I am afraid I must be the skeptic in the bunch. Security is a classic collective action problem in which distributing the burden is not made easier by shrinking the resources that are available to contribute to the collective good in question. For NATO and the EU, the problem is compounded by different perceptions regarding current or potential threats - some members are greatly concerned about Russia while others feel no threat from it at all - and wide disparities in how the burden is shared.
While allegations that “Europe” is free-riding on the United States still attract the most attention in the academic literature and popular commentary, much greater realization is becoming apparent regarding asymmetries between the European members themselves. In the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, for example, in terms of the size of population, armed forces and gross domestic product, several European states are carrying a proportional burden as great as or greater than that of the US (e.g. Denmark, Estonia, and Norway). Yet others, most notably France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, are not matching their ISAF contributions to their military and economic capabilities. These political realities mean that austerity will very likely mean much less security overall.
Making the debate even more complex is the problem of accurately identifying the tradeoffs and probable outcomes to enable a comparison of various policy and budgetary options. When a private enterprise cuts back, there is a basic indicator of whether reorganization is increasing efficiency: financial profit. It is a relatively straightforward question to determine whether a business is making more money, or at least reducing the rate at which it is losing money – but what are the tangible security outcomes when there are no profits to measure? How does one assess changes in the value of security in comparison to changes in defense budgets?
Nevertheless, there are several principles that would be useful in helping to maintain security capabilities despite budget cuts:
- Flatten organizations and reduce overhead. Decisions on where to cut budgets are made at higher headquarters, which will be subject to bureaucratic pressures and natural human tendencies to protect one’s own position and those of immediate subordinates and colleagues. Avoid a bias towards protecting those at the top: the reductions in headquarters personnel and budgets should generally be greater than, or at a minimum proportional to, those at lower levels.
- Develop capable reserves, trading time for cost. Reserve forces are less costly than those on active duty. However, they require additional training to bring them up to the same readiness level as active forces. The needed amount of time is an element of risk that policy makers and strategists must consider when determining the capability of the total defense force. Furthermore, reserve units must be frequently tested to ensure their capabilities are accurately assessed and understood.
- Reduce the appetite for new missions. The majority of analysts had been predicting that an era of reduced defense budgets was beginning and thus Afghanistan would probably be the last expeditionary operation for NATO. Then, the mission in Libya emerged and put great stress upon the capabilities of several allies – to the point of public discussion as to whether they would be able to logistically support their combat operations if the mission continued much longer. Policy makers, or perhaps more importantly their domestic publics, need to understand that cuts in defense budgets must also produce reductions in security ambitions.
- Don’t sacrifice long-term capability development just because it seems easier. A natural human tendency is a bias towards the present. Cutting long-term investment in areas such as training and education, new equipment fielding, and research and development may appear to be simple tradeoffs that will reduce the near-term pain. However, the needs of tomorrow must be considered as well as those of today. Otherwise, the failure to adequately invest in these areas now could mean that the future force will lack sufficient capability to deter future competitors and meet future threats.
It is theoretically possible that sovereignty and trust issues can be overcome to allow bold initiatives such as specialization and pooling equipment amongst allies to succeed. Regardless, significant attention should be paid to more mundane organizational transformation approaches such as those outlined above. These offer the most realistic chance of mitigating the effects of austere defense budgets.
Dr. Schnaubelt is Transformation Chair at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. These opinions are his own and not the official position of NATO or the US Government.
Related articles from Atlantic Community's "Security Despite Austerity" theme week:
- Christian Mölling: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense
- Aleksandr Blagin: Europe's Choice: Diplomacy or War
- Nikolas Gvosdev: A Modest Proposal for Pan-European Defense
- Robert Helbig: Beyond Pooling and Sharing: Open Europe's Markets
- Andrew Dorman: European Defense in an Age of Austerity
- Dmitri A Titoff: Open Markets, Better Arms
- Jason Naselli: US Should Invest in European Militaries
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September 19, 2011
Paul-Robert Lookman, http://geopolitiek-in-perspectief.blogspot.com/, Platinum Contributor (280)
The author bluntly states that the fact that certain European NATO members underspend on defence in relative terms “will very likely mean much less security overall”, but he fails to substantiate that claim against real threats. Where the author speaks about different threat perceptions within NATO, Russia is only a part of that equation. To borrow from Stephen M. Walt (“Is NATO irrelevant?”, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/24/is_nato_irrelevant), the ill-fated Afghan adventure will have divisive long-term effects on alliance solidarity.
The one part in his piece that everyone will agree with is “Reduce the appetite for new missions.” Taxpayers have never seen a cost/benefit analysis of the various military missions of the last few decades, where – to compare with the business environment – shareholders rightly demand this type of information and hold management to account. A comparable scrutiny of the military would be very healthy. Without accountability, “domestic publics” will never accept “that cuts in defence budgets” will “also produce reductions in security ambitions”. The “needs of tomorrow” must be presented to publics in a credible way. Who is calling for “sufficient capability to deter future competitors and meet future threats” if the average taxpayer does not perceive “competition” or “threats” to the same extent as politicians and military decision makers?