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Revolution needs independence. Thus, the core of Venezuela's diplomacy is the acquisition of strategic technologies that lessen economic dependence on oil. Chávez has long shown interest in a nuclear reactor of his own, but has been unable to purchase one from Argentina or Brazil. That is why the most ambitious field of common interests between Iran and Venezuela could become a cooperation in the area of nuclear technology. A diffusion of nuclear technology among ambitious middle powers seems inevitable.

Between Iran and Venezuela, many economic complementarities exist. Venezuela has technical know-how in the gas and oil sectors, while Iran has industrial knowledge, for example in automobile manufacturing, and in the production of tractors and plastics. In these areas cooperation between those two countries already exists. Venezuela has laid ground for a gasoline refinery in Iran, undermining the most effective sanctions the West could have implemented in the struggle for Iran's nuclear program: a gasoline embargo of Iran. Even though Iran is rich in oil and gas, it lacks in refineries. Through this cooperation, Iran buys time for further negotiations until it finishes its nuclear program (be it military or civilian), and Venezuela buys sensitive technology that leads to stronger diversification and development, as well as greater autonomy from the United States.

Since the West and Venezuela's neighbors do not trust the Chávez administration with this sensitive technology, his quest for an alternative technology source is rational. The farther the revolution progresses the more important the nuclear option becomes. It frees up oil for the lucrative export business (or the kind of petrodiplomacy Bolivarianism has come to be associated with), while at the same time continuing to guarantee energy autarky at home. Venezuela has explicitly not discarded this nuclear option, has campaigned for peaceful reactor technology during Chávez's state visit in Russia, and also very publicly held up every country's "right of nuclear self-determination" in discussions on the nuclear fuel cycles of Brazil and Iran. The Chávez administration was the only member country in the IAEA to have voted against the sanctions on Iran. Official rhetoric and diplomacy has already set the ground for Venezuela's nuclear option.

Venezuela has been trying to buy a reactor for some time now, but a nuclear program of its own would be much more beneficial to the country. Even if this option continues to lie in the distant future, it nevertheless becomes more probable with every year the "revolution" rages on in both Iran and Venezuela. It is not unlikely that a perpetuated "Bolivarian Revolution" - modeled after the Cuban system under the lifelong presidency of Hugo Chávez - would raise Venezuela's self-esteem to a level where it would no longer accept the nuclear gap between itself and neighboring rival Brazil, within the struggle for regional leadership. Brazil is currently the only Latin American country with a complete fuel cycle of its own.

Venezuela is not pursuing military interests through nuclear technology. In spite of the somewhat hysterical official rhetoric and the powerful modernization of its armed forces (with Russian help), the country does not really feel threatened by potential military intervention from the United States (or its close ally Colombia). However, it does not want to stay dependent on overseas reactor technology that makes the revolution prone to potential blackmail. For Russia and Iran, Venezuela could therefore be a lucrative export market - and an opportunity to break the West's (restrictive) technology monopoly over the region.

The decisive question will be whether "nuclear brother" Iran will really share its hard-won technology with Venezuela. This is indeed unlikely. But if not for ideological then for pragmatic economic reasons, will Iran be able to provide active assistance in building nuclear reactors and maybe even enriching (small amounts of) uranium? It is true that the relationship between Iran and Venezuela is more one of convenience than of ideology. Still, the more Iran is isolated internationally, the more probable a nuclear technology transfer becomes. In a context of rising international pressure, Iran and Venezuela increasingly depend on mutual loyalty - the kind of unquestioning loyalty that can be counted upon even in adverse times. This could change the political calculus of sharing technology.

The answer to the looming nuclear multipolarity is not a penalization of the nuclear technology transfer itself (for the West will not be able to enforce it against other suppliers), but the recognition of these transactions as economic opportunities other non-Western powers have no moral qualms about. So, the answer has to be a push to rally all the suppliers around the idea of more transparency, oversight, and monitoring of the technology. But in the end, a diffusion of nuclear technology among ambitious middle powers seems inevitable - and unlikely to be approved by the West.

Christian E. Rieck is project assistant in the International Cooperation Department of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) and Editor Latin America of the World Security Network (WSN). He is also a lecturer at Humboldt-Universität Berlin and member of the KAS Working Group on Foreign Policy.

Related Materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Christian E. Rieck: Western Woes and Rogue Pride
• Christian E. Rieck: "The Axis of Good": Iran and Venezuela
• Tony Karon: Asking the Wrong Questions on Iran