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May 14, 2007

Alexander Skiba, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), (4)

I don’t agree with the premise that the EU is the “obvious candidate to shoulder the development tasks” in Afghanistan. Such a statement seems to rest on the assumption that the United States and the EU should work out some sort of division of labor along the lines of: the U.S. “cooks dinner” (i.e. does the war fighting) while Europeans “do the dishes” (i.e. reconstruction and development).
Civilian reconstruction and development and military stabilization efforts must go hand in hand. Effective civil-military relations are key to achieve success in Afghanistan as in every post-war society. This is one of the main lessons learned from Western engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
I agree that the EU could do more in terms of building up civilian capabilities. However, even if the EU would be willing to send out more police forces, judicial reform or rule of law experts: where would they come from? As far as I can tell, most of them are already deployed in EU operations from the Western Balkans to the Middle East and Africa.

May 14, 2007

Jan Techau, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Gold Contributor (81)

Julianne Smith is 100 per cent right to ask for more EU involvement in Afghanistan. However, the issue of stability and consolidation of Afghanistan sheds light on a greater question that's looming in the background - the question whether the transatlantic partners have a shared understanding of the most daunting of tasks in international politics: nation building.

In recent years, European countries have put great effort into "transforming" their militaries in order to make them more versatile, more flexible, more deployable, and more compatible with the similarly transforming US forces. The political doctrine formulating the goal of military intervention in failing states, however, has not been synchronized in similar ways. There are still great differences between the transatlantic partners as to what nation building is and how it is being done.

Unfortunatley, tt is largely overlooked that America's and Europe's (i.e. NATO's) ability to safeguard its interests, and to stabilize and uphold global order depends to no small extent on whether we will be able to harmonize our understanding and our implementation of nation building. I am convinced that the difficulties the alliance has run into in Afghanistan are rooted in our failure to do so.

Developing this much-needes shared political approach would entail saying good-bye to some long-held beliefs on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe must realize that its soft power needs to be backed up by military force in order to be fully relevant. It also means that - yes - maybe Europe needs to do more in Iraq. On the other hand, the US must realize that its anti-nation building instinct has lead to grave policy failures, and that a well-balanced mix of soft and hard power approaches is needed.

Let's have a debate on nation-building. Now. Afghanistan can't wait. Neither can Iraq.

May 14, 2007

Ulrich W. Speck, , Bronze Contributor (12)

It's understandable that, from an American perspective, it would be highly desirable to have more burden sharing with Europe.

The stabilisation and reconstruction (or construction) of the Afghan state is an important task, everybody agrees. In a European perspective, Iraq is the wrong war while Afghanistan has been the right war.

Afghanistan shows the strengths and weaknesses of multilateralism. Strengths: No dispute over legitimacy, broad willingness to participate. Weaknesses: Bad organisation of the efforts, unwillingness of many coalition members to really invest their ressources and to take responsability.

Without a good dose of unilateralism, multilateralism doesn't work. Without the clear political will of one of the central actors to take the lead, to make decisions, to be in charge, there will be no effective action.

The EU is not such an actor. What is called "EU" is a coalition of states that have their separate political will and definition of interest.

Only if one or several EU states take the lead, there can be effective action. Given the task, only one of the big three - England, France, Germany - might be a serious candidate for that. But none of them is currently capable nor willing to take the responsability that comes with such a role. None of them will invest its diplomatic capital in that risky business. And none of them has the domestic support of such a role.

And also it's very disputable whether Berlin, Paris or London have the ressources that are needed for a leading role in Afghanistan.

The U.S. clearly has the ressources. It's will is damaged by the Iraq experience. But there is no other candidate for that role. Either Washington leads or it will not work at all. If we like it or not.

May 14, 2007

Michael F. SChuette, , (3)

Everybody talks about nation-building. From what I understand most political entities that seem to work well consider themselves "nations". Example: most European countries, Japan, U.S.A. None of these nations was built from the outside, actually most of these nations came into being when the people in that particular area decided that it was more advantageous to live under their own rule, i.e. these nations came into being even though most of their neighbors very much resented that very fact.
There has to my knowledge not been a single (successful) example of a nation being built from the outside.
Most nations that I am aware of have decided on a common language: As far as I am aware there is no common language in Afghanistan. So how are they supposed to communicate to resolve their massive issues?

From what I understand, "nationbuilding" is a neo-con concept. Like all other "isms" before neo-conservatism is failing since it is replacing good old (cynic) real-politik with concepts, big ideas, ideology.

All "nation-building" in Afghanistan has done so far is to bring poppy-growing to record levels. By the way: what would the West do if there ever was an Afghan nation and they would decide that heroin needed be included in the next WTO round? Would the West then elect a new nation in Afghanistan?

Al Quaida seems very much alive too. And even if we ever succeed in beating Al Quaida, these bastards will just move to another country. All they need is a backward Muslim country. Hell there is a good many of them around. Do we want to nation-build all of them.

Let´s move out of Afghanistan. We have no business being there!

May 15, 2007

Michael John Williams, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Silver Contributor (62)

Interesting comments, and rather revealing. Every time I give a lecture about US Foreign Policy, I always get asked ‘why does the US not do something about Darfur?’ It is an easy answer – 1. Lack of direct threat to national security; 2. Too much on our plate already. But beyond that I always like to ask ‘Why does Europe not do something about Darfur’. Time and time again we hear about European security and defence and Europe’s role in the world and more often than not it’s a lot of hot air without enough substance. It really gets old fast and this thread falls into the exact same plotline.

First off, I should note that I completely agree that NATO does not know what it is doing in Afghanistan. The Alliance has stumbled into the 21st century, still suffering from vertigo induced by the collapse of the USSR. I don’t fault NATO for trying to do good in Afghanistan, but as we have all seen over the last few years if there is not a clear understanding across the Alliance as to what exactly the mission is, and more importantly, how that mission will be carried out, the whole endeavour is bound for a rough ride (at the very least). Hopefully, if there is a next time, the Alliance will work through this beforehand – but I am not going to hold my breath on that one.

What we have learned from NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is that our understanding of conflict requires updating and that we need more effective coordination of the development, defence and diplomatic resources of NATO allies. We also need to pull in other international organizations and non-governmental organizations to lift some of the burden. Many of these organizations are better suited to address the long-term development needs of Afghanistan than any western military ever will be able to. To bring all these actors together we need ‘talkers’ and ‘organizers’, folks who can look across the board at the various actors and determine who does what and how. The EU is well positioned for such consensus building and helping to organize disparate actors. Lets be honest – the EU does not contribute the bulk of the money to the efforts in Afghanistan, nor does it contribute the bulk of the forces, nor does it contribute the most key enablers. Furthermore, of the European troops that are there, many are limited in the area of scope of their deployment (and please spare me the domestic argument about German politics – Ich habe Deutsche Geschicte studiert – try explaining to people in Kansas, Winnipeg, Sussex or Rotterdam why it is ok for their kids to die in Helmand, but not Germans or French).

So what’s wrong with Julianne asking European allies to use their excellent brains to help coordinate a truly effective comprehensive approach? In Britain the Government developed the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) to help facilitate the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach. The paradox of the PCRU is, however, that the UK will never engage in a mission that requires the PCRU and the Comprehensive Approach unilaterally. It will also do so at the very least bilaterally, and most likely, multilaterally with a host a European allies. The EU should therefore work to develop a pan-European PCRU that would effectively link-up the efforts of various EU member states militaries, foreign offices and international development offices (as well as the efforts of the US and Canada). One thing that Julianne does overlook is that the EU has a real issue with autonomy and the idea of working with others (the dish washing debate, yet again). The EU has only gotten involved in Afghanistan very, very reluctantly. This is a shame, because even Washington has slowly come to realize that it alone cannot solve many of the most pressing international challenges. If Europe is to act on the world stage it will have to do so with other countries, IOs and NGOs – Afghanistan is in many ways a window on the future in this regard. There is little interest or will to develop the type of capacity that Julianne would like. Furthermore, it is questionable that even if the will were present, I don’t think the EU has the capability (at the moment) to engage in such cross-coordination just within Europe, never mind across the scope of actors in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, it would be a truly remarkable step forward for European integration and it would be a massive contribution towards the cultivation of international peace. It is obviously not an easy task, but we don’t live in an easy world. Europe needs to step up to the plate on this one – the 21st century is not about Europe – it is going to be about Africa, Asia and pretty much anywhere else, but Europe. This is because Europe has done such a remarkable job at integration and development. It is a remarkable achievement, but it is one that now needs to be placed within the larger context of world politics. The members of the transatlantic area need to work better together and this is a good place to start. Although I think it is easier said than done, I can only say bravo Julianne for putting the idea out there.

May 16, 2007

Ulrich W. Speck, , Bronze Contributor (12)

Michael, yes, the EU should do a lot. There is no lack of ideas of what the EU could and should do. But is the EU the kind of actor you and Julianne are talking about? Does it make sense to call the EU to do these kind of things?

Not really. The central actors in European foreign policy are Berlin, London and Paris. It's no accident that they formed the EU-3 in order to negotiate with Teheran - bypassing Brussels. (Solana got informed only afterwards.)

The point is that "European" action can only come from the European actors, and these are mainly the big three. Foreign policy, and especially security, remains a core attribute of statehood also inside the EU, and this is very unlikely to change. To cite just one example: does anyone expect London and Paris to give up their permanent seat in the UN Security Council? Not in the forseeable future.

Another point, Russia, the most urging and challening Foreign Policy for EU today, and in the years to come. Is there a European Russia policy? No. Will there be a strong common European Russia policy in the future? Highly unlikely, given the different (perceived) interests and views of EU memberstates.

What is called European Foreign Policy is either a policy of states who decide to use the EU for their purposes, or its not a policy at all - at least not an effective one.

That does not mean that we should not try to get a better cooperation on a EU level. But we should be careful not to confuse wishful thinking with the political reality. Politics is the art of the possible, not the art of daydreaming.

May 17, 2007

Michael John Williams, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Silver Contributor (62)

Ulrich - I do agree with you. I think the point that frustrates Americans is that 1) the EU was supposed to give Washington a number to call, but instead we still too many numbers. 2) Even if London, Paris and Berlin drive an operation, you then have the rest of the EU to deal with, which can also be pragmatic. You'll notice that I said I did not think it would be an easy task (it is perhaps impossible), but I think there is a general frustration that with so many problems that need attention, 'Europe' can't get its act together. I don't mean this in an overly negative way - I'd rather have disorganized help than no help. I am glad the EU-3 took the initiative on Iran and then pulled in Washington, but I can't help but think we could do so much more together and Europe could have a bigger voice in Washington if it was a more credible actor.

May 20, 2007

Ulrich W. Speck, , Bronze Contributor (12)

Michael, I completly understand the frustration with the EU. I think this frustration is the result of an uncertainity about what the EU is - and is not. Some people think of it as a kind of federal state in the making, others think of it as a close association of states which maintain central parts of their sovereignty. (That is, by the way, the reason why the fight about veto rights versus majority decisions is so crucial.)

It is really hard therefore to understand what the EU is, what it can do, and what it cannot do. There was a time when Washington decided to take the EU serious - to assume that there is a telephone number now. Then it turned out that it's still the big players who count most - the big three.

A common security and defense policy - and therefore, the ability to be an actor on the global stage - depends from the political will of the states: Will they give up their veto? Will they accept a majority decision about questions of vital interest, ie security? For example, would France send its troops somewhere against the will of its governments - only because the other EU governements have decided so? The answer to me seems to be obvious - they will never do so. Granted, not every decision in this field is about war and peace, but most of foreign and defense policy is ultimately related to that.

A realistic view should take the EU for what it is, a community of closely associated states.

In foreign and security matters, they will try to coordinate their policies, but they will never give up their sovereign rights.

Therefore, it's very problematic to talk about the EU as a coherent actor in security and foreign policy matters. Sometimes some states decide to try to use EU as a mechanism, to pursue foreign and security interests, sometimes they prefer to act on their own.

The point here is: Common EU action only takes place if there is a strong political will by important member states to act in common. EU may serve as a very important and useful platform for discussion, but Brussels will never decide about core security and foreign policy matters.

It's complicated, it's frustrating, but that's how it is.