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As winter approaches, Iran’s leaders in Tehran will be satisfied that for much of 2011 the world’s attention has been drawn to the Arab Spring. In particular, the ongoing problems in Egypt, war in Libya, and continued violence in Syria are welcome distractions from the biggest threat that faces the Middle East - Iran’s nuclear program.

No one in Tehran can be ignorant of the determination in some nations - publicly Israel and the US, but privately many others - to prevent Iran from ever owning a nuclear weapon. This determination is only matched by Iran’s resolve to do so. Therefore, much of what happens in the years leading up to the culmination of Iran’s nuclear program will be geared to shaping the emergency that program will create.

What will be the response to that emergency? Do, for example, US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan make a military incursion against Iran more, or less, likely? Does the US military withdrawal from Iraq free up veteran forces for a future operation in Iran or, after such a bloodied experience, deter them from putting troops in another large country with a hostile population? The Ayatollahs will obviously hope the latter.

Certainly, the enduring calamities which followed swift victories against Saddam and the Taliban regime will influence future decisions on whether to unleash US military capabilities. However, rather than forestall military action they may simply shape the type of action taken. While there will be little appetite in Washington to fall into a Persian quagmire, the Libyan campaign was a timely reminder that national objectives can be met without taking the risks associated with putting boots on the ground.

In Tehran, the ease with which western air and maritime power shaped events in Libya should cause some concern. Whilst Iranian leaders may feel that their air defenses, regular and especially revolutionary guard forces are superior to Gaddafi’s military, Libya was not an exception; in the Balkans and Iraq (twice) Western forces swept aside opposition with significant air defense arsenals. Libya is not Iran, but the US (and any allies) would not need the enduring presence required in Libya to achieve a decisive effect on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Libya limits the comfort Iran can take from the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is easy to forget that western forces have been continually fighting wars or conducting real operations since 1991. The effect of 20 years’ warfare on technological development and military capabilities has been immense, but is often overlooked. In contrast, over that period Iran has struggled to modernize its military while under severe international sanctions. Tehran may trumpet the development of new midget submarines, aircraft, and anti-ship missiles but in reality this indigenous equipment is inferior in quality and performance to what may be employed against it. It is doubtful Iran could protect its (known) nuclear facilities from military attack so a key question for Iran’s leaders is: can they be sure that any secret facilities remain hidden from US or Israeli intelligence services? If not, these are also at risk. Tehran’s best hope is therefore to keep military action off the table.

Since diplomatic solutions are critical to Iranian interests, the alleged assassination plot in Washington is a bizarre episode. Rather than attempting mental gymnastics to unravel what the intricate motive for such an attack might be, perhaps the possibility it was simply a mistake based on bad judgment is more likely. The detailed analysis of policy that liberal societies are used to is conspicuously absent in Iran, removing an important brake on, frankly, stupid decisions. While observers are quick to blast NATO or the US for a lack of cultural understanding in foreign endeavors, the failure of Afghans, Arabs, or here, Persians to comprehend the West is routinely ignored. Even pontificating ayatollahs make mistakes.

From a military perspective, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya offer Tehran scant reassurance. The costly investment in blood and treasure has informed and enhanced western military capabilities, keeping alive the potential for limited military action. If the Arab Spring cultivates democracy, moderation, and stronger states with Sunni majorities Iran will be unhappy. Neither will it wish to lose influence in Syria or see Iraq and Afghanistan prosper under governments linked to the West. This year may have produced some welcome distractions but if current circumstances result in Iran’s increased isolation, its nuclear ambitions will suffer, and 2012 may prove to be a far more difficult year.

Paul Smyth has 30 years' association with the defense arena, as a military officer and later as a Head of Program at the Royal United Services Institute. He is currently the owner of R3I Consulting.