Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

July 1, 2011 |  6 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

Felix F. Seidler

NATO Needs Global Partners for the Global Commons

Felix F. Seidler: Despite financial constraints, the transatlantic partners must tackle the 21st century’s challenges together. However, the allies will be unable to pursue their interests on the global commons without new partners. Therefore, NATO should push cooperation with global partners who share our values.

Despite Robert Gates' "two-tier" wake-up call, NATO is a budgetary one-tired alliance of broke states. However, all 28 Allies with highly strained resources share the need to tackle the new geopolitical environment. The US is likely to turn inwards and towards Asia, whereas the EU will never make its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) work. But turning inwards accompanied by a steady look to Asia will not be enough to handle the four global commons (air, space, sea and cyberspace) and the security of resources in times of enormous geopolitical shifts. China will not wait until all NATO allies have saved their budgets. Thus, it is time for the transatlantic partners to focus together on common strategic interests.

Even if Mr. Gates is partially right to highlight the `collective military irrelevance´of Europe, the ongoing struggle for the control of the global commons and resources will, in the end, not be decided by the number of aircraft carriers, boots on the ground or ammunition supplies. Yet this will be the most important struggle of the 21st century. Instead, as geopolitical weights shift, the US and Europe are not capable of acting politically the way they want to on all global commons and the resource questions. Look at China´s or India´s activities in Africa, Russia´s status in energy security or at China´s and Russia´s role in space and cyberspace; all without the means that Mr. Gates considers relevant. And precisely because of constrained budgets, the transatlantic partners have to work together if they want to protect their common interests.     

When NATO tackles the global commons, it needs to seek partners worldwide. Beyond the Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) , the alliance only has worldwide partnerships with the `Contact Countries´ Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. But the PfP, MD and ICI are no more than military dialogue programs; although quite valuable ones as the Libya crisis has shown. However, what NATO needs to pursue its interests is strategic partnerships rather than such activities. All allies like the Contact Countries share the interests of freedom of movement in the air and on the seas, a secure cyberspace and the prevention of the militarization of space. Furthermore, these 32 states most importantly share the pillar of democracy. All share a desire not only to keep this pillar stable but also to spread it to other countries; even if there are some differences over 'how' this should be achieved.

The rise of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) represents a new global block. But it is not in the interests of the transatlantic partners that the democracies of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) align too closely with Russia and China in particular. Given the rivalry between China and India alone, BRICS will never become a military block. So why does a military alliance like NATO have a role to play in this great game? IBSA is pushing for military cooperation, for example through joint naval exercises. And especially on the seas, but also in space, cyberspace and for the security of resources, IBSA, NATO and the Contact Countries share, based on a common democratic pillar, the interests of secure sea and communication lanes, the prevention of cyberwar and the peaceful use of space and cyberspace. Because they are free market economies, none of these countries are interested in resource conflicts.

Intensified cooperation with IBSA and the Contact Countries is quite an ambitious project. Moreover, due to inner-alliance differences, other states reactions, e.g. China or Russia, and reservations within the seven desired partner countries a trilateral NATO-Contact Countries-IBSA cooperation is unlikely in the foreseeable future. However, due to its common pillar and common interests, NATO should not dismiss starting on this track. As such, first step cooperation and dialogue with Contact Countries on all global commons, especially sea lanes and cyberspace, must be intensified. Secondly, NATO should seek to reach out to IBSA by starting with low level dialogue that can be pushed and intensified over the next years. Moreover, with the NATO-India dialogue and joint NATO-South Africa naval exercises, there is already a basis to start from. Later on, based on longer cooperation and identified common interests, Contact Countries and IBSA could be brought on the same NATO table to discuss the global commons.   

There has been significant criticism of NATO´s partnership activities. It is indeed true that over 1,400 means for cooperation make for an impervious jungle. NATO therefore needs a more streamlined partnership structure. Nonetheless, as the Libya crisis has shown, criticism of NATO for seeking partnerships with countries it has no direct dealings with is wrong. Before the Arab Spring and Libya, very few people valued the MD and ICI. Now, many people should be happy to have established contacts and cooperation with these countries.

Future crisis are likely to be related to the global commons. But the more the broke transatlantic partners 'two-tier', the less they will be able to pursue their interests in a multipolar world. Instead, NATO must adapt its partnership policy to a further multi-polarizing world. The alternative is the looming collective irrelevance of the alliance´s strategic interests on the 21st century horizon.

Felix F. Seidler graduated with an M.A. in political science from Würzburg University and blogs about security policy at Seidlers Sicherheitspolitik.

  • 8
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
 
Comments
Unregistered User

July 3, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Mr. Seidler,
Congratulations on your well written report.
When you propose IBSA, NATO and Contact Countries, such as Australia,
to seek partnerships, which could materialize in NATO-India, as well as
NATO- South Africa naval exercises with the intention to put a wedge between
Russia, China and now IBSA, NATO and Australia, for example, or simply
marginalize BRISC, you seem to elevate NATO to bogeyman practitioner.
Yes, there is a need for controlling and protecting and not exploiting global commons and resources, as you say it, but let me put this into perspective:
The commons are actually resources that are collectively owned and shared between or among populations. Part of the commons are, let me say "life commons" e.g. the human
genome or rather the quality of Human Capital.
It would mean sharing responsibility, accountability, etc. within the scope of our values, such as freedom and liberty.
But like Greek history teaches, the freedom as an individual has its differences when compared to an individual living within a society, multi-polar or otherwise....
But this is what it is all about, competitive cooperation and not wasteful confrontation.

Recently a Chinese submarine penetrated one of a US aircraft carrier battle group
without being noticed. In addition India and Russia are developing super torpedoes (speed ), which are marginalizing US naval superiority.
These are the battle groups parading up and down the China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
And on the other side of the globe we are resorting to hunting people from
unmanned aircraft.

But before bullets and missiles are flying, they need to be manufactured and paid for.
You are right, we are living in times of enormous shifts.
A economic Ponzi mentality," the belief in non existing reality combined with the old fool theory", combined with integrated recessions, not only created a unseen polarization of capital, but also Bank Holding Groups, which almost questions the value of a country's
sovereignty.
It is now not only about the poverty of people, but also the level of deficit of sovereign countries.
And with the excess liquidity floating around, it is now a question of for how much a
country can be acquired for, no need for military.
With that however military objectives will be more focused and sophisticated, especially as it is becoming trendy, as to how much one can steal through cyberspace.
Finally, as Thomas Jefferson suggested in 1802, when banking holdings arrive to control
currencies through inflation and deflation they will become more dangerous to our liberty
( our values ) than standing armies. The time will then come, when the children will not be able to sleep on the land their fathers once conquered.-------

How does NATO fit into all this.

HRF
 
Felix F. Seidler

July 3, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear HRF,

Thank you for your interesting comment.

My intention is not to “put a wedge between BRICS”. Neither is breaking up or marginalizing BRICS possible, nor would a military alliance be a mean for a try. As we have seen this week, moreover, BRICS, together, voted against a UN Security Council resolution in case of Syria.

My argument was, however, that it is not in transatlantic partner´s interest that IBSA “align too closely with Russia and China”. NATO is not the “bogeyman”, rather one mean that the 28 states (plus further partners) have in this great game.

Furthermore, US/NATO naval superiority will not be marginalized as soon. You are right, China, India and Russia are developing many military capabilities (e.g. SSN/SSBN subs, aircraft carriers, ballistic missiles, stealth fighters and many more). But most of these projects are far from full operational capability or combat proficiency. Thus, there is some time left for the allies.

Finally, NATO is a military alliance and, therefore, cannot be a political forum or mean in any case to regulate the financial market, fight poverty, reduce government debt, reform the economy, achieve gender equality or save the environment. These are jobs states have to do themselves or within the EU, G8, G20, WTO, IMF, UN or other forums and organizations.

Let me conclude, in times of financial overstraining accompanied by a new great game, henceforth, states are very advised to use NATO what it was made for and what it can do best, beside combat operations: First, as a political discussion form (Art. 4 NATO treaty) for strategy and security policy; Second, a mean to pursue allies interests. As this website points out, moreover, “today´s transatlantic agenda”, whether discussion topics or interests, “is global”. In times of the reemergence of geopolitics, the transatlantic alliance has to adapt.
 
Unregistered User

July 3, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Herr Seidler,

Thank you for responding to my opinions.
It is not surprising for me to see your response to my mentioning
of military hardware development by China, India and perhaps Russia.
You are right, it will take some time for this hardware to achieve combat proficiency.

Thus, as you say, there is some time left for the allies------ but to do what.
And that is exactly what you don't want to do. Therefore there is no need for a new
NATO as most envision it and even more, cannot afford it.

HRF


Tags: | tx |
 
Unregistered User

July 12, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Mr. Seidler,

Congratulations on an excellent article. I think you are right, and that it is important to implement policies along the lines you suggest.

You are too modest in disavowing the goal of "driving a wedge" within BRICS. It is a worthy goal, one in the shared human interest, not anything to be ashamed of.

BRICS, unlike the Atlantic Community, has no organic unity or positive shared purpose in itself. It is a disparate coalition thrown together almost solely for the sake of opposing the global leadership of the Atlantic Community. There is every reason for the Atlantic community, which does have a positive purpose in the world, to make use of BRICS's lines of division. Positive use, in the global meaning of “positive”.

BRICS will inevitably eventually dissolve, some of its members meanwhile joining the Atlantic community, probably first Russia then Brazil. This can be expected to happen long before BRICS' much-predicted collective overtaking of the Atlantic community GDP several decades hence. We should do what we can to encourage it to happen sooner, not discourage it out of a misplaced admiration for BRICS, or out of inattention to our differentiated partnerships among its members.

O'Neill himself, inventor of "BRIC" at Goldman Sachs, explained that he did so out of an ideological motive -- to find a vehicle for reducing the Western role in the world order -- not just the motive of making profits by getting investments to flow to his clients in the south. Obviously there has been a widespread market for this ideological motive; and, also, for believing in Western decline, which has been serving as a way of passing off the undermining of Western global roles as objective and inevitable.

Nevertheless, reality stands in contrast to this ideology. OECD has 70% of world GDP, BRICS under 20%. The talk of our decline, despite its near unanimity, comes close to being pure myth-making. We could, to be sure, find a way eventually to decline, but only if we fail to continue with our historic policy -- since 1947 a conscious cumulative policy, and long before that an intermittent trend -- of integrating the Atlantic community and prudently expanding its membership. "Prudently" is to be understood here in a necessarily dual sense: not rushing, out of a universalism that is unrealistically immanent and turns destructive, to extend membership recklessly or proffer vetoes that will be ill-used; but not neglecting, out of laziness or outmoded prejudices, to integrate former enemies and neutrals who have come onto the market as potential allies. And -- what reconciles these two prudences -- combining the continued gradual widening of the community with its continued gradual deepening.

In this regard, you make perhaps a tactical mis-step, seemingly treating Russia as a fixed adversary, not considering the ambiguity of its strategy and identity, not discussing our NATO partnership with it as something that holds future potentiality. You might want to look into the history of this partnership, from Russia's reorientation toward joining the West after 1988, to its urgent overtures from 1989-92 on this, to its sense of rejection and being left at sea without anchor; leading to Primakov's floating of an alternative geopolitical orientation -- a Russia-China-India triangle -- long before O'Neill took up the idea in the form of BRIC; and Russia's balancing of these two orientations ever since, using BRIC as a threat-and-bargaining chip for getting better deals with the West, keeping its ultimate choice open.

I am glad you want to upgrade the partnership with India. One of the venues for further development of this partnership is by connecting it, when useful, with our partnership with Russia. This has much larger potential than dealing with India in connection with SA and Brazil.

There is a strategically urgent mass of shared interests between the West, Russia, and India, in dealing with the instabities and enmities emanating from the geographical space in-between them. This space -- the Middle East and Central Asia -- has been the primary source of global strategic trouble and risk for twenty years. It will remain a powerful source of such troubles for a generation to come. A triangular relation in pursuing these shared interests would be a way of upgrading our partnerships with both great powers, Russia and India.

There was an opportunity for forming a fairly strong triangular alliance in 1998-9, with the wars in Daghestan and Kargill, when for the first time the U.S. government explicitly supported the Russian and Indian militaries as "allies" in their battles against enemies that were heavily into terrorism and Islamism. Inertia -- meaning, mostly, inherited historical prejudices against Russia and in favor of Pakistan -- prevented a consolidation of the relation that time, and led to a Western regression toward neutrality in both cases. The occasion was lost, but not the logic. If anything, the logic has matured. By now we should understand that our problems with Pakistan and other in-between areas are going to endure for another generation or more, and will not be solved by any short-term measure. We need to upgrade our permanent capabilities for bringing influence to bear on this region -- both consistent support and consistent pressures, brought to bear by consistent cooperation among Rusia, India, and the West. While full consistency will always elude us within any grouping, even NATO, we have an enormous interest in upgrading our mutual consistency among the three powers in dealing with this region.

Our shared interest in this space is also a shared global interest, in the sense of being shared by all major legitimate interests and forces in the world. Including the legitimate interests of the peoples of the Islamic world, even if it is an interest often traduced by Islamist and nationalist passions in the region. And the legitimate interests of the people of China -- a national interest that is pretty well understood, yet still traduced by the Chinese regime's geopolitical habit of prioritizing the promotion of forces (such as Pakistani nuclear forces) unwelcome to the West.

The day will come for a closer partnership with China also; and will come for upgrading some of the specific partnerships with some Islamic countries. For now, as you have said, we need to be discriminate. Not prejudicially discriminating (i.e. discriminating out of outmoded or unfounded prejudices), but rationally discriminating. To develop our partnerships further, by prioritizing where we can make progress, and make sure of doing so in a way that adds to capabilities rather than obstructing them -- interlocking, not interblocking, to recall a 1990s NATO phrase.

Yours faithfully,
Ira
Tags: | BRIC | decline | OECD | India | Russia | NATO |
 
Felix F. Seidler

July 13, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Ira,

Thanks for the kind and well elaborated comment.

However, I BRICS will not break up. The party has just begun. China will surely put more effort in BRICS, which will stabilize the block. Moreover, nobody can predict whether a demographically marginalized Russia will turn west- or eastwards. This depends on where Moscow´s elites feel treated better. In addition, it is more likely that BRICS is joined by more countries which want to pursue their interests by intensified south-south cooperation. Potential candidates are Indonesia, Mexico and, despite the South China Sea conflict, ASEAN; would be BRICSAM. Furthermore, on the long run, one may also think about Argentina, Chile, or Nigeria; perhaps even others.

Western decline is happening, undoubtfully. Debt and demography don´t lie.

Moreover, we have to differ between absolute and relative decline. Absolute decline is the rising or shrinking of number (soldiers, GDP, etc.). Relative decline is the shrinking of distance between the powers of players. Players face relative decline when their power grow less fast than other player´s power. Now absolute like relative Western decline are happening. Worsen numbers? Look at government’s budgets, demography, and military spending. Relative decline? Compare the growth in military, economy and demographics form BRICS(AM) or elsewhere to Western numbers.

Due the financial crisis and decades of realpolitik-partnerships with dictators Western governments, furthermore, cannot boast their soft power. As we saw during the Arab Spring/Facebook Revolution, the Western strength is the soft power of its civil societies, but not of its governments.

Global geopolitics is changing to Western disadvantage. However, the West is lacking politicians with a proficient understanding of this matter and, above all, with the ability to create a grand strategy dealing with this new environment.


 
Unregistered User

July 26, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
The most important strategic alliance for all the countries worldwide is the economic alliance. Few countries are declining economically and many developing countries are emerging as new economic opportunities. The economically declining countries would like to use NATO for self serving purpose and would like to impose NATO as an organization in which the dissent of member countries is not tolerated.

On the contrary, the more NATO gets involved in the current and future projects the more likely that the alliance member states would review its role in the NATO. Currently the NATO alliance is only unified organization on paper; however, in reality it is only few member states that participate or fund the projects.

Hans Reuther-Fix is totally correct in his posted question the authors of the article "there is some time left for the allies------ but to do what." What is the author of this article asserting to? It seems that few NATO countries are welcoming new project confrontations. The rest of the world, including outgoing NATO member states, are moving forward to economic prosperity while few NATO states are stuck in the Cold War mentality.
 

Create Comment

Type the characters shown in the image below into the textfield.
Captcha

What are tags?

Community

Jobs / Internships

Call for Papers

Atlantic Events

Partners

User of the day

Jean-Paul  Gagnon
Jean-Paul Gagnon
Member since
May 16, 2011

Poll

Should NATO intervene in Syria?