and
probably Israel possess some 1,000 weapons. North Korea presumably has a
few and Iran is most likely still pursuing a nuclear weapons programme.
Presidents Obama and Medvedev have agreed on a common objective of a
nuclear free world and agreed on cuts that will reduce their respective
strategic arsenals to 1550 weapons each. This is more by far than the
1,000 figure Barack Obama had in mind, but it is nevertheless a huge
step that could bring about further nuclear disarmament.
But the
road to global nuclear disarmament will be long and bumpy. To begin
with, the capacity to dismantle and destroy nuclear warheads
is rather limited, and it seems that it is virtually impossible to
increase it. Present capacity is some 500 weapons a year in both
countries which means that the total of 2000 weapons each which the
ICNND Report suggests for the year 2025 can't be fully implemented much
before 2028. Then there is the likely renaissance of nuclear power
plants to be taken into account. To come close to the targets that were
under discussion at the Copenhagen Summit, more nuclear power plants will
be unavoidable, leading to additional enrichment and reprocessing
facilities so that considerable quantities of fissile materiel are going
to be produced.
Continue reading the full article at Europe's World, atlantic-community.org's new partner.
General Klaus Naumann is a former chairman of NATO's military Committee.
Related Material:
- Alexandra Dobra: The Way to Denuclearize the World
- An End in Itself - Focus on First Steps!
- Jerome Grossman: Acepting American Hegemony




September 17, 2010
Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)
Additionally, there are several other fundamental flaws with the entire Global Zero movement:
1) Getting rid of each and every nuclear weapons, even if it could be done (which on its own is highly dubious), will not get rid of the knowledge to develop them, meaning that in a "disarmed" or "Global Zero" world, any nation that might have aggressive designs could re-establish a covert program and hold non-nuclear power states hostage. Maybe it wouldn't happen that way, but maybe it would. What leader of a nuclear power wants to be the person responsible for opening up their nationto nuclear blackmail when they once had the capacity to deter it?
2) The incentives different nations have to acquire (or pretend to acquire) nuclear weapons are multifarious and include concerns over regional security and, often, a lack of conventional military capability vis a vis regional comeptitors and rivals (see Pakistan). Absent a general disarmament that goes beyond just nuclear weapons, how do we get rid of those incentives?
A response to those two huge problems with "Global Zero" need to be addressed and addressed within the context of reality not utopias or legalistic frameworks that collapse under the pressure of exerted power. Until they are, which really means until human nature itself changes, this movement is an experiment in dangerously wishful thinking.
We have reduced our stockpiles in America a great deal as have the Russians. We are safer than during the Cold War notwithstanding the terrorist threat. To go much further than we have is to invite new strategic problems and even more instability than there already is in a world where instability is already making a distinct comeback.