Though public opinion polls in Europe do cite widespread dismay with America’s presence in the global arena, behind the surveys about “why they hate us” lies a reservoir of goodwill waiting to be tapped.
Four modern myths deserve to be debunked.
1 The French hate us.
There is scant evidence to suggest that exploiting anti-American attitudes wins elections. During the French campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy was often pegged as “an American neoconservative carrying a French passport.” Some critics claimed he would dismantle France’s welfare state and replace it with an American-style “law of the jungle.” But most voters ignored such rhetoric. If anything, Sarkozy’s public endorsement of the United States helped convince voters that he would shake France out of its torpor and put the country back to work.
In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel has steadily increased her popularity with high-profile visits to Washington. Contrast Merkel’s experiences with those of her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, who mobilized his base during earlier campaigns with harsh criticism of the United States, but in the end failed to convince voters that an anti-American platform was the answer to their problems.
In Britain, though America’s image has been badly tarnished by the Iraq war, there are no signs that the Premiership of Gordon Brown — who is regarded as even more of an Americanophile than Tony Blair – will affect the strong historic bonds between Washington and London.
2 Europeans look down on the American way of life.
Young Europeans are more eager than ever to work and study in the United States. A brain drain from France and Germany has sent some of their best and brightest to the United States. When I spoke last year with about 50 Germans studying at MIT and Harvard, not one of them expressed a desire to return home. Many complained that the sclerotic welfare states in Europe punish those who work and reward those who don’t.
Europe’s leaders are slowly waking up to the fact that the continent may no longer be able to afford lavish social benefits. They are exploring best practices in the United States to see how to rekindle entrepreneurial spirit and push people off welfare rolls.
Similarly, European politicians are seeking to learn from the United States about diversity. Faced with changing demographics, European governments are now looking to America for ideas to improve racial integration and encourage class mobility.
3 “Old Europe” no longer matters because China and India are the future.
With the end of the Cold War, Europe supposedly lost its relevance. Not true. Europe and the United States still act as the twin turbines of the global economy, accounting for 60 percent of all trade and investment flows.
Americans invested five times as much money in Germany last year as they did in China, and U.S. firms in total have poured four times as much money into tiny Belgium as they have into India. Europe provides three-quarters of all foreign investment in the United States, creating millions of American jobs.
When it comes to security, it’s now clear that the future of U.S. interests still depends on closer coordination with our European allies than we can ever expect from our Asian friends.
4 Europe loves only Democrats.
Most Europeans loathe George W. Bush, but that doesn’t mean that Europeans want a return to the kumbaya-ism and humility of Jimmy Carter and the early Clinton years, when the United States failed to lead in stopping genocide in the Balkans.
Indeed, the passage of time has healed much of Europe’s negativity toward Republican presidents. Today, Ronald Reagan is regarded as a visionary who helped hasten the fall of Communism; George H.W. Bush is now lauded for his skillful management of the peaceful reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet empire.
The next occupant of the White House will be judged on how well he or she can infuse a new sense of purpose and destiny into the Western alliance. There is plenty of work to be done to repair the damage inflicted on America’s moral leadership. But given the pro-American mindset among the new leaders in France, Germany and Britain, the next U.S. president, regardless of party, could command surprisingly strong support from our supposedly fickle allies.
William Drozdiak, a former foreign editor and chief European correspondent for The Washington Post, is president of the American Council on Germany.
This article has been shortened from its original version, which first appeared under the same name in the Washington Post on May 13, 2007. Click here to view the original article.
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June 18, 2007
Raffaello Pantucci, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Silver Contributor (36)
Since then, it would seem that leaders have learned their lessons and toned down the anti-Americanism - but maybe this shift is more about the fact that they have realized that they have their own domestic issues to worry about that are something of a priority over international affairs. So, it is not so much that there has been some sort of groundswell improvement in pro-Americanism in Europe, more that their leaders have moved on to other pressing issues. While I think that European's default mode (and crisis mode) will be to be with America - with whom we undeniably share so many values - i think it would be dangerous to underestimate the potential underlying tension that there is.
To look at specifics. While President Sarkozy has indeed come in on what is indisputably a pro-US ticket, he is not in favour of Turkish membership of the EU or for getting France more involved in US adventures around the world. Similarly with Gordon Brown, his mute silence on Iraq is probably reflective of the fact that he would like, where possible, to try to move on from this issue and distance himself a bit from the Blair poodle imagine. While he is definitely a pro-American, he has gone on record saying that the UK will be a good friend to the US who will make them listen to advice that they may not want to hear. How this will work in practice i do not know (especially when one considers what a crunch situation in international affairs might look like), but the reality that both these leaders present is not that the people they represent are now suddenly deeply anti-American, but more Yanko-sceptic. My point being that these leaders are reflective of publics who no longer believe every word that the President of the US says. They need persuading, and within Europe there is a growing sense of Europeanness that makes people think that Euro-solidarity will be their overarching shield in the world. Many still see the US as the ultimate security guarantor, but at a ground level, they are deeply ambivalent about this (and also do not see any external menace that they need protecting from), and also would undoubtedly prefer it was a European administered defence. While government-government relations between the US and Europe will undoubtedly improve ("they could only" one might add), the reality is that government's are made up of people, and there are many in Europe who remain deeply sceptical of the US aims and goals in the world.
Finally, i think it is a facile assumption to predict that European publics are simply going to return to a vision of America as the shining city on the hill simply when administrations change. The re-election of President Bush really put a damper on lots of European's feelings that this President was somehow unrepresentative of the American public in general. One of the key challenges facing the next American president is how he or she remakes/reshapes/refocuses the US role in the world. I am not convinced that Democrat or Republican makes a difference, and would advise people to be careful not to simply assume that they would love a Democrat over a Republican.
In conclusion, Mr. Drozdiak's four points represent to me something that seems to be what one hopes is a fading perspective of the transatlantic relationship, that it is in some way a sacred creature that must persist throughout the ages simply for the sake of its existence. This is surely the way to obsolescence. Much better to construct a transatlantic alliance built upon doing things together in the world. Rather than the this improving relations for the sake of them, improve them with a goal. Realistically, the US's focus is no longer on Europe, nor should it be, that is not where the threat is. Europe is the US's old partner who will always be reliable in her own way and will ultimately support when the crunch comes. The sizeable transatlantic marketplace (as pointed out by Mr. Drozdiak and gone into even greater detail by Joseph Quinlan and Dan Hamilton) means we will always be connected. Beyond this the familial connections, etc, mean that this is something that will persist for a while and we need not worry about it in such an infinitesimal way. This is not to say it must be completely off our concerns, but better to construct a transatlantic relationship around issues that we can work on together and in this way persist in maintaining the Alliance as the pre-eminent forum and grouping for the Western liberal ideal to spread around the globe. This will make it endure beyond the inevitable leadership changes that seem to be so at the root of so much tension.