The Iranian nuclear program remains a perceived threat to most, and an enigma to all but Iran itself. There has been widespread discussion on the dangers of possible weaponization and US, Israeli and others' policy responses to various scenarios. The purpose here is not to synthesise these views, nor is it to either support or oppose the various courses of action proposed. The goal is to offer a more optimistic course of action. More urgently, it is the only course of action most likely serving long-term stability and peace in the region.
A major point, which agitates against rapprochement as an ideal course of action, is the nature of how we see the Iranian democracy. While Iran's leaders proclaim it to be the paragon of mankind's struggle for a just society, it is by few means truly democratic. Calls for democratization are noble and understandable, and we should indeed support grassroots movements in their quest for justice, equality, and representation.
We should also be aware, however, that full-fledged support of movements against the current regime is seen as an existential threat by those in power. Any political leadership seeks to survive; auto- or theocrats merely have different means of doing so than do democrats. Support for democratic movements need not be accompanied by a denunciation, condemnation, or stigmatization of the Iranian political establishment. And lastly, we should at least find the room to understand the rationale of Iran's (probable) desire for a nuclear threshold capability. One only needs to take a look at the map. The West also deals on equal grounds with China, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The same pragmatic approach is legitimate in Iran's case.
There are still more tremendous obstacles to rapprochement, however. Entrenched views and animosities do not easily subside. Harsh sanctions may be effective in harming the Iranian economy, but they are hardly effective in their purported goal to change Iranian political behavior. If at all applied, they should be combined with ways out towards détente. Moreover, our discourse on the Middle East is still tilted too much in favour of Israel. Israel has legitimate security concerns, like Iran. It just so happens that Iran and Israel are each other's geostrategic rivals, especially now that Iraq has undergone a "reset," and that historically the West has been supportive of the Jewish state. Our emotional, religious, and ideological preferences should not distort our path to a more peaceful and stable Middle East, however.
In reality, more flexible relations with both Israel and Iran are possible and it would make for more options in solving and tackling regional concerns. Such normalization is terribly difficult, however, as better EU/US relations with Iran are hardly in Israel's interest. Neither are they in Saudi Arabia's interest, another geopolitical rival for Iran. But more flexible relations are, luckily, by no means impossible.
American rapprochement towards the People's Republic of China carries valuable lessons for today's policymakers. The US sought rapprochement with a regional major power despite mutually opposed ideologies, tainted histories, and entrenched alliances. It was set in motion largely thanks to pragmatic considerations, threatening "what if"-scenarios, and delicate statesmanship. The parallels are evident, though there are many differences.
We must, however, overcome historical prejudices, other states' preferences, and our greatest and oft-overdrawn fears. It has happened before, and it can happen again. Those who militate against normalization or find it to be too risky might do well to consider the fact that harsh actions have not worked in the past and that Iran will most likely stay its course towards a threshold nuclear capability. Military action, escalating tensions, and an unstable status quo do not hold the promise of a long-term solution. At most, they will deter, delay, or destroy Iranian ambitions while simultaneously giving it more incentives to step up its aggression. Such action is costly not only in a financial sense, but also in a cultural and political way.
Why not bet on more optimistic stakes? Being the first person to step down from a heated debate and take a bird's eye view of the situation is clearly a sign of maturity. Let us lead by example by seeking ways to normalization through overt, covert and unconventional means.
Vince Klösters is a graduate student at Radboud University Nijmegen and is engaged in an independent advisory process on the Iranian nuclear program, currently writing a Master's thesis on US policy towards Iran.



February 17, 2012
Brian William Roche, University College Dublin, (5)
However, I would feel that the domestic constituencies for leaders in both countries would be the prime obstacle to such a course of action, rather than any strategic concerns.
Witness the influence of AIPAC on US domestic politics, in addition to partisan nature of political discourse, where any similar reconciliation with Iran in the same way as China would
result in accusations of 'weakness' and 'giving into americas enemies'. Any attempts to recocile with Iran would run into the same electric fence that restricts any American condemnation or action against Israel.
Similarily, in Iran, it would be diffcult to reconcile rapprochment with the ideals of the Islamic revolution, and it would be possible to envision that hard line elements within the regime would be unhappy at any perceived concessions to the United States that would compromise
the nuclear program, or its pursuit of status as regional hegemon, both of which are seen as key to achieveving what they would see as Iran's rightful place.