Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "A Clash of Discourses: Sovereignty vs. Integration "

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November 10, 2010

Philipp Johannes Große, Koblenz University of Applied Sciences, Silver Contributor (58)

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Hello Alexandra,

to get the discussion started I would like to make the following remarks:

I agree with your premise, that there is no manifest conflict looming between Russia and the West - at least not one comparable to the Cold War. Consequently, we will have to overcome the friend/enemy rhetoric in political discourse: Russia is not an enemy anymore. Whether we are friends remains to be seen.

However, I beg to differ with your first policy recommendation: Western politicians are under close scrunitiy by their electorate and the media. Simply ignoring human rights violations doesn't work under these circumstances. The political opposition would have every right to accuse the government of moral sell-out. Engaging with Russia under these conditions would be harder, not easier.

On the other hand side, not every political and judicial decision in Russia should be subject to Western critique. Indeed, the concept of sovereignity cuts both ways: If we meddle in strictly internal affairs of other countries, we can't expect others to refrain from doing the same. So in my opinion the challenge is not whether or not to name certain negative developments in Russia. It's rather to find a way to do so that makes change for the better more, not less likely.

Your second recommendation has my full support.

With your third recommendation I disagree. While there is certainly no point in ring-fencing Russia with military bases, we can't leave countries out in the cold that chose the path to Western institutions. It will probably take decades before countries like Belarus or Ukraine would be suitable for accession. Denying them this opportunity at all compromises the very values NATO and EU stand for and will put Russia's will over the sovereignity of those countries.
However, I think we can find common ground on this issue: Further enlargement (at least regarding the EU) is not of pressing concern and can be accompanied by steps to overcome Russia's legitimate reservations. Options include further steps in arms control and Russia's integration into missile defence.

So much for now, looking forward to your response

Philipp

November 10, 2010

Matthias Conrad

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Hi Alexandra, hi Philipp

I would like to add my comments on Alexandra’s article.

First of all, I agree to a great extent with your analysis and I am very fond of your idea to foster reconciliation by a change in political discourse. However, I remain skeptical about the solution(s) you propose, i. e. that a “reasoned framing” of the foreign policy discourse on Russia will enable progress and constructive relations. To make this more clear:

1) I agree with your main analysis that there is a significant divergence between the foreign policy discourses in Russia and the West. While the West, notably the EU, pursues a foreign policy approach that is deeply embedded in arguments of (neo-) liberal market integration, Russia’s foreign policy can be neatly framed in (neo-) realist terms of International Relations. This creates misunderstandings, friction and conflict, as you describe.
2) I also agree that the Russo-Western relationship has suffered especially during the presidency of President Putin (or US-President George W. Bush for that matter). Although it seems worth mentioning that the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in the last decade of the 20th century were also a serious burden to the relationship. Russia then just was not as self-confident. Obviously, the high oil price prior to 2008 nourished Moscow’s self-esteem.
3) I agree with you that the “gas wars” as some described them and conflicts in the post-Soviet space seriously deteriorated the relationship and nourished a great level of mistrust. I would argue, however that there is much more reciprocal interdependence in terms of energy relations – given that virtually every major gas pipeline transports gas to the West. Only recently has a pipeline been built that now connects Russia and China.
4) I agree with your argument about the transformative power of ideas and the importance to alter the prevalent discourse in the West on Russia. You say that Obama and his advisers deleted much of the vocabulary of his predecessor. As much as I personally like that – it was ironically terms like “war against terror”, “Muslim threat” etc. that established common ground between Russia and the West in the aftermath of 9/11. As Secretary of State, Collin Powell described the changed nature in the relationship after the attacks in New York and Washington: »It is a seismic sea change of historic proportions.«

But despite all the common ground I see, I remain skeptical about your solution:

1) I am very skeptical to what extent a German initiative to polish the image of Russia in Europe/the West will be successful. On the one hand, I would say that Russia enjoys a better reputation in Germany than in most parts of Western Europe (cf. p. e. UK). When it comes to states of the “new Europe” that suffered under the reign of the Soviet Union, a German image campaign to whitewash Russia will be perceived critically – to say the least. Thus, it is doubtful in my eyes that a German public diplomacy initiative will reach the audience p. e. in the Baltic States or in Poland.
2) On a more general note, I want to point to the time factor when it comes to “engineering” public discourse: it is a long-term endeavor that is very complex and multi-faceted and in this sense only to some extent steerable. Of course, a public policy initiative for a more benevolent nation-branding of Russia is highly desirable. But it is a huge project that requires generations. Just of think of how long it took to overcome German-French stereotypes.
3) I disagree with your main argument that divergent discourses in the West and Russia on foreign policy make successful cooperation practically impossible. To give an example: During the Cold War, i. e. a period of the greatest discursive divide between Russia and the West, very successful German-Russian economic exchange took place. In other words: Although I concede that discursive structures exert inarguable influence, it does not impede or enable cooperation altogether. NATO-Russia cooperation p. e. had an impressive track record of joint military exercises in 2005, Russia even joined NATO’s “Operation Active Endeavor” – which was an Article V operation (NATO’s collective defense clause). At the same time, Russia and the West were severely divided over “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space. What I want to point is that public discourse often follows a domestic rationale. External enemies are created to rally the population behind its leaders for internal cohesion (this applies to Russia as well as to every country of the so-called West, North and South).

Finally, I want to comment on your concrete steps “for a new rhetoric and a new approach”:

1) I am in favor of a less paternalistic manner in which Russia is treated in public discourse in the West. However, this cannot mean to abandon justified criticisms. If the EU can openly criticize France for deporting Roma, if the world can legitimately accuse Washington for Guantanamo etc. – I do not see why Russia is not to be criticized for severe breaches of human rights and other worrying phenomena. The manner in which this is done is important. It is, in my view, the sound that sets the tone.
2) I absolutely agree that the EU (or NATO for that matter) has to provide real incentives for cooperation. A relaxation of visa rules is imperative to foster mobility of goods, services and people. The EU is probably not willing to give up its normative claims and requirements. However, many of them seem to be in line with Medvedev’s modernization plans. I would argue that a (at least rhetorical) rapprochement in this sphere is wanted on both sides.
3) and 4) I do not really understand how you can call for respect for Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space, and in the same time call for equal engagement with post-Soviet countries. This seems contradictory to me. I would argue that Russia outright rejects the idea of joining p. e. the EU or NATO. The Russian foreign policy emphasis is on being a distinctive Eurasian power and to strike a balance between its Eastern and Western orientation. In fact, Russia does not want to be treated in the same way as Latvia for example. Quite to the contrary.
5) When it comes to UN-mandates for the hotspots in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, it seems worth pointing out that both, the OSCE and the UN were forced to leave South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Central Asia, the UN mandate in Tajikistan was effectively a Russian mission with a UN badge. All of the mentioned cases do not strike me as model solutions to those conflicts.

To sum up, I agree that a transformation of ideas has to take place. I doubt, however, that this can be done quickly and with direct effects. Furthermore, I am very skeptical about the prospects for success of a joint image campaign of Russia and Germany especially in the so-called “new Europe”. Still, cooperation has to be incentive-driven and there is much room for very pragmatic improvement of the relationship. A relaxation of the visa regime seems an obvious goal. One last thing I want to mention: I am somewhat confused by the title of your essay: I cannot see clashing dialogues in the relationship between Russia and the West. To me it seems rather as a clash of narratives and indeed a lack of dialogue that is at the core here.

November 10, 2010

Matthias Conrad, Free University of Berlin, Silver Contributor (59)

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Sorry, I forgot to log in before I posted my comment!

November 11, 2010

Benjamin Hanke, Universität Leipzig, Silver Contributor (37)

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Greetings Alexandra,

I am in complete agreement with you that language matters and that in the past, some Western governments have been rather naive in their choice of words targeted at Putin-era Moscow. I do however get the impression that this has changed considerably in the last few years - though not necessarily for the better. While they were frequently bringing up the subject of the dire state of human rights in Russia before, compounding top level relations and achieving very little in the process, Western states have been noticeably quiet for some time now. Among the major European countries Germany's change of stance has been especially apparent. While this has resulted in improved relations between them and the Russian government, it has also brought disaster to the already weakened opposition movement, as well as left the "near neighbourhood" vulnerable to Moscow's ambitions. NATO and EU enlargement towards Ukraine and Belarus have been cleared off the table for a long time to come. Clumsy language has largely been exchanged for little or no language.

I argue that this (predominantly German) policy of "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil - and well, while we are at it, let's do no evil" is being followed because too much weight is placed on the economy, which all other sectors of public policy are forcibly taking a back seat to. Russia is too important an economic partner to risk permanently aggravating. However, this is overlooking the fact that for Moscow, Germany and other European countries are just as important economically as well. And while both sides are looking to diversify, they'll be stuck with each other for a considerable amount of time.

This is a chance. Shared interests in a major arena of politics such as the economy can serve as a working base for converging interests in other sectors. What it does require is a resumption of language: not of the kind utilized before the time of the three not-quite-wise-monkeys - but of the kind that you speak in your policy proposals #2 and, perhaps in the long term, when mutual trust has developed, #5. I believe that this policy of positive engagement is also the key to internal change and liberalization within Russia, by opening it up to more manners of communicating than silent economic cooperation and noisy confrontation with its neighbours.

November 11, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Matthias,

Thank you for your detailed comment and constructive ideas, most of which I would subscribe to. You seem to understand me perfectly right in terms of the core problem in Western-Russian relations – it is basically indeed the tension between the “liberal” and the “realist” understanding of international relations that are deeply at odds with each other and cause friction in the first place. Against this backdrop it is somewhat surprising for me that you are not convinced by my proposed solution of “reasoned” framing of the foreign policy discourses, as you write in the beginning of your comment. Let me try to (at least partly) convince you by referring to the points that you make.

Let us start with your first “sceptical point” – if you doubt that the German initiative to polish the image of Russia in the West will be successful, then how are we supposed to improve the Western-Russian relations? Somebody has to start, in my opinion, and due to the good relations with Russia it is rather Germany than Poland who could indeed be the engine for the “reset”. The lack of consensus within the EU is indeed one of the core impediments to the improvement of relations with Russia, as I write in my article. Therefore, first of all the EU obviously has to find solutions to its internal dissent. Germany has traditionally played a role of mediator, given its good normative and financial standing in the EU.

Let us now turn to the time factor, your second scepticism. Is not the overcoming of the German-French stereotypes the best example that improvement can happen and is definitely worth trying? I think the main problem of the current politics in general is the narrow time horizon. Many policies are planned and implemented in order to achieve short-term goals, which not in the last place help the incumbent to be re-elected. What we need today, if we want to achieve a sustainable result for the generations to come, is the orientation on the long-term perspective beyond every day domestic constraints and public opinion polls. Seen from this perspective, it seems to be just the right moment to start the work on the incremental adaptation of discourses.

Coming to your third scepticism: I do not render the cooperation between Russia and the West impossible due to divergent foreign policy discourses. On the contrary, in the very beginning of my article I claim that cooperation is more than flourishing in many areas such as trade, energy, research & development, security and so on. The friction happens rather on the diplomatic, discursive level (think of some truly aggressive statements by the former president Putin, for example on the Munich conference in 2007, about the West “twisting Russia’s arms”). But this kind of friction has repercussions on the practical political level, creating mistrust (particularly in the realms of energy and security) and images of an enemy. This is what the West is actually trying to overcome and this is what we are supposed to give policy recommendations about.

Speaking of Russian presidents – you mention Medvedev’s modernisation plans. Along with them a clear rhetoric change came about, which was very much welcomed by the West (most notably the Medvedev’s article “Go, Russia!”). I doubt the sincereness of Medvedev’s “democratic claims” – no matter what he himself might believe, his action are highly constrained by the dominant constellation of the ruling elites (the so-called siloviki, members of the power ministries and the secret service FSB, Putin being one of the most prominent members). Rather, I assume that Medvedev is courting the West with his benevolent rhetoric, while Putin – who arguably has the real power in Russia – keeps on deploying the old sovereignty discourse directed foremost at the domestic public. Despite all that, formally one could claim that Russia already makes some discursive adaptations – and I would argue they are deliberate ones! – and, in terms of reciprocity, the West should do the respective adaptation in order to reach an improved understanding and thus better political relations. This is, in a nutshell, my solution of “discursive framing”.

Although I whish to be brief, I cannot help responding to some of your final four points.
You are very right that the West can hardly afford abandoning its “justified criticisms” – simply because the normative component is the core of Western politics and also of the foreign policy discourse. Without having a perfect solution (yet), I nevertheless dare to argue that insisting on the normative component of relations with Russia can turn out to be rather counterproductive – it already is, in fact. This is why in this workshop we are supposed to come up with innovative ideas how to overcome this counterproductivity! The Western criticism – directed automatically to Russian internal politics – is in my view the core trigger of friction. In this sense, however hard and Realpolitik-like it might sound, – I think the West should stop voicing its criticisms too loudly, or even abandon harsh criticism at all for a certain time. In my view, then and only then Russia will stop perceiving itself as a junior, underestimated partner who is constantly being taught things (democracy, human rights...). Russia has to regain the sense of being treated as equal (something that has been repeatedly emphasised in official Russian foreign policy documents) – and then a constructive partnership is more likely to start. As for now, Russia is being treated as a junior, developing and stubborn partner or even, in some cases, as a potential threat.

Regarding common neighbourhood – I understand your confusion. Although 3) and 4) do not seem to me contradictory in theory, they are hardly feasible in practice – you are right. Russia of course does not want to be put “in the same basket” with Georgia or Kazakhstan. This is the major reason why Russia rejected the participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy.

But what about overcoming friction in the neighbourhood? My core idea about the neighbourhood is the word “common”. Ideally, the West and Russia should treat this space as their common neighbourhood and not as a sphere of competing interests or of privileged influence. I hope we can discuss how to achieve it best and look forward to your ideas.

The issue of frozen conflicts and of the UN relates directly to the common neighbourhood. I propose the UN as a possible solution to the conflicts in South Caucasus and Central Asia simply due to the fact of UN’s neutrality. In the field of conflict resolution, the UN could be a perfect mediator between Russian and Western interests in the neighbourhood, making the overcoming of Russian-Western disagreement easier. The UN is probably one of the few supranational bodies whose authority Russia fully acknowledges (thanks to its Security Council seat and the veto right). Now that Germany will hold a Security Council seat for the next two years, may be new possibilities of consultation and cooperation will arise. The UN remains one of few international bodies that might foster cooperation between Russia and the West even when other channels might seem to be deadlocked.

I would like to conclude that along with a pragmatic, incentive-driven improvement of relations, which you and Philipp propose and I support, we should keep in mind the discourses. Since they form the overarching dimension of international relations (they indicate how foreign politics is understood in a given country, and thus guide political action!), the most well-advised politics should begin with the constructive, far-reaching, and in the Machiavellian sense wise framing of politics via the discourse, no matter how long the adaptation might take.

By the way, the title of my article was given by the Atlantic Community, not by me. It should rather read “The Clash of Discourses” – thank you for drawing my attention!

November 11, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Philipp, dear Benjamin,

Thank you for your very interesting comments - I will answer tomorrow, if you do not mind. It took quite a while to answer Matthias - but please feel free to have a look at this text since it might contain some answers to your comments already. I tried to clarify my perspective as much as I could - this is why the response turned out to be similarly extensive as Matthias' comment!

Anyway, I feel that the discussion is very productive and that we have generated a lot of ideas in the course of discussion already - not to mention the articles themselves. And although some of us seem to pursue quite different approaches - I am sure that we can find a compromise and accomodate as many good ideas as possible.

I am looking forward to further discussion and also to your articles,
Philipp, I will comment on your article tomorrow too, of course!

Alexandra

November 11, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Philipp,

As promised my response to your reaction to my article. First of all thank you very much for your ideas – I appreciate them very much. Now let me address the two points that you make.

First you speak of a normative dilemma that the West is facing, when engaging with Russia. I absolutely agree with you that it would be hard for Germany to legitimise the abandonment of the justified criticism in the eyes of the domestic electorate and the media. Furthermore, the silence about certain problematic issues might undermine the overall normative and value-laden agenda of the West. I acknowledge this problem in my response to Matthias’ comment, too, and wonder what the solution could be.

Nevertheless, I disagree that engaging with Russia on these terms would be harder than it is now. I expect quite the contrary result, in fact. Engagement with Russia would be far less complicated if the normative component of the Western foreign policy would be abandoned or at least voiced less pervasively. My idea is that the West could return to the normative component on the next step of relations (say, in two or three years), when the practical every-day cooperation would be strengthened without being disturbed by the normative criticism (there have been a lot of instances in recent years when cooperation projects were put on ice due to normative discursive clashes). Anyway, in my view some compromise has to be found between the Western normative commitment both in domestic and foreign policy (which implies criticism and thus interference with Russian domestic affairs) and the Russian enduring insistence on sovereignty - as you also note in your comment. Cooperation will be much easier if Russia gets rid of the impression that most of the policy that the West pursues is directed towards interference with Russia and towards teaching it the right way. This is the matter of discourses, and this is why I insist on their transformative potential. The rightly chosen, wise (and in this sense, pragmatic) discourse may affect real politics and the course of affairs.

Your second claim concerns the common neighbourhood. You are right that the EU or NATO should not deny states the opportunities to join. However, I have a feeling that you conceptualise the common neighbourhood in terms of a zero-sum game. The states of the common neighbourhood should not be seen “in between” something. Nor are they torn between the Western institutions and Russia’s “will over the sovereignty”, as you write. To be sure, the 2008 Russian-Georgian military conflict gives reasons for being anxious. However, in order to improve the Western-Russian relations and to give the states of the common neighbourhood a feeling of security and benefit, the neighbourhood has to be treated as a COMMON one, so in terms of a multiple-sum game. For doing so, appropriate discourses can serve as a solid basis, but practical cooperation beyond discourse is needed for sure. I gave the example of the joint efforts in conflict resolution under the auspice of the UN; other forms of joint Russian-Western projects beyond hard-policy, or security, issues, are also possible– for example in soft-policy areas such as energy, education or trade. I am convinced that the common neighbourhood could thus serve as a perfect arena for “training cooperation” between the West and Russia, without invoking the Russian feeling of interference, given that Russia can be convinced of the Western multiple-sum approach.

To conclude - Reframing the Western-Russian relations from a zero-sum game towards a multiple-sum approach seems to be essential to improving relations. I hope that we can jointly find solutions which could facilitate this indispensable shift.

November 11, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Hello Benjamin,

Thank you for your valuable comment. Let me respond to you straight away.

Regarding language (your first paragraph) – you are very much right speaking of the danger when relaxing the Western (German) normative pressure. Probably the West should relax its highly normative stance, but at the same time let Russia know that the West would not tolerate Russia’s interference with the neighbours’ affairs (like in the case of Georgia in 2008). In this sense Russia is definitely instrumental about its “sovereignty discourse” since it seems to treat its immediate neighbourhood (the so-called “close abroad”) as the space of its privileged influence. The West has to try to promote the idea of a common neighbourhood (as I write in my previous comment) in order to foster mutually beneficial cooperation but at the same time delimitate Russia’s exclusive and arbitrary treatment of its “backyard”.

I very much appreciate your idea about economic interdependence as being a possible catalyst of further engagement and of the overall improvement of relations. I propose a similar idea saying that cooperation could be effectively driven by engagement in sectors which are not normatively laden. This is part of my two-steps model which I refer to in my response to Philipp (previous comment) – give the relations a fresh new start through deeper economic (or other soft-issue) engagement without putting emphasis on democratic values, and may be return to the normative components of policy in the second steps when relations have already been improved via cooperation.

Thus I support your “policy of positive engagement” and am also convinced that it could drive liberalisation in Russia, which would be beneficial both for Russian citizens and the relations with the West.

November 14, 2010

Philipp Johannes Große, Koblenz University of Applied Sciences, Silver Contributor (58)

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Hello Alexandra,

Thank you for your reply!

I don't regard our common neighborhood a zero-sum game. Actually, countries with strong economic and cultural ties to Russia may still regard themselves Western-orientated in terms of public policy. Whether they can keep this balancing-act up is a different question. Still, their engagement with Russia may bring benefits for both sides: Trade will only flourish if all players stick to the rules and political interference is limited. These rules are mainly technicalities. However, their just enforcement will be an important step forward to accountability and fair procedure both in Russia and in neighboring countries.

Linking up the regional, Russian-orientated infrastructure (roads, railways, energy networks) to Western networks will open new markets for the countries of the common neighborhood and put competitive pressure on Russia. It will also make trade between Russia and the West easier. In my opinion this is a promising approach to induce some level of reform in Russia without impeding on its sovereignty. The mutual benefits will be even higher, and here I disagree with you, if the West openly stands for its values. You're rightly demand a careful communication of our policies. Still, not insisting on reforms at all will mean lost time for both sides.

November 15, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Philipp,

Thank you very much for your response and for keeping the interesting discussion going.

Regarding the second part of your comment: I wonder how it is possible to "induce some level of reform in Russia" without encroaching on the sovereignty – both in legal and in practicale terms. I think this dilemma precisely mirrows the discursive clash and thus the main problem between the West and Russia. In line with the Western “integration” discourse (or: understanding of foreign policy, if you will), induction of reforms in a given country is not regarded intrusive in terms of sovereignty. This is due to the European understanding of the sovereignty: it is understood as relative (pooled sovereignty), instead of absolute (complete non-interference). This is why for the EU interference with domestic affairs via active promotion of own values is absolutely legitimate; what is more, in practice it constitutes the main tool of foreign policy (political conditionality, technical assistance, civil society dialogue). By the way, the universal applicability of Western values and the conviction that the “Western way of life” is per se better than any other, remains unquestioned in this view.

In Russia, as we agree, sovereignty is understood in a strict and undivided sense – this is why I render the Western subtle promotion of reform in Russia (at least the way it has been done until now) counterproductive in terms of improvement of relations. It simply does not fit into Russian vision of foreign relations between states. As Matthias notes, these clashing visions (discourses) are rooted in different world views: traditional realist (non-interference) versus modern liberal one (integration). Hence I am afraid that Germany’s insistence on reforms will not benefit both sides (although from the perspective of the populations this might be very much true), bur rather hinder cooperation and not contribute to the improvement of the relations (our ultimate goal!).

We have to find other solutions to improve the life of Russia’s citizens – and you give some very good suggestions in your article (see my comment to your article). However, it remains open if the endeavours to improve lives of Russia’s citizens necessarily will go hand in hand with the improvement of Russian-Western relations. Probably they might not due to the clashing discourses. So why not promote an active civil society dialogue via NGOs and university exchanges, as you suggest in your article, and at the same time reframe the official discourse in non-normative terms, as I propose? The disentanglement of these two foreign relations levels (people-to-people and official policy) may lead to a positive change and improve both the Western-Russian relations and the lives of Russia citizens.

So my summary at this point: if we treat these two issues (society and politics) separately we might come closer to innovative and at the same time feasible solutions to friction in Western-Russian relations.

November 15, 2010

Marcel Lewicki, University of Munich, Silver Contributor (45)

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Dear Alexandra,

I liked your approach singeling out the different discourses as a cause for friction between the Euro-Atlantic countries and Russia. I agree with you for the most part on your findings as well as your proposals to remedy the situation. Rhetoric is surely part of the problem and it is also part of the solution. The West's perceived agressiveness in expanding the EU's and, more importantly, NATO's borders to Russia is surely partly to blame for a host of different problems we face now, in particular with regards to Ukraine and Georgia.

European integration theory has been wedded to the idea of the logic of spill-over for some time, notwithstanding critiques and assertions of a possible "spill-back". The idea that "integration begets integration" is still a powerful concept in the minds of politicians and academia alike. It just doesn't work, or doesn't work that well or quickly, when it comes to Russia and other post-Soviet countries, where retaining sovereignty plays a much bigger role.

This is also the core problem when engaging with FSU countries other than Russia - because Russia considers countries like Ukraine and Georgia to be in its "near abroad" (during the Shevardnadze years it's been argued that Georgia was little more than a Russian proxy), any engagement "on equal terms", as you propose, will lead to a confrontation with Russia. I think that, parallel to promoting respect for Russia's zone of interest, Europe, and especially Germany with it's historic ties to Central and Eastern Europe, should work hard to promote reconciliation between Russia and its former satellites.

Take Georgia, for example. Russian overstretch and Western indifference have navigated both Russia and Western Europe into a quagmire of inter-ethnic rivalries and it's going to be very difficult to get out of there, peacefully. The perception of the West vis-à-vis Russia is (naturally) fundamentally different in Georgia from how it is in the West. For instance, when I worked in Georgia for a couple of months and interviewed politicians, they seriously wondered why George W. Bush and the US didn't come to Georgia's aid during the August War (they had named one of Tbilisi's main thoroughfares after him, after all..). A first step to normalise relations between countries like Georgia and Russia would be to give Georgian politicians a reality check: to tell Saakashvili that he will have to at least try to engage in constructive dialogue with Russia, maybe with European help. Russia realised that the West did not really care for the Caucasus and saw its chance to impose a policy of fait accompli on Europe and the US. Germany and Europe will have to point out to Russia that, while they respect Russia's "near abroad", it is also Europe's "backyard" - and that common strategies will go a long way further than unilateral military operations by either side.

November 15, 2010

Matthias Conrad, Free University of Berlin, Silver Contributor (59)

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Dear Alexandra,

Thank you for your long and quick reply to my comments and I apologize to have taken so long to react – and also for writing so much in my first comment!

I will try to be brief now, bear with me ;-)

To make it clear, I very much like your article and I am happy to see a constructivist perspective that is turned into a policy proposal. A few more comments:

1) You say that “it is rather Germany than Poland” that should be the engine for polishing Russia’s image in the West. Why not include Poland? I do not want to sound naïve but Russia and Poland have established much better ties under Tusk and such a trilateral campaign – although difficult, no doubt – could have far-reaching effects of countries in Eastern Europe that have equally suffered under the Soviet Union.

2) Concerning the time factor: You are right, start now! Given that changing dominant discourses is a project that takes generations – I’d say that too much time has already been wasted.

3) I agree that the clash of discourses “has repercussions on the practical political level, creating mistrust (…) and images of an enemy.” I find it strange that you say that “this is what the West is actually trying to overcome”. Maybe I do not understand you correctly, but it sounds to me that you want only the West to change its discourse. I would say that Moscow has a lot of discourse changing to do as well. To give only one example: I find it disturbing how often the (almost Carl Schmittian) term of “enemy” is used in Russian foreign policy.

4) Criticism on human rights: This will remain a heated debate among us and I am looking forward to trying to find consensus in our joint memo.

5) This applies equally for trying to find consensus on the security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Again, sorry for the long comment last time. I tried to make this one shorter ;-)

November 15, 2010

Guli Babadjanova, Philipps Universität Marburg, Gold Contributor (80)

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Dear Alexandra,

Thank you for your insightful and pragmatic theses. It is encouraging to see, that our proposals are on a similar stance.

I only have one question. How do you see the “engagement with post-Soviet countries on the same terms as Russia”? The energy-security, which is the first problem-area in relations with Russia that you’ve pointed out in your article, may turn to energy security-dilemma in the post-Soviet territory, bearing in mind bilateral energy obligations of Central Asia with Russia.

November 16, 2010

Matthias Conrad, Free University of Berlin, Silver Contributor (59)

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Dear Alexandra,

I wanted to add a small idea concerning the "engines" for discourse changing in all of Europe:

I suggested a trilateral campaign that brings together Russia, Germany and Poland. Given that Berlin and Moscow have a history of joint decision-making without taking Poland into account (the North stream pipeline was strongly criticized by Warsaw as a renewal of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact), it would be a smart thing to deliberately include Poland. One option for Germany could be to push Poland and Russia to establish a joint committee of historians to try to write their history together (as Germany did with France and then with Poland). This is a very painful and a very difficult process. But once successful, it lays a sutainable foundation on which a lot can be built. Note that Russia and Poland have come closer on the question of Katyn in April this year (cf. Putin's and Tusk's handshake in Katyn). This opens a door for a such a project, I would argue. Ultimately, such a project could serve as a "pilot" and be a very strong signal to countries in Eastern Europe.

November 16, 2010

Matthias Conrad, Free University of Berlin, Silver Contributor (59)

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Dear Alexandra,

I keep pondering about your article…again, I am very fond of your analysis which I find very inventive, convincing and well-written.

I think I keep stressing the need for economic incentives so much BECASE I SHARE your analysis of colliding (neo)realist and (neo)liberal narratives. I would argue that the economy is the sector where those two narratives intersect and offers economic and face-saving potential for both sides. This otherwise conflictive setting of clashing narratives could ironically be used to achieve progress. Economic integration with the West (via WTO, ECT) offers a real incentive for Russia, one that can be incorporated into the dominant discourse that puts so much emphasis on its “national interest”. Such economic integration is in line with the truly (neo)liberal project of the EU to foster integration by economic interdependence (which is equally a policy of pursing (supra-)national interests). Thus, the economy constitutes a “discursive overlap” in the case of Russia and the West. This creates a window of opportunity for steering the long-term discourse to mutual trust-building that should not be spoiled.

On a more theoretical level, I want to make the following argument: To put it very bluntly, social constructivists argue that discourse shapes structures, words shape things. I would argue that there is a certain immaterial quality to things as well – put bluntly, things equally shape language. What do I mean by that?

Lord Ismay, Nato’s first Secretary General, famously said about Nato's purpose: ‘To keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down’." They were quite successful in doing so. Robert Schumann described in 1950 the goal of the European Coal and Steel community to ensure "that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.” They, as well, were quite successful in achieving this goal. In both institutions, Germany is not perceived as a potential threat anymore. Why? Because structures (i. e. institutions in this case) shaped discourse to such an extent that Germany can bail out in the context of the Iraq war without completely abandoning its commitment to the West. One last example: The recurrence to cold war rhetoric surrounding the missile defense discussion in Eastern Europe was so swift because, I would argue, missile defense rang such a bell in Russia (SDI, star wars etc.). This is what I mean by the discoursive power of things.

November 17, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Marcel,

Thank you very much for your valuable comments and for sharing your ideas.

I very much support your idea that Germany has to try to promote the reconciliation between Russia and its “former satellites” – this is the key to the success in the genuinely COMMON neighbourhood. You are equally right about the necessity of a “reality check” in some of the common neighbourhood countries – Georgia was needlessly provoking Russia with its NATO aspiration although it did not have a clear perspective of accession. I visited Tbilisi just this summer and was rather surprised to see (sort of a) monument on the central street close to the parliament, reading “our foreign policy priority is the integration into the NATO”.

November 17, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Guli,

You are right, “engagement with post-Soviet countries on the same terms as (“with”, I want to say) Russia” is a rather unfortunate formulation, I discussed it with Philipp in one of the first comments to my article. It is virtually unfeasible for the EU to engage with post-Soviet countries and with Russia on equal terms without giving Russia an impression of being “downgraded”. Russia clearly wants a preferential treatment. What I mean (and some other discussants, for example Marcel, give some good hints) is the Russian and the Western engagement in the common neighbourhood on similar terms. So on the one hand treat it as a COMMON neighbourhood, not as somebody’s taken-for-granted backyard, and on the other hand respect Russia’s privileged relations with the former SU members.

November 17, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Matthias,

I agree with you, Poland could also serve as an engine of rapprochement. What I wanted to say is that Poland hardly has better relations with Russia compared to Germany. This is why if we had to choose who “pushes the reset button” I would suggest Germany should do. However, the accord between the EU member states is even more important: ideally, the whole EU (including Poland, of course) should fully back Germany in improving the relations with Russia.

Regarding your idea of pushing Poland and Russia closer to each other, for example via letting the respective historians write joint history books – honestly, no matter how much I like the idea I doubt that this could be realistic in the near future. It does not mean that we have to try, but.. Russia’s historians have not agreed between themselves (and the ruling elite, obviously) on the “correct” interpretation of the Russian history yet, particularly since the beginning of the 20 century. This is definitely a significant part of the Russian discourse, too – grounded in the perception of the inimical West, own great powerness and largely positive image of Stalin due to the victory against Hitler.

You are also right that both sides could adjust their discourses, in order to achieve mutual rapprochement. However, since we are about to give policy recommendations to Germany, I do not include the Russian side here. Another option would be to propose to Germany how it should try to persuade/influence Russia to change its discourse. Ideally we meet somewhere in the middle (I mentioned in my comments possible limitations of strongly normative discourses such as the European one).

I agree with your idea of the “discursive overlap” in the case of economy – I am sure Russia and the West should deepen their economic cooperation, and may be spill-over effects to other areas are likely to follow. Deep economic interdependence as a key to good relations (as you beautifully illustrate on the example of Germany and France), simply because conflict becomes materially impossible. I fully subscribe to this idea and thus would argue for the creation of a free trade zone between Europe and Russia (in the long run).

I also appreciate your idea about structure shaping ideas and the other way round – this is indeed a very old debate in social sciences and I tend to advocate the two-way connection, exactly the way you do. However, the things-shape-language avenue is a rather obvious one, and in the last years things seem to have shaped language in a negative way. Thus, bearing this connection in mind, we (policy-advisors) have now the chance to attract the attention of policy-makers to the less obvious notion: the transformative power of ideas and words.

I see perfect possibilities to combine our approaches – following the two-way logic they will reinforce the success. Let us try to incorporate these ideas into the policy memorandum!

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November 10, 2010 | 18 comments | Print | E-Mail Your Opinion

A Clash of Discourses: Sovereignty vs. Integration

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