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October 24, 2008 |  7 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

How to Unfold the New Iron Curtain

Member deleted While security problems around the world cry for the broadest coalition possible, NATO and Russia keep falling back into a Cold War state of mind. Moscow proposes a new European security deal as a long-term solution and has criticized the present system as outdated and US-dominated. A new plan is needed to address modern security threats, including climate change.

"The Warsaw Pact has not existed for almost 20 years," said Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and he added, "But unfortunately for us at least, the expansion of NATO is being carried out with particular fervor." This, according to Russia, undermines European security and a new treaty is necessary, devoid of ideology and based on national interests.

What should be the form of this new organization? What role should Central and Eastern European countries play in shaping it? What if the idea fails?

Medvedev outlined his proposal at the World Policy Conference in France, and the French President Nicholas Sarkozy was the first European leader to support it. The European Security Treaty would cover areas such as arms control, national military build-ups, counter-terrorism and drug trafficking. It would also ensure that no single organization or state, including Russia, dominates European security.

Moscow's proposal is an opportunity for Central and Eastern European leaders to achieve at least two goals: to change their image of being anti-Russian and to steer attention towards emerging security problems related to climate change and poverty. That would show they are no longer obsessed with old-fashioned territorial defense based on the fear of Russia. Countries such as Poland are often more suspicious of Moscow than Western European states. Overcoming this sentiment will boost their credibility on the European scene.

The European Union already recognizes many security implications of climate change. A document drafted jointly by major EU institutions in March 2008 states that "The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place." It says that increased tensions over falling water supplies in the Middle East will affect the EU's energy security and economic interests. Global warming will also deepen poverty in developing countries, boosting migration. Melting Arctic ice, revealing access to vast natural resources, has already triggered disputes between Russia and other states owning Arctic Ocean coastline, such as the US and Canada.

If politicians omit these new challenges from the discussion on the new security agreement, and focus only on traditional military problems and national interests, the chances for success will decrease. And what is the danger of the status quo?

On the one hand Russia is recovering as a military power. It recently conducted the biggest war game since the end of Cold War. According to military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, these maneuvers were aimed at "preparing for the eventuality of a nuclear war." Russia also agreed with Belarus to build a regional air defense system as a "shield against NATO." On the other hand, NATO's top commander, Gen. John Craddock, called for plans to protect Eastern Europe and Baltic States from potential Russian aggression.

The present Euro-Atlantic security structure guarantees insecurity and is ill-prepared to tackle new security threats. The new system requires forward-looking leaders. Are there any?

Kamil Zwolski is a researcher and teacher at the University of Salford, United Kingdom. He works in the field of European Union and international security.

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Marek  Swierczynski

October 24, 2008

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To be fair with the CE countries, they're not alone with their "obsession with old-fashioned territorial defense". Russia itself seems to be quite old-fashioned in security policy. For instance, it is the only country that develops and tests new ICBM's - something that resembles the cold war much more than the US missile defence installations. It is also very affectionate to "securing" territories outside its own borders, in the former Soviet buffer zone of satellite countries and Soviet Union republics. It opposes the CFE treaty and relocates newest tactical weapons to outposts like the Kaliningrad zone, making the CE countries even more "obsessed". And so on. All questions raised by the Author are relevant and should be adressed by the EU, NATO and Russia, as Europe's and world's security stakeholders. They should be discussed without prejudicies but in fairness, which should apply to all sides. On EU's side there seems to be a vision, namely the CSDP, introduced in the Lisbon Treaty - but the Treaty itself is in trouble. On NATO's side a serious debate is looming as the Alliance approaches its 60th anniversary and faces "defeat" in Afghanistan. What about Russia? The recent events did not show a great will for co-operation in security area with the remaining stakeholders, to say the least.
Tags: | EU | NATO | Russia |
 
Unregistered User

October 24, 2008

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Author is presenting a very interesting point in the discussion about European security issues. I have an impression however that the argument presented here is of a normative nature. Author is treating Russia as a stable, democratic and predictable partner with whom it is easy to make a deal and be sure that it will be respected. Russia might be recovering as a military power, but its economic power (GDP is about 6 times less than in USA) is far too low for the role it would like to play on the international scene.
 
John  Hadjisky

October 25, 2008

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I want to second the points made by Swierczynski and Lenarcik. Russia's behavior and security policies declare that there is nothing in which Russia believes other than old-fashioned, 19th and early 20th century spheres of influence and great power politics. Isn't this the attitude that let to the first World War? A stable, democratic, and predictable partner doesn't repeatedly threaten preemptive nuclear with its peaceful neighbors -- how is Poland a realistic threat to Russia? Only if we accept the old-fashioned paranoia of the Cold War and Mutually Assured Destruction can a regional defensive missile system be seen as some sort of covert, first strike initiative.

The author needs to defend his attempt to link Russo-European security arrangements to the issue of climate change. Yes, catastrophic climate change (for those who believe in it; so far we've only seen mild change that stopped for unknown reasons in 1998) would present security challenges in some regions of the globe, but not primarily for central Europe. Also, given the EU's current modest military capabilities and commitments, shouldn't EU resolve regional security questions (Georgia, former Yugoslavia) before addressing global security?

Finally, we come to statements like this:

"Countries such as Poland are often more suspicious of Moscow than Western European states. Overcoming this sentiment will boost their credibility on the European scene."

Only someone young and ignorant of history could reduce the distrust that Poland and countries like her feel for Russia to mere "sentiment". I wouldn't mind seeing closer relations between Russia and her Central European neighbors, but let's be honest, the barriers go far, far deeper than mere sentiment, and in recent history, most of the fault lies with Russia and Germany. Of these two countries, one has fully atoned, while the other has made only sporadic and token efforts, and is now entering a period of revisionist denial. Acknowledging this problem would increase European credibility on the central European scene.
 
Unregistered User

October 27, 2008

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The author’s point of view is balanced and forward-thinking. Thank you.

History of Europe offers lots of reasons for countries to point fingers at each other. It’s a loosing strategy. We all need to make an effort and remove obstacle on the way of broad European cooperation.
 
Member deleted

November 3, 2008

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Dear John,

Thank you for your comment, it is highly appreciated. I am young indeed, but I don't think I am ignorant. As a Pole, I very much understand and appreciate the depth of the Polish distrust towards Russia. It is understandable and if we started talking about it, I would probably find even more reasons for this distrust than you would.

However, imagine how much the two world wars deepened the distrust among western states. Yet European states managed to overcome divisions. Now it is time to do the same for the Central and Eastern European states and Russia, even though Moscow does not seem ready for reaching out, but neither do states like Poland.

In this sense my article indeed is normative as Marek suggested. But I believe that the change of relations in Europe is possible just like it happened after the WWII. Even if it will take more time.
 
Unregistered User

November 5, 2008

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It is the only country that develops and tests new ICBM's - something that resembles the cold war much more than the US missile defence installations. It is also very affectionate to "securing" territories outside its own borders, in the former Soviet buffer zone of satellite countries and Soviet Union republics. It opposes the CFE treaty and relocates newest tactical weapons to outposts like film izle the Kaliningrad zone, making the CE countries even more "obsessed". And so on.
 
John  Hadjisky

November 8, 2008

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Kamil,

Thanks for your response. I too look forward to a day when these divisions can be forgotten. As an American with some central European heritage, I understand that anything is possible, especially after our recent election.

My reluctance to support a policy of reaching out to Russia is simple: When there is a trend towards truth and reconciliation, it is appropriate and necessary to make a special effort to reach out. Those efforts ideally should be bi-lateral, but even unilateral efforts are worth the attempt. That was the case for several years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Tragically, trends have changed, opportunities were squandered, and that moment has now passed. It is simply no longer realistic to pretend that outreach is the right approach.

I am particularly puzzled by the European reflex to reach out to the current Russian government, as if traditional diplomacy is the only legitimate tool in the soft-power kit. Given the current conditions, and the many failures of traditional diplomacy, it seems far more promising to use a non-traditional approach. We should be making overtures to movements like The Other Russia. We should engage the Kremlin only the bare minimum amount needed to keep the peace, and otherwise ignore their attention-seeking machinations.
 

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