RSS

Lack of action by an opponent can easily be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness. No major high profile Al Qaeda attack has taken place since the May 2 killing of Osama Bin Laden. The organization has lost quite a few biggies. Its operations are in shambles. It is merely attempting to survive rather than expand or even strike back to vindicate its leader's death.

Several such assessments have emerged from the United States after May 2, all suggesting newfound confidence in strategically defeating Al Qaeda, once and for all. In the wake of the death of Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, the number two in the organisation in a Central Intelligence Agency drone attack on August 22 in Pakistan, such assessments have gained strength.

On August 31, White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan described Al Qaeda as being "on a steady slide", "on the ropes" and "taking shots to the body and head." Leon E. Panetta, who took over as US Defense Secretary, affirmed that American focus has narrowed to capturing or killing 10 to 20 crucial leaders of the terrorist group in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. Within a month, media reports were quoting unnamed CIA sources indicating that only "a relatively small number of additional blows could effectively extinguish" Al Qaeda.

According to these new assessments, 1,200 Al Qaeda militants have been killed since 2004 and 224 have been killed this year alone. Violence by Al Qaeda proper "as the global, borderless, united jihad" may end soon.

This new wave of confidence, however, is contradicted by some a consideration of other threat assessments of Al Qaeda. First, Al Qaeda's core leadership and structure is intact in Pakistan. Ayman al-Zawahiri is suspected to be in Pakistan. Even after Atiyah Abd al-Rahman's death, attempts to get these top leaders will be difficult, considering the strained US-Pakistan relations. This gives the terrorist leadership a fair chance to survive and revive. They can build and rely on regional affiliates like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Haqqani network and others to carry out symbolic and high profile attacks.

Second, Al Qaeda continues to be supported by anti-US regimes and will continue to survive US military onslaughts. Iran has been accused by the US of aiding Al Qaeda. On July 28, documents filed by the US Treasury Department accused Iran of facilitating an Al Qaeda-run support network that transfers large amounts of cash from Middle East donors to Al Qaeda's top leadership in Pakistan's tribal region. Earlier, Washington has accused Teheran of supporting militias inside Iraq and Afghanistan that carry out attacks against the American forces.

Third, a chemical or biological attack by Al Qaeda and its offshoots remains a valid threat. Mike Leiter, who retired as director of the US National Counterterrorism Centre early July, has said that despite the killing of Osama bin Laden, there are "pockets of Al Qaeda around the world who see" using chemical and biological weapons "as a key way to fight us, especially the offshoot in Yemen." Another major concern is nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorists in Pakistan and proliferation concerns stemming from states like North Korea.

Fourth, a substantial number of US citizens have developed links with Al Qaeda. They may be assets for the terrorist organization within the US homeland. A recent US congressional report indicates that the Somalia based al-Shabab has recruited 40 Muslim Americans and 20 Canadians to be part of its terrorist campaign in the African country.

And lastly, even if one accepts that Al Qaeda is disintegrating into regional organizations with limited reach, the spectre of lone wolf terrorists brings no respite. The failed plot to blow up an explosives-packed vehicle in Times Square last May (2010) was carried out by a Pakistani-American trained by the Pakistani Taliban.

The July 22 Norway attacks demonstrated that a lone self-radicalized terrorist can equal or even surpass the efforts of an organized global terrorist outfit.

All these trends are derived from various recent assessments of the US intelligence and certainly are not views the US government is unaware of.

What then explains the inordinate hurry to declare a military victory or write an obituary for Al Qaeda? It may be due to the difficulty of sustaining an economically unsustainable military effort against a thoroughly dispersed enemy. Or it may spring from the desire to claim political benefits from an assumed victory, especially in view of President Barack Obama's re-election bid in 2012.

Underplaying the latent but potent threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and then retreating in such a hasty manner when the conditions for such organizations to thrive haven't been addressed, seems risky. The existing infrastructure, training, funding and support networks - especially in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia - still need to be reckoned with right now. The need to engage radical Islamists and focus on effective deradicalization programs as part of the counter-terrorism effort should therefore be clear. Such effort needs to be sustained and coordinated, and must be undertaken alongside host nations, not without them.

Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS); Bibhu Prasad Routray is a Visiting Research Fellow with the South Asia Programme of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.