Since independence Pakistan has seen military coups, wars with India, the secession of its largest province, broken democratic governments and its country used as a geostrategic base for foreign powers to fight wars in Afghanistan. Yet despite this difficult history it has never been this bad. Today the country is in the throws of what is in effect a civil war between the army and the various tribal insurgency groups in South Waziristan, retaliatory terror attacks striking military and civilian targets with deadly accuracy every couple of days. In the last month, suicide bombings and Fedayeen attacks have killed over 300 people. Beyond this there is a separate insurgency going on in Balochistan, Islamic militancy is spreading to southern Punjab, relations with Afghanistan, Iran and India are fraught, the economy is in tatters and a weak civilian government has no idea what to do about the whole picture.
Public concern is concentrated on the war: There is little support for the operation Rah-e-Nijat as the common perception is that the army is fighting a war on Washington's orders despite the wave of terrorist activity. People are searching for explanations as to why the Pakistani army is killing Pakistani citizens - something no one accepts lightly. Few want to acknowledge that the militancy is home grown - and those who do, point to a reaction to years of Western policy in the region. Many believe that the militancy is financed by the US, India and even Israel, all who could have a separate interest in seeing Pakistan fail. The US is often portrayed as playing both sides and people seriously discuss how, if instability increases, the US will try to break up the country in order to secure the nuclear arsenals. Others again discuss the possibility of an Islamic revolution Iranian style - which would keep the country together but would get rid of the foreign influences on the ground. Whilst the virulent anti-Americanism has been a given (but in the West little accepted) fact for a while now, it would have been impossible to imagine such discussions even three months ago.
Part of the problem for the Pakistani society is the lack of future vision for their country - there is no aim beyond Rah-e-Nijat. There is no conception of what victory or success will mean in South Waziristan. Once the militants have been killed - what then? There will be more who will take their place. FATA might be held by the army (and will that mean an occupation lasting years?), but the insurgents can simply regroup across the provincial border in Punjab, or across the international border in Afghanistan. As a result of the political mess - in reaction to America‘s war on terror and militant Islam, both of which have killed scores of civilians, many citizens seem to have turned to religion. Today in the streets of Lahore and Karachi, there is an increased presence of women covered in hijabs or even full abayas, as well as men in loose salwar kamises sporting beards. Across liberal educational institutions such as LUMS the mosque fills at prayer time. Pakistanis are looking for answers that their government simply cannot give them.
Conclusions for Europe and North America
Currently in the UK and the US the voices advocating a withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan are getting louder. Whilst a withdrawal of western troops from the region will be welcomed across the board in Pakistan, it might already be too late to reverse Islamic militancy and terror. Even if Rah-e-Nijat is declared a success, the likelihood that the various militancy groups will resume their anti state activities once the snows have melted next spring is indeed very high.
The only way the West can help stem what is likely to be years and years of terror in Pakistan is by following up a military withdrawal of troops with a substantial cash injection into the economy, making sure that the money does not get hogged by the military, caught up in the very corrupt civilian governmental system or simply serve to pay for western consultants and contractors in the country. It is a proven fact that militancy becomes less attractive to those who can feed their families, have a roof over their heads and have a life to look forward to. For this to happen, the money has to reach ordinary Pakistanis.
Dr Marie Lall is a South Asia Specialist at the Institute of Education at the University of London. Currently she is based at the Lahore University of Management Science in Lahore.
Related Material From the Atlantic Community:
- Greg Randolph Lawson: Maintaining Strategic Flexibility
- Harlan Ullman: Stakes are Higher in Pakistan than Afghanistan
- Shuja Nawaz: Pakistan and the Taliban: Leaders Caught Betwixt and Between



November 16, 2009
Jakob Schirmer, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Gold Contributor (134)