It's only now - as we are entering the eighth year of the US-led international intervention in Afghanistan and while the situation is degrading by the day - that the US seems to realize there is a need to overhaul its strategy. But the remedy offered - i.e., more US and allied boots on the ground - shows a misunderstanding of the mechanics in that country.
We have erred so far away from what the outcome of years of conflict and financial/human efforts and sacrifices in Afghanistan could have/should have produced that it is not unreasonable to be willing to go back to the drawing board and do some serious rethinking - this time with the benefit of the lessons learned during these past seven years.
Nothing is irrevocable. I briefly lay out here what I think are the four legs - interdependent and to be implemented concurrently - on which a new comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan should be built:
1. Put the Afghan Army on steroids: Fast-pace the build-up of the Afghan Army so that it quickly reaches a minimum of 150,000 - and ideally 250,000 - men. The Afghan Army does not have to reach the standards of Western elite forces to be efficient. On their home turf, in addition to more than a minimum of training and decent equipment, soldiers need a fatter paycheck, incentives, and a government that can inspire confidence.
2. Reorient the mission of all US and international troops: Foreign troops must cease all operations inside Afghanistan to exclusively concentrate - under a new UN mandate and with specific geographic delimitations - on the border area with Pakistan and hermetically close it. Security operations within the main Afghan territory should be devolved to Afghan security forces. At this time, the somewhat uncontrolled presence of foreign troops on its soil not only violates Afghanistan's sovereignty, but it also antagonizes growing portions of the population, especially considering the increasing number of civilians killed by ‘friendly fire.'
3. Dramatically increase pressure on Pakistan: Islamabad, by delaying its efforts and only half-heartedly going after Al-Qaeda and affiliated leaders, has allowed extremist organizations advocating violence to prosper again and diligently work from within its territory towards the destabilization of not only Afghanistan but Pakistan itself. Washington and its allies should firmly pressure Islamabad - including by imposing sanctions - to rein in its military and intelligence apparatus (ISI) as well as halt cross-border militant violence. In the case of Pakistan, a ‘carrot-and-stick' approach in needed.
4. Overhaul the Afghan political process: The Government in Afghanistan has to change. It is an inefficient, feeble and unfortunately corruption-plagued entity that has not been able to prove itself worthy of the expectations of the international community or that of the Afghan people. The new process would involve a more assertive and independent-minded United Nations - unlike its role during the 2001 ‘Bonn Process' - as facilitator and guarantor. The UN would appoint a triumvirate of impartial elder statesmen - ideally former UN envoys to Afghanistan - who would come up with a list of seven independent Afghan personalities tasked with proposing essential changes/reforms - including new leadership and a new cabinet - that would put Afghanistan back on track and restore confidence inside and out. A Berlin-style UN sponsored conference would give its seal of approval to the process as well as set clear goals with a timetable for all major partners - i.e. Afghan Government, US, UN, European countries, Pakistan, etc.
Afghanistan faces many challenges beside or related to the war itself - booming narco-business can be cited as a manifest one. But none of the problems plaguing that country today can be resolved without restoring security and stability. The last seven years have been a failure and a terrible waste in that regard. It is about time to change strategy and come up with new approaches.
Dr. Assem Akram is the author of two books on modern Afghan History and two works of fiction. (assemakram@msn.com)
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Morgan Sheeran: Afghanistan's Need for European Expertise
- Florian Broschk: Kickstarting a New Debate on Afghanistan
- Abbas Daiyar: Negotiating with Taliban is Admitting Defeat
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January 13, 2009
Anne de Brux/HILLBLOGGER3
- I have heard senior industrial people from Khazakstan saying that the NATO operation in Afghanistan is a complete failure and NATO needs to withdraw.
- In any nation an occupying army will always be resented and resentment will grow with time.
- The Afghan army is developing well, but still has some way to go before it will be fully capable of ensuring the security in Afghanistan without some support.
- The police in Afghanistan are well beind the army in their development and effectiveness and corruption is rife.
- The government of Afghanistan is weak. This weakness is endemic in this country that has never really been stable. The tribal divides have always been stronger than national unity.
- Governance in Afghanistan is extremely weak. Corruption is an enormous problem.
- Relations with Pakistan are extremely difficult. Afghanistan needs Pakistan as a route to the outside world for trade, as a political ally with the outside world and to support refugees, as a support in governing the extremely unruly tribal areas on the borders of the two countries. Pakistan needs Afghanistan to help control the tribal areas and, also, sees Afghanistan as a country that is in their sphere of influence.
How to develop policies to help Afghanistan move forward against this background is addressed well in the article by Dr Akram. The basis of his ideas is excellent, but may need some amplification modification because, as I have understood them, they are written from a Afghanistan perspective.
1. I fully agree with putting the Afghan army on steroids. That said they still need help from outside if they are to be effective at providing security in Afghanistan even though I agree they do not need to be as effective as some of the NATO forces. I would go further and say that from my perspective it is even more important to put the Afghan police force on a double dose of steroids.
2. Re-orientating the mission of the ISAF and US forces is totally supportable, even if it still needs time for the Afghan army to come up to strength. I am not sure I agree with them entering a border protection role as this would lead to great difficulty with Pakistan and the tribes on the border. The idea of supporting Afghan and Pakistan forces to control the border I would support. It is essential that Afghanistan and Pakistan provide security in their own nation and secure their own border. For me the role of ISAF and US forces should be to take more and more of a back seat in their current role untill they can leave the country.
3. Dramatically increasing pressure on Pakistan could produce more trouble than it is worth. The government in Pakistan is not that stable and does not really control much of its own country, let alone the tribal areas. I am not sure how to address this, but more pressure on an unstable government could bring it down.
4. Overhauling the Afghan political process is essential. The main issue is governance and corruption at all levels. This starts with the police and then runs all the way to the head of state. Without a reduction in corruption the prospects for Afghanistan are not good. The proposed idea for a UN inspired triumvirate is a nice idea, but I do not believe it is realistic. The UN will never achieve the mandate to do this. The implications for other countries would be too great. If we have been unable to remove Mugabe in Zimbabwe how are we going to overturn a relatively benign ruler in Afghanistan.