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Too Much To Do

NATO is overwhelmed by new members, tasks and missions, without making the required commensurate changes in its resources and organizational structure. Contrary to the EU, NATO has clung to the unanimity rule, where every member state can block any decision. Today, this makes it difficult to reach or impose consensus. Since neither a consorted transatlantic approach to Iran’s nuclear program, nor a satisfactory NATO-EU relationship can be achieved, NATO is losing grip.

NATO’s policy agenda is used as a dumping-ground for almost all challenges and threats facing the West. Its tasks now range from territorial defense and peacekeeping, to dealing with WMD proliferation, energy security, as well as missile and cyber-defense. Instead of being at the center of the transatlantic security and defense debate, NATO suffers from its lavish multifunctionality as well as from a lack of resources and of a clear sense of purpose.

A new NATO Strategic Concept might bring some clarity into the Alliance’s priorities, but many officials in NATO capitals argue that it might revive the transatlantic controversies of the recent past. With more members and more tasks, but lacking the infrastructure and the resources to handle them effectively, NATO needs to be thoroughly reorganized and the chances of that happening anytime soon are dim.

Beyond Article

NATO’s strategic solidarity has been affected by its transformation into a loose coalition of like-minded countries. The collective defense clause (Article V of the Washington Treaty) made the Alliance unique. Yet as today’s conflicts are so-called “wars of choice”, rather than classical “wars of necessity,” many member states are taking free rides within the Alliance. NATO has also failed on matters such as the management of financial burdens and the force-rotation of its operations.

Countries like the US, UK, France, Canada, and the Netherlands who are fighting in Afghanistan’s dangerous southern provinces have to pay their own way under the current system. The lack of common funding for costly NATO operations makes a sham of the strategic solidarity. Every time NATO secretary-general De Hoop Scheffer has to go on a begging-tour around capitals for troops, equipment, and financial support, NATO’s deficiencies and out-datedness are at public display.

Catch-all security?

Despite collective defense NATO now embraces a so-called “comprehensive approach” to security. At the Riga summit of November 2006, member states agreed that coordination between a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both military and civilian, is essential. Both in Afghanistan and Kosovo, NATO has learned that success requires economic, financial, and humanitarian assistance as well. But because NATO remains a military force work and effectiveness are restricted.

The relevance and utility of military force has changed. It is therefore not fair to dump non-military security challenges such as cyber-defense and energy security on NATO’s agenda. NATO’s instruments are becoming blunt and outdated in the light of novel, mainly non-traditional security challenges. The main question used to be how the EU could use NATO’s military tools (under the so-called Berlin-plus arrangement), the debate is now how NATO can draw upon the resources of the EU, UN, World Bank, as well as NGOs.

Just as NATO is fully dependent on others to stabilize Afghanistan, so it requires outside help to achieve all its other main goals, ranging from energy security to dealing with international terrorism. It just seems a matter of time before the EU crowds out NATO as Europe’s main security and defense provider.

Liquid coalitions

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested a few years ago that “coalitions of the able and willing” were preferable over static and cumbersome international organizations. Today, the US evaluates the utility of international institutions according to their contribution to American security. NATO’s future is bleak because it offers the US the useful stamp of multilateral legitimacy, without really imposing too many limits on America’s foreign policy. This explains why the US favors expanding NATO even further to partners such as Australia and Japan.

Surely there is merit in bringing NATO’s relationship with new, often global partners and key players like the EU and UN on a new level. In Afghanistan, ISAF includes crucial allies such as Australia. Static and formal defense alliances are outdated, and will be replaced by more fluid, ad hoc coalitions of like-minded countries. Since almost all military operations will be voluntary “wars of choice”, it is inevitable for NATO to become a clearinghouse of shifting coalitions.

Conclusion

NATO will not suddenly disappear from Europe’s security radar, but slowly fade away. NATO will have to reinvent itself in order to remain relevant. Article V will have to go, and global partnerships should be formalized. The end-result will be the OSCE-ization of the Alliance, proving that it may be necessary to destroy an international organization in order to save it.

Dr. Peter van Ham is director of global governance research at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" in The Hague, and professor at the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium).

This summary was prepared by the Atlantic Community editorial team. The original article was first published here in German in Internationale Politik.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• James Jones: Military Alone Cannot Solve Afghanistan
• Daniel Rackowski: Think Tank Analysis: Rethinking European Defense Policy
• T. Noetzel & B. Schreer: Afghanistan: Chances are High That NATO Will Fail