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January 19, 2009

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1100)

The first test - the gas crisis - was passed largely positively by the Czech presidency. As the first country from Central and Eastern Europe to preside in the EU Council, it brought to attention of the western Europe the dependence of south-eastern EU countries on the Russian gas supplies. It also managed to convince its heavier Western-Europe partners to act decisevely, but stopped short of taking sides in the dispute. In the larger picture it is also a success for the Ukrainians, that the EU has taken care of the problem and did not allow Moscow to dictate the conditions of the deal. Ultimately, the way this conflict was resolved, is an optimistic sign of the EU's involvement and hopefully it will be a model for the future.

January 19, 2009

Alexandr Nikiforov

Mr. Swierczynski,
EU took sides in the "gas conflict". It played, together with the European media, on the Ukranian side. But, as in case of "Georgian war", the truth was on the Russian side: Kiev was stealing gas and closed the pipelines. The Ukranian arguments were just awesome: we need the gas for ourselves, we do not want to pay and really why to pay at all? When a "democratic state", a "NATO and EU aspirant" and a "solid friend of the US" steals from a "totalitarian" one, it is not stealing, it is called justice.
When faced with such a simplicity bordering on stupidity, even Mr. Topolanek with his pronounced anti-Russian views got to back down and put some pressure on the "pro-western liberals" in Kiev.
As for the question, who won - read the Putin-Timoshenko agreements and see - what the Ukranians wanted to pay and what they will to pay. Of course, they can easily take they word back. A "democratic state" is not bound by any obligations to the "totalitarian" one. But doing so this particular "young democracy" will further embarace itself in front of its European sponsors. Its US sponsors do not care about such minute things as hones and good name.
And once again Mr.Swierczynski - Putin is one of a so few living politicians of a world caliber. Will you disagree?

January 19, 2009

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVN24, Diamond Contributor (1100)

Mr Nikiforov
I do not recall that any of the official EU statements issued in the course of the gas dispute used the terms you quoted as if they were used. I may be wrong. But I guess you would not find many references to these terms even in unofficial statements of EU's top leaders - please do not take my compatriots into consideration, they're not top leaders by any mean. As to who is and who isn't a politician of a world caliber - this is something that history makes judgements on, not us. But the word "caliber" is very meaningful in this particular case.
Regards.

January 20, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Mr. Rovensky,

Thank you for your article. I am interested to learn more about the role of the Czech Presidency within the Trio as this pertains to its relations with its predecessor, France, and its successor, Sweden, in three specific areas:

1) the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty after Ireland's failed referendum;
2) the policy debate about reliance on nuclear energy in the broader security debate; and
3) European defense initiatives in the context of closer EU-NATO relations as the European Security Strategy (ESS) came up for review in December 2008.

My first question concerns the extent to which you believe that France may still try to dominate within the Trio using the argument that only a large state can address foreign policy crises. In other words, are the Czech Republic and Sweden's turns in the Chair likely to be overshadowed by French initiatives?

Or can the Trio use their differences to create initiatives that open a negotiating space in which the other member states locate their interests, much like the French-German tandem did when it functioned constructively?

My next question relates to the steps the Czech Presidency may be taking in the eventuality of a second Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the next referendum. What action (s) has (ve) the Czech Presidency taken to prepare for this possibility?

My next question speaks to the other issues mentioned above. Will the radar installation issue in domestic politics interfere with progress on the ESS even if the US Congress decides not to push ahead with the project? If missile defense is used as a bargaining chip in which the US agrees to drop the initiative in exchange for more European Union cooperation on Iran or Afghanistan, how might this impact on the Czech Presidency's agenda?

Finally, what is the Czech Presidency's view regarding increased reliance on nuclear energy in the broader security debate? Is this an option in the future for the Union as a whole? Certain member states are for the idea. Others are clearly opposed to this option.
Is there room for compromise? Is this a priority of the Trio Presidency and/or the Czech Presidency in particular?

I would appreciate hearing your views. Greetings from New York, Colette Mazzucelli

January 20, 2009

Marie Grunert, intern at SWP, Silver Contributor (59)

That times are unfriendly for changes to be made, and in particular positive ones, is hardly debatable. Obama as new American President is left with a difficult task and the same holds true for the Czech Republic as current rotating President of the Council of the European Union. In addition to the grim financial climate, the unprecedented “gas war” and still absence of Lisbon Treaty are putting the Czech Republic, notorious for its rather euroskeptic stance, in a challenging albeit difficult position. The “Sarkozy factor” is also not to be neglected; the relatively successful and much mediatized French Presidency makes it even harder for the Czechs. As such, the expectations from the Czech Presidency to make big steps forwards at the European level are low.

This having been said I would like to comment on one point. I think that the success of the EU as mediator during the gas crisis has been overestimated. True, shipments seem to have restarted; true the EU has committed itself in the region as observers have been deployed near the pipelines to monitor whether Ukraine is siphoning off any gas transit. However, I don’t think that this lies from a wave of genius coming from the Czech Presidency as some media presented it ,but rather as an unavoidable response since several EU countries were directly affected by the crisis.

The crisis has however succeeded in creating or rather re-assessing the utmost necessity I) not only to vary energy resources due to the very high dependence on Russian gas (1/4 of gas supplies imported to the EU come from the Kremlin II) diversify the supply pipeline routes. Maybe this awareness will translate into a more active than expected role of the Czech Presidency? After all even if times are indeed harsh there seems to be a window of opportunity for the EU to (re)act, and hopefully circumstances will press the Czech Presidency to use it (first step, ratify Lisbon Treaty).

January 20, 2009

Marie-Claude Corneauster, self-employed, Gold Contributor (125)

"the Czech government's position is all the more difficult after taking over the helm from European heavyweight France, whose president Nicolas Sarkozy seems hell-bent on convincing the rest of the world of Prague's inability to lead the EU."

I can't see that you are surpised of that, but that you are rather complaining about the heavy weight of France. Now if you check the medias on a world scale, which country they are pointing in EU the first ??? France of course, as being responsible for the good and the bad things that happen in the world (after the Jews).

Apart the fact that France is a medias star, it' also obfuscating her past as an important empire, (still kinda carried on with the "Arab policy", and her griefs against evil States such as Iran, that lots of french soldiers and persons had to pay with their blood), that is playing as influencing part in the UN, NATO, Atlantic decisions.

Also, in the energy conflict with Russia, you can't say that France was neutral, she could have been so (according to her energy independance, even for gaz, Sahara gaz can easily replace the russian gaz), in the contrary, she chose to support her affected EU partners, I wonder which one of these partners would support France when she is in trouble ???

The "none" comes easily to my mind, and we are in use to it ; fortunately de Gaulle taught us that we had to take care of ourselves.

I am not devaluating the Czeck republik, as mere, just that our EU fellows should acknoledge where is the "error" in attribuating the same weight to any EU nation. It doesn't work in the "real life", never it has. You perfectly know that each nation president works for himself and or for his country first. The thing is that Sarko made them move on in the self-absorbed EU instances, and that the people there had not the habit of that.

So, if Mr Klaus wants to make more "movements", why not ? I would then applause him, and I am on his side as far as the global warming hoax, as well as far as his will to reduce the EU administration, so Mr Klaus, go on please !!!

January 21, 2009

Markus Drake, atlantic-community.org, Gold Contributor (80)

As far as the Czech presidency goes, Mr. Klaus will fortunately be restricted to two ceremonial speeches at the European Parliament. While they certainly will be interesting events, their Realpolitik-effect will most likely be minimal. It is rather to the Czech government and bureaucratic institutions that one should look when asking who is in charge in the EU right now. And that is good.

Of course, any refusals to sign agreements from Mr. Klaus' part may do some damage. That is unfortunate, and while a part of a normal democracy, any extended veto rights of a otherwise largely ceremonial president should give parliament and government reasons to look over such "loopholes" with the intent of modernizing government in general. The institution of a strong president goes a long way back in European tradition, to when an absolute head of state had to be replaced with another. It has been useful at times, even in post-WWII-contexts, to centralize executive power, foreign representation and even supreme command of the army in one person, but after, say, '68, that role has been played out. Just ask (Finnish president) Tarja Halonen. Or Martti Ahtisaari, for that matter.

January 21, 2009

Member deleted

Dear Ms. Mazzucelli,

Thank you for your comments and questions, here are my answers.

„My first question concerns the extent to which you believe that France may still try to dominate within the Trio using the argument that only a large state can address foreign policy crises. In other words, are the Czech Republic and Sweden's turns in the Chair likely to be overshadowed by French initiatives?
Or can the Trio use their differences to create initiatives that open a negotiating space in which the other member states locate their interests, much like the French-German tandem did when it functioned constructively?“

France has always been a leading power in the European integration process and that its ambitions in this respect are evident, so much so with Nicolas Sarkozy in the presidential seat. So the question is not whether France may try to dominate but to what extent it will do so. This was apparent during the war in Gaza, with at least two European cease-fire initiatives: the one lead by the Czech presidency and the other lead by Mr. Sarkozy.
In light of this, however, such a situation shows the rationale behind getting rid of six-month rotating presidencies (as envisioned by Lisbon) and having one or two representatives for a common security and defence policy (no doubt this will be a very coveted job). In my eyes such an arrangement would be much more constructive at least on the surface, but it would not get rid of the internal squabbles.

“My next question relates to the steps the Czech Presidency may be taking in the eventuality of a second Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the next referendum. What action (s) has (ve) the Czech Presidency taken to prepare for this possibility?”

The Czech presidency will finish by June, and due to the fact that the Irish will vote in autumn, there will not be any vital steps Prague will be taking. This being said, however, does not mean that we have got rid of our own ratification problems – for example, as I have mentioned, president Klaus may be inclined not to sign the treaty when it gets ratified. Lech Kaczynski, the Polish president, announced just recently that he will not sign Lisbon until he sees the result of the second Irish referendum. I expect Klaus will act in much the same manner.
In addition, it seems that our government will stall yet again as our Upper House, the Senate, is rather hostile towards the document (many Klaus-minded civic democrats are there) and will want safeguards, much like the Irish did during the December summit of the E.U. So it seems that the Lisbon Treaty is for some rough times ahead also in the Czech Republic.

“My next question speaks to the other issues mentioned above. Will the radar installation issue in domestic politics interfere with progress on the ESS even if the US Congress decides not to push ahead with the project? If missile defense is used as a bargaining chip in which the US agrees to drop the initiative in exchange for more European Union cooperation on Iran or Afghanistan, how might this impact on the Czech Presidency's agenda?”

This is a very difficult question and all eyes are pinned on Barack Obama at the moment. The radar installation is very unpopular amongst the general public in the Czech Republic and frequent reminiscences of foreign troops are drawn (some European states also voiced their concerns).
In my eyes, there needs to be some sort of renegotiation between NATO and the EU, which is trying to create its common security and defence policy, because to a certain degree these two initiatives keep clashing and will continue to do so unless there will be some clear guidelines.
To answer the question about dropping the defence shield in exchange for Iran and Afghanistan – I primarily believe that a lack of an effective common foreign policy is detrimental to other efforts to deal with Europe as a whole and that without such a policy, it will boil down to the initiatives of individual countries. Again, in this respect, I think the Czech government would be very adamant about the fact that such an arrangement could not be made on a European level because it is a bilateral matter between Prague and Washington.

“Finally, what is the Czech Presidency's view regarding increased reliance on nuclear energy in the broader security debate? Is this an option in the future for the Union as a whole? Certain member states are for the idea. Others are clearly opposed to this option.
Is there room for compromise? Is this a priority of the Trio Presidency and/or the Czech Presidency in particular?”

Energy security, especially after the gas crisis, is at the top of the agenda for the Czech presidency. As for having a European nuclear energy policy, I remain sceptical due to the positions of some member states (Austria, for example). However, I believe that Europe is at least realising the urgent need to diversify its energy dependency and create new energy sources.

I hope my answers provided you with at least some of the answers you were looking for.
Jan Rovensky

January 21, 2009

Member deleted

Dear Mr. Corneauster

Thank you for your comment, though I did not at times understand what you mean.

Firstly, I am not surprised that Mr. Sarkozy is trying to lead Europe, he is an ambitious politician and surely a leader of world-calibre. On the other hand, like it or not, if the E.U. rules are to function, they must be upheld. With all due respect to Mr. Sarkozy, a mark of a good politician is not only to lead but also to know when to keep one’s distance providing the occasion calls for it. His cease-fire efforts in Gaza, though no doubt laudable, in the end undermine the creation of a common foreign policy (working under the assumption that France is not what everyone thinks of when one thinks of a common EUROPEAN foreign policy). And I am certainly not complaining about anything, and wish France all its weight and importance it deserves in the world and see the logic of it being fairly represented with its size in mind.

Regarding the gas crisis, I never said anything about France being neutral and it is quite logical that it would support its European partners as the situation was (at least in supporting E.U. member states) rather straightforward.

Regarding Mr. Klaus, I believe that his comments are self-defeating but this would require a much larger debate.

Jan Rovensky

January 21, 2009

Member deleted

Dear Ms. Grunert

Firstly, to your comment that "the Czech Republic, notorious for its rather euroskeptic stance" I would like to point out in the strongest possible terms that this is a media image created by Mr. Klaus and his group. Politicians as everywhere over Europe like to blame Brussels for all ills and thus create a hostile atmosphere towards the E.U. Czechs are not eurosceptic per se, they are being made so and pushed into such a position.

Secondly, I agree that the E.U. could have done very little and in the end if it weren´t for Russian and Ukraine agreeing to some arrangement, there would still be no gas. In this respect I do not think any presidency could have done more, short of declaring war! I also agree with your assumption that Europe woke up (hopefully) from its energy complacency and got another clear signal that it is nigh time to act. However, I fear that this will not translate into the ratification of Lisbon.

Jan Rovensky

January 21, 2009

Marie-Claude Corneauster, self-employed, Gold Contributor (125)

Dear Mr Rovensky,

" (in the end undermine the creation of a common foreign policy (working under the assumption that France is not what everyone thinks of when one thinks of a common EUROPEAN foreign policy). "

when was the EU policy working ?, don't remember prior to last summer !!!

ah yes, when MM Mitterand and Kohl worked together

Now, if one would have wait for the EU policy intervening in the Gaza war, I expect that some people would still talk about who's gonna go there, while our surburbs would have started their true intifadah, I guess that there isn't any emergency to treat a "hot" problem in your aseptised sphere

yeah, he even did that, not alone though, he had to convice some of his fellows :

"French President Nicholas Sarkozy plans to host in the coming months an international conference in Paris to advance stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, the French daily Le Figaro reported Tuesday.

Sarkozy seeks to capitalize on the momentum created by the participation of European leaders at a summit Sunday in Sharm al-Sheikh summit on the recent hostilities in Gaza, according to Le Figaro.

The paper also states that Sarkozy convinced German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who had feared the cease-fire would not be kept, to attend the summit in Egypt.

The goal of the conference, the paper reported, is to reach a peace accord within a year, and it will be held a few weeks after a meeting of European foreign ministers in Egypt due to take place in February.

The form of the summit will reportedly be similar to that of the one the United States hosted in Annapolis in late 2007.

About 40 countries participated in the U.S. conference, including Saudi Arabia, Syria and Indonesia. "

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057116.html

January 24, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Dear Mr. Rovensky,

Thank you for your comments. I agree with you that the new posts envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty will not eliminate conflicts that presently exist among the member states pertaining to responsibilities in external relations. It is quite possible that, depending on the personalities chosen in these positions, the EU policy system may fundamentally change.

I do believe there is an on-going need for the Trio Presidency in order to engage the different member states in the integration process, especially the small and medium-sized countries. European Union policy making risks becoming too dominated by the larger countries. This intergovernmental trend is likely to become more dysfunctional as enlargements continue.

Each country learns from its experiences in the Chair and this opportunity should be offered to each member state to give the country a chance to lead the Union in close cooperation with the other members of the Trio. In my understanding of integration, national politicians and administrations appreciate the chance to work together for a specific period of time in their own interests and in the interest of Europe.

I will pay close attention to the debate around the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech Republic and will look to the lead of the Swedish Presidency as the Irish participate in the second referendum. Do you believe that the Czech ratification might scuttle the second Irish no if there are complications, for example, if the Czechs insist on safeguards to ratify?

I appreciate your comments regarding the need for a renegotiation between the EU and NATO pertaining to the common security and defense policy. However, do you believe that there is enough solidarity among the European Union countries themselves on these issues to make such a renegotiation feasible? Or would the decisions be left to those countries with the most assets: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland? Moreover, as you underline, some issues can only be addressed on a bilateral basis with Washington even though the implications for the Continent as a whole are clear.

Lastly, pertaining to the nuclear energy question, could you envisage a smaller core grouping of countries moving ahead in this policy area leaving open the possibility for others to join at a later time?

Thank you in advance for your responses.

Greetings from New York, Colette Mazzucelli

January 26, 2009

Member deleted

Dear Ms. Mazzucelli,

Thank you for your questions and comments.

I am not sure about Lisbon, but the European Constitution (Lisbon is 98% the same thing) envisaged much larger cooperation for these trio presidencies than at the moment. In any case, there seems to be a general push in this direction as six months does seem rather short to sensibly promote worthwhile policies. The possibilities of one member state dominating another are, however, always present. This brings me to your second point, regarding domination of policies by large member states. I believe that this danger has always been here yet the E.U. managed to sort out these problems and will do so, I believe, even in the future.

Regarding Lisbon and the Czech Republic, I think that there are, unfortunately, difficult times ahead as the Treaty can become hostage to internal power struggles but do not feel that our ratification would somehow affect the result in Ireland; I frankly think that the government will delay its decision regarding Lisbon after the Irish referendum. I was actually thinking of writing something for the Atlantic Community on this issue.

As to the NATO – EU defence relationship, this truly is a difficult question. At the present, I do not think there is enough solidarity you speak about, but hope there will be sometime in the future. There are obviously larger issues involved, for example the creation of a possible European defence force which would supersede the national ones, but this is a matter of decades as integration will continue. A renegotiation with NATO would then seem much more logical. But again, this is something for a longer discussion.

Coming back to the nuclear energy, there is logic to your comment, however, I think that for a European energy strategy to be effective, say, 90 per cent of member states would have to join in (yet I point out that regarding E.U. energy, I am not an expert). The concept of closer cooperation is nothing new in Europe and has been mentioned a number of times (for example regarding to the common security and defence policy). However, this would create a two-speed Europe, and effectively a union within the union; most integrationists realise that this is a double-edged sword and are therefore very wary about such a development. I believe it is part of the integration ordeal that we have to wait for the other states.

Best regards,

Jan Rovensky

January 31, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Dear Mr. Rovensky,

Thank you for your comments. I would like to read your commentary about the Czech Republic's plans to continue with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty after the second Irish referendum. May I send you an analysis I wrote about leadership in the Union by the first Trio Presidency? I would like to continue research into successive Trio Presidencies and appreciate your insights as a Czech citizen.

The domination by the larger member states has always been an issue in European integration, as you explain. I do think that when Germany, for example, has been aware of the need not to alienate the smaller member states, that integration has led to policies that the majority of member states could accept in their own respective interests, i.e., Single European Act. Presently, there seems to be a need for leadership that can identify policy areas that allow integration to deepen. Internal security may be one area as more responsibilities shift from intergovernmental cooperation to community competence.

I do believe that European security and defense policy will always be subject to the "logic of diversity" in that geography and history, particularly with regard to colonization, accentuates differences among member states. My sense is that France will insist on leading any new system created in this policy area as a result of Lisbon and that much depends on the dynamic that France and Britain can establish ten years after St. Malo. In this area, I believe a two-speed Europe is a de facto reality, which the larger member states insist upon because only a core group can take the necessary decisions to move ahead. However, will this allow Europe to speak with one voice.

I appreciate your comments. All the best and greetings from New York, Colette Mazzucelli