Terrorism Threatens the Construction of Trans-Saharan Pipeline
Riccardo Fabiani | Jamestown Foundation | August 2009
Algeria, Nigeria and Niger are planning one of the biggest infrastructural projects in Africa: the construction of the worlds longest gas pipeline, which will lead 4000km from the Niger Delta across the Sahara to the Mediterranean. The estimated construction costs amount to US$12 billion however the list of interested energy investment companies is long: Shell, Total, ENI and Gazprom all want access to African resources. Indeed, the supplies are significant as 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year will be supplied to Europe. This corresponds to the EU goal of diversifying energy resource suppliers.
Apart from technical challenges the unstable security situation threatens the project. The planned pipeline leads through an extreme climate zone, which makes it a highly risky investment. Even greater dangers are the regional terrorist movements. On the Nigerian side, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has already previously attacked oil and gas infrastructure projects and now threatens to sabotage the new initiative. In July, militants destroyed ten pipelines of a terminal in Lagos without the security forces intervening. If this is already possible in the biggest cities, how can thousands of kilometres pipeline be effectively secured in the interior of the country?
In the Sahel region, the project is threatened by the guerrilla movements of the Tuareg, who have already successfully kidnapped Chinese and French employees of other energy projects. The organisation al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), classified by the US as one of the most dangerous terrorist groups worldwide, is now active in Algeria. The AQIM's Southern Zone has been in the spotlight for attacks and kidnapping in the Northern Zone also.
What does this mean for the realization of the project? Regardless of their doubts the involved states are at least presently still highly motivated to build the pipeline. For them the connection of their resources to the European market is of strategic importance. However, critics warn of the high costs and risks involved. Apart from the expenditure security is a major issue with regard to both construction and operation; the expenditures for an insurance premium will be very high also. Ultimately one single attack would be sufficient to disrupt the project potentially indefinitely. These risks discourage private investors. An alternative often being mentioned is liquid gas, which could be transported by ship from the Gulf of Guinea to Europe at lower costs and with fewer risks. The benefits of the project could also be jeopardized from the other side: The main reason for the project is for Europe to end its dependence on Russian energy supplies. Should Gazprom however succeed in becoming a partner of the project, Europe's diversification policy will surely fail.
This summary was prepared by the Atlantic Community editorial team
from "Is the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline a Viable Project? The Impact of Terrorism Risk" published here by Jamestown Foundation.
