It has become popular in recent years to argue that
NATO is no longer serving the interests of either the Europeans or the
Americans. Many such arguments end with
the suggestion that the European Union should take over responsibility for
defense of European interests, variously accomplished by the United States
withdrawing from NATO and "Europeanizing" the alliance or making the alliance a
bilateral US-EU operation.
And, there is a legitimate American complaint: the Europeans have always to some extent been
free-riders on the defense commitments and efforts of their North American
ally. Just as other Americans argued
during the Cold War that NATO burdens were inadequately shared, voices today
are rising to complain about the inability of NATO allies to support US security
requirements.
But, the Europeans have a legitimate concern as
well: their political and military
shortcomings tend to enhance American dominance of security and defense
decisions that affect their vital interests.
The unilateralist character of US foreign and defense
policy under George W. Bush led some Europeans to favor using integration in
the European Union to "balance" US power in the international system. This
multi-polar temptation, like the US unilateral temptation,
threatened trans-Atlantic cooperation and therefore international stability.
The failure of the EU Constitution undermined the
argument that Europe could effectively balance US power, and strengthened the
case for building Europe in parallel with maintenance of a cooperative transatlantic
relationship-a position favored by several EU members led by the U.K. and many
of Europe's new democracies. The
emergence of serious fissures in Europe's
financial edifice has raised even more questions about the pace and ultimate
destiny of European integration.
At the end of the day, there are two basic
requirements for NATO to be perceived as important enough for the member states
to ensure its survival. Put most simply, the United States must be convinced
that political and military cooperation with the European allies makes an
important net contribution to US interests. On the other side of the coin,
Europeans must believe that contributing to international security efforts
alongside the United States
will produce influence for Europe over US
decisions that affect their security. These are the fundamental terms for
continuation of a vital, productive transatlantic bargain.
Will the NATO members continue to find NATO
cooperation to their advantage, even against the backdrop of their mutual "legitimate"
complaints, intensified in recent years by the difficult experience in Afghanistan?
Only time will tell. However, history suggests that, in spite of their
differences, the United States
and Europe will have little choice but to try
to keep their act together, including defense cooperation in NATO.
Dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and
managing most other aspects of transatlantic relations demand more effective
transatlantic cooperation in political, economic, financial, and social as well
as military aspects of the relationship.
This calls for continued evolving and enhancing of transatlantic
cooperation, not searching for some other option, as intellectually stimulating
and psychologically satisfying as that exercise might be.
The burden of proof rests on those who argue that the
bargain is no longer working. In the
real world, they must produce not only critiques of current arrangements but
credible alternatives that would serve North American and European interests
more effectively.
The transatlantic bargain will survive in part because
the security of the member states cannot be ensured through national measures
alone. It will survive because the member states will continue to recognize
that imperfect multilateral cooperation serves their interests better than a
myriad of bilateral arrangements or no cooperation at all. NATO will be adapted
to meet new challenges. And the value foundation of the transatlantic bargain
will persist, in spite of differences over specific issues and shifting
patterns of member state interests.
It will survive in part because the bargain is not
just NATO. In fact, recent trends suggest that there is much more creative
thought and political momentum behind enhancing transatlantic cooperation
rather than diminishing it. As Lawrence S. Kaplan has observed, "The
transatlantic bargain still resonates in the twenty-first century." As a
result, this bargain in the hearts and minds of the member states has become as
close as one could imagine to being a "permanent alliance."
Stanley R. Sloan teaches international relations at Middlebury, College, Vermont, and lectures frequently at the NATO College in Rome.
This article is based on his latest book: Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama.
Related Materials:
- Donatella Scatamacchia: NATO Needs the Mediterranean in Afghanistan
- Greg Randolpf Lawson: Opening the Door to Great Power Conflict



June 28, 2010
Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)
While NATO has played an extremely significant role in Afghanistan, the complexity of this situation and the lack of clairty of what an end goal will be (especially with the US withdrawal timeline looming and the significant changes of personnel from McChrystal to Petraeus) leaves many questions about NATO's viability in other extra-European theatres open.
Meanwhile, fiscal austerity within many NATO nations (Germany being the most prevalent recent example) seems to show that Europe will actually spend far less on its military capabilities in the near term than it has as it grapples with debt and various fiscal imbalances. This combined with public attitudes already reticent to engage in military conflict of any kind cannot be seen as a portent of overly positive European support for the alliance as it relates to key security issues emanating from the Middle East or Asia.
NATO will survive in a form, but it will not be in a form that addresses many of the multifarious security needs of the US. Consequently, the US will find itself seeking cooperation with other nations and regions more and more with India and Japan likely to be paramount in the near to medium term.