The current strategy of the international community to solve the “Iran problem” is not working. The UN Security Council resolutions, sanctions and financial pressure of the American “global whisper” campaign provide more fuel for hardliners’ anti-Western-imperialist themes. Ahmadinejad continues to brag about his country’s technological achievements, overstating the number of centrifuges his scientists are spinning, even as the Security Council gears up for what may be a third round of sanctions.
The only publicly discussed alternative to the sanctions route—military strikes—would not only fail to eradicate the long-term nuclear proliferation risk, but would have grave immediate consequences for regional and international security. In Mohamed ElBaradei’s words, the military choice would be an act of madness.
Both the sanctions and military options would give Iran the confrontational motivation to get the bomb in the long run. Both strategies depend on the idea that Iran’s primary decision-making factors are economic and physical security.
These strategies fail to appreciate Tehran’s evolving external perspective. Although Iran was strongly motivated by security concerns at the start of its nuclear program in the 1980s, and at the stage when its program was exposed to the international community in 2002-3, circumstances have changed over the past four years. Increased oil prices, a militarily and diplomatically weakened US and the ever-growing energy concerns of China (already relying on Iran for 12% of its energy), have all reduced the threat potential to Iran from the US, the only country capable of following through. Military action would get little or no domestic support in the United States. Economic carrots and sticks will not threaten the regime’s life-blood as long as oil is exempt from sanctions.
Another even more important circumstance overlooked by the current strategy is the domestic symbolism that the civilian uranium enrichment program has taken on. We emphasize civilian, because there is little public support for a weapons program. According to a poll in December 2006, more than 90% of the Iranian population considers the program to be important for their country’s future. Meanwhile songs about uranium enrichment are sung on public television. The campaign around the nuclear program is a propaganda masterpiece—Ahmadinejad managed to maneuver this issue into his electoral victory in 2005, and has continued to focus his presidency on it since. However, the campaign has also put the regime in a political corner, which it cannot get out of without maintaining some level of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.
The EU proposal of 2006 gave Iran almost everything it could ask for—except an enrichment program. Offering a long list of political, economic and security carrots, it simply failed to recognize the clear political importance of the issue to all factions within the Iranian regime. Try advising a US Presidential candidate to go against the public on an issue where there is 90%+ support, and see how long you last as a campaign adviser.
Any solution to the present confrontation will almost undoubtedly involve some level of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. To prevent a purely indigenous and virtually unconstrained Iranian enrichment program (paving the way for another DPRK), Western policy-makers must understand the domestic political importance of this issue and consider pragmatic alternatives that provide Iran a face-saving path out of the corner. Robust measures to monitor and limit the scope of an enrichment program should be created. A multinational consortium running the program in Iran would be one such alternative with a decent chance of political acceptance in Iran and tight control over enrichment activities. Multinational ownership and personnel would create transparency and build trust; innovative safeguards beyond the global IAEA standards (“Additional Protocol Plus”) would alleviate international, especially American, security concerns.
The window for achieving any negotiated settlement is closing quickly as Iran’s domestic enrichment capabilities continue to increase fast. Once Iran reaches full technological competency—industrial-scale enrichment—international ability to monitor and limit Iran’s capabilities will be dramatically eroded.
We’ll be the first to admit that this third way isn’t perfect. However, when compared with what’s publicly on the table right now, and how fast the clock is ticking down, it starts to look a lot like having a Plan C is just common sense.
The full text of the article is available here.
Manjana Milkoreit directs the Center for Strategic and Global Affairs at the public policy group. She has studied law in Germany and the UK. She graduated in 2007 with a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where her research focused on international relations, security studies and global governance. Her past professional experiences include the UN, the European Commission, McKinsey & Company and several international law firms.
Dr. Jason J Blackstock is a Senior Fellow of the Trudeau Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, a researcher at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and a licensed Professional Physicist (P.Phys.) through the Canadian Association of Physicists. His research focuses generally on policy areas at the interface of science and international affairs, presently spanning non-proliferation, energy and environmental issues.
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October 11, 2007
Robert Shawley, University of Iowa, Gold Contributor (99)
Secondly, as the authors themselves agree, the enrichment program is a matter of intense national pride and has strong public support in Iran. It is one of the last threads Ahmadinejad's rule is hanging on. But in order to portray himself as champion under pressure he has already repeatedly announced that placing the program under international supervision is akin to taking it out of Iran's hands - and has struck a chord with the population there. For Iranians, nuclear power in itself is not the issue - it is Iranian nuclear power that is the matter of pride.
Given these two major problems, the question is: how does the proposed Plan C envision obtaining agreement for it from both Iran and the US?