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It has become impossible to make clear to either the NATO partners or the German public why the Bundeswehr has three different mandates for operations in the same country—each stipulating different objectives, different scopes of action, and different command structures. Germany and its partners need to end their military involvement in the OEF mission in Afghanistan and redirect these military capabilities into an intensified ISAF mission under NATO leadership.

• The seemingly clear division into two mandates, one aimed at establishing security and the other at fighting terrorism, can no longer realistically be maintained. In the field, it is virtually impossible to distinguish whether an armed combatant confronting ISAF troops is opposing the establishment of the Afghan state or whether he is one of the “hard-core” terrorists referred to in the OEF mandate. OEF troops have now driven the al-Qaeda leadership into the tribal territories of Northwest Pakistan. Even if the OEF mission is not subject to geographic limitations, it still cannot be expanded across the border into Pakistan against the will of the country’s leaders.
• A mission’s objectives can only be realized if all the available military capacities are placed under a central unity of command, guaranteeing coordinated leadership. This is true whether the mission is led by an international organization or by an individual country. In Afghanistan, the apparent lack of coordination among the western countries, international organizations, and NGOs involved has been the subject of frequent criticism, and rightfully so.

Future Configuration of the ISAF Mandate
The military capabilities of three existing Afghanistan mandates should be merged under a single, coherent ISAF mandate and the OEF mission in Afghanistan should be brought to an end. The resulting quantitative expansion of the ISAF mission would offer a good starting point for establishing transatlantic equilibrium in the burden sharing in Afghanistan.

1. Security and Nation-Building
   The goal of the ISAF mandate is to provide NATO support to Afghan security forces in establishing security in Afghanistan. The alliance should focus on rendering the Afghan National Army (ANA) capable of controlling these areas permanently on its own. Only in this way will a medium-to-long-term perspective open up allowing for the withdrawal of NATO troops.

   The Afghan police training through the ESDP police mission EUPOL Afghanistan should also be intensified. The NATO mission still lacks adequate resources, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to carry out this mandate successfully. The German government should lead the campaign in NATO for additional troop contingents and provide additional personnel and material support under the German ISAF mandate. They should also lift all restrictions currently limiting the activities that German ISAF troop contingents are allowed to engage in and the geographical locations where they can be deployed, and encourage other NATO partners to lift the troop restrictions imposed in what are known as caveats (national rules or limitations).

2. Military vs. Civilian Instruments
   While the military measures in Afghanistan aim at short-term public safety, the development-oriented measures aim at a medium and long-term stabilization through economic and institutional reconstruction. Both aspects thus deserve equal attention. Ultimately the success of the ISAF will not depend solely on its own activities but also on the progress achieved by other international organizations, civilian aid organizations, and Afghanistan’s neighbors. The NATO partners involved must therefore also find more institutions which allow ISAF activities to be more closely interlinked with the activities of other organizations active in Afghanistan.
   
   
3. Developing Realistic Expectations and Setting Clear Priorities
   Realistic expectations should be set for the objectives of the ISAF mission. The countries involved are investing vast amounts of energy to create political and administrative structures that meet Western standards. This is laudable in principle, but not only does it require huge amounts of time and money, it also raises the bar for the political success of the ISAF mission too high. As a result, little rational debate has emerged thus far on the criteria for success or on the possible schedule for terminating the mission. The mandate itself, however, clearly delineates the task of the ISAF troops: as soon as the Afghan security forces are able to guarantee security in the entire territory of Afghanistan, the ISAF will have completed its mission. A mandate for expanded ISAF operations with German participation should be focused clearly on achieving this criterion: it alone can offer a sensible measure of the interim or ultimate success of the ISAF mission.
   
   
   Markus Kaim is Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and currently DAAD Visiting Professor of German and European Studies at the University of Toronto
   
   
   Related Materials from the Atlantic Community:
   • Egon Bahr Says Europe Must Say No to Globalizing NATO
   • David G. Haglund Explains How Afghanistan Is Testing German-Canadian Ties
   • GM Roper On How Germany Belongs in Afghanistan