Madeline Albright was phlegmatic in 1999 on the treatment of alleged Kurdish terrorists by EU memberstates. Inaction, possibly apathy, worst of all weakness, were laid at the door of the bloc. In the dust kicked up by the September 11th attacks too few saw that the American policy of a conventional military response to fourth generation, 'irregular', warfare had been quietly critiqued as lacking pragmatism by Europe's leaders ever before Robert Kagan (2002) cast this side of the pond as weak and Venusian and America as Mars. America, he contended, was conditioned by power to exercise it early and often and Europe benefited from having a man in the house.
Such dichotomies are unhelpful, even asinine, and this article rectifies an imbalance in the discourse with the benefit of hindsight in 2010: surveying the aftermath of the mixture of technocratic, draconian and interventionist policies pursued by administrations in the United States and Britain which have since been rejected by their voters.
The lack of proportionality of response by the United States and its allies to terrorist attacks on its soil undermined its noble rhetoric and soured relations unnecessarily with its essential partner - Europe. Europe's focus was not merely more pragmatic but truer to the spirit of human rights and international criminal law; even if it was and is far from perfect. Indeed, it is more difficult to speak of a unitary 'Europe' anyway when it is a 27-member supranational organisation with a primary competence in regulating the common market unlike the entirely sovereign and unitary United States.
In sum, we need to remind ourselves that terrorism is a security issue with an impact out of all proportion to its relatively low material cost (compared to crises of malnutrition or disease or traditional organised crime) and if it is supposedly a 'clash of civilisations' (which I dispute) then it is surely the case that the 'West' needs to show in its words and actions why it is 'the bigger man' and worthy of being defended in the face of violence by those bent on establishing Islamic theocracy. Our conduct has thus far been unbecoming and is apt for the demonisation of a society that ought to represent the refinement of the 18th century enlightenment.
James Cussen is a student at University College Cork
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April 11, 2011
Chris Hawkins, University of Sussex, Silver Contributor (27)
1) As the author correctly points out, with 27 members with a variety of interests it is extremely difficult to establish a unified position on matters. Not only is this a very difficult process, but when a unified position is established, for example the EU's Common Strategy on Russia, bilateral dealings and disputes undermine what has been achieved.
2) Yes, the EU has a wonderful normative agenda promoting democracy, human rights etc. But what kind of leverage does the EU have to enforce this normative agenda. This is perhaps the key challenge for the EU. Without the means to back up this agenda, they are simply empty words. As a result, it can have a detrimental effect on relations with potentially key partners such as Russia.
3) With a rotating presidency it can often be the case that issues, particularly in foreign and security policy, tend to fluctuate in position on the EU's agenda, depending on which member holds the presidency. Again, using Russia as an example, under a Finnish presidency, Russia would assume a relatively high position on the EU's agenda. However, for another member state, for example Spain, Russia would fall down in perceived importance. This, coupled with the first point, creates a situation whereby it is extremely difficult to formulate effective policy and thus become a true global power. All three of these points, though, along with many other problemes, come together to show how the EU is certainly ill prepared to meet new global security challenges, along with other foreign policy challenges.