In the media comments on how poorly NATO functioned in Libya, it was almost forgotten that NATO won. What are the lessons of its victory? And what are the lessons of the practice of depicting NATO as a failure?
- NATO is 3 for 3 in its interventions - Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya. These were all “wars of choice”, where the West could have survived a defeat. The Atlantic Alliance has also been 3 for 3 in its larger “wars of necessity”: World War I, World War II, the Cold War. It is a success by all honest measures.
- Why then is NATO repeatedly declared a failure, repeatedly declared on the edge of collapse, repeatedly branded “obsolete”, a “Cold War relic”? Partly by mistake (illogic), partly by malice (hostility). A sector of Western society was never comfortable with the Western side of the Cold War. It would naturally like to be rid of anything associated with the Western Cold War effort; for it, NATO is viscerally tainted by the fact that it organized the West during the Cold War.
- The Atlantic Alliance has had a gradual learning from experience in its wars. Its perfect record of victory has given it the time and space to learn from its never-perfect record of coordination and efficiency in getting to victory. As a result, it has grown gradually in depth -- from the emergency arrangements of WWI, to the much deeper emergency arrangements (Supreme Council and SACEUR) of WWII, to the permanent institutionalization of those arrangements in peacetime form in NATO, to the activation of the non-emergency provisions of the NATO Treaty (Article 4) after the Cold War ended.
- NATO’s illogical PR defeats in the West place it in danger of being damaged by politicians who draw false lessons from the Libya experience. NATO deserves to learn the true lessons and continue its historical learning curve.
- The main lesson is that NATO needs to get on with setting up arrangements for more efficient decision-making during conflict, for greater efficiency in setting up coalitions, and for defining the terms for its forces to go into conflict. NATO Generals and Atlantic think-tanks have been saying this for several years, building on the lessons of Kosovo. The lesson is now confirmed in Libya. Unanimity is not a good enough method in the fluid era since the end of the Cold War, when NATO wars are “wars of choice” and the main role of the Alliance is to act in fast-moving conflict situations, not to deter the big war by presenting a front of unanimity and practicing unanimity in repulsing a potential frontal attack. NATO has managed to win its every war despite this, but the risks and costs have been high.
- There are further, albeit secondary, military lessons. Britain and France hadn’t fought anything this close to a real war in a long time; it is not surprising if they found some gaps in their militaries. Meanwhile the Alliance worked the way it was supposed to, with one ally helping fill gaps in another ally’s capabilities. No reason for treating this as a cause for U.S. complaint; Gates’ language on this was nothing short of demagogic -- a symptom of (and contribution to) the negative PR tide in the West.
- While NATO suffered its usual PR troubles in the West, it won a major PR victory in the Arab world. Al Jazeera has moderated its line of always blaming the West for the ills in the Arab world; having campaigned for the Libya intervention and having called it a “double standard” when the West was failing to intervene, it found it didn’t work to call it a “double standard” for intervening. The Libyan rebel leadership honorably refused the invitations it got from the media to play a triangulating game -- the usual game of blaming the West for its accidental role in the civilian casualties deliberately brought on by the tactics of the anti-Western forces.
The Arab Spring, when the West played a quiet but quick role in overthrowing two of its best allies in the region -- who were also two of the most decent rulers in the region -- did nothing to put a dent in the blame-the-West habits of Al Jazeera and the street. The summer, with the louder Western intervention in Libya, brought about a real change. - The West needs to strategize about how it can legitimately build on this change of attitude and determine:
a) How to build on Libyan gratitude to help get Libya oriented in an enduringly pro-Western way. This does not mean oil; if oil interests are the main thing attended to, it means the West will have failed to strategize seriously.
b) How to consolidate the change Libya has begun to make in the course of the Middle Eastern revolution -- a change from an orientation primarily against benign and pro-Western regimes, toward an orientation equally against malign and anti-Western regimes.
It needs to do this strategizing without thought-suppressive moves -- e.g., the familiar move of ruling out a precedent for Syria and Iran, or the move of refusing to consider Western interests for fear of the "double standards" accusation. Real strategizing is always difficult, and is made only the more urgent - remedially urgent - when these moves have been preventing it.
Dr. Ira Louis Straus is coordinator of the American branch, Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO.
Read a deeper analysis from this member here:
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October 11, 2011
Paul Smyth
First, at para 1: 'Nato is 3 for 3 in its interventions', completely ignores Afghanistan, Nato's primary (and largest) intervention. Also, by recognising that Libya is an intervention without 'boots on the ground' Nato's air and maritime activities in the Horn of Africa should also be considered an intervention. Nato is presently 3 from 5.
At para 6: from a British point of view the idea that the UK has not fought a 'real war in a long time' is a rather strange statement. I see nothing in Libya that makes it more of a combat mission than Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1990s), Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003-09) or Afghanistan (2006-11). Even whilst the Libya operation is underway, the UK's principal military focus remains Afghanistan.
Nato does deserve credit for the Libyan intervention, but also criticism. E.g. for following what is effectively two operations: one that pedantically sticks to the impartial character of UN resolutions, and the other that patently favours one side in a civil war. Better to have come off the fence me thinks...
Paul