Stopping the proliferation of both nuclear materials and technology along with promoting the denuclearization of rogue states have long stood as pillars of the transatlantic alliance. Yet despite the stalwart efforts of the United States and its NATO allies, North Korea has become a significant transatlantic threat due to its persistent proliferation of nuclear materials along with its production and international trafficking of illicit drugs, currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals. Today, the U.S. government is realizing that it must promote many of the long-held norms of its transatlantic alliance in its global diplomacy – most recently, trying to convince China to elevate denuclearization to a higher spot on its priority list.
During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington in early 2011, North Korea was, not surprisingly, a hot topic on the Obama administration’s agenda. President Barack Obama stressed the regional and global threat North Korea will continue to pose while encouraging China to take a tougher, more constructive stance towards its northeastern neighbor in the year ahead. However, despite persistent pleas by the United States and its allies, Beijing will likely choose to do little to change the behavior of its communist-ally, instead preserving its own long-term economic, security, and geopolitical interests. Thus, a patient Beijing will continue to make gossamer promises to an anxious administration in Washington, prioritizing stability and the satisfaction of its own goals on the Korean peninsula rather than capitulating to those of the international community.
Although China has more diplomatic and economic sway over North Korea than any other member of the international community, it also has the highest level of allegiance to its historical ally. The Chinese are not willing to sacrifice both their leverage and the status quo in exchange for tougher policies that would upset or marginalize the already precarious Pyongyang regime. Therefore, Beijing’s ultimate goal is stability on the Korean peninsula. Further, the Chinese have promoted economic interdependence with North Korea, investing in the development of mass mineral projects located in the northern portion of the country – investment they are not willing to lose as a result of reunification or potential collapse of the North Korean regime. China recently announced it will invest around $10 billion in North Korea over the next few years, an obvious attempt to bolster the failing economy and incentivize its neighbor to mitigate its brinkmanship tendencies.
For geopolitical reasons, China seeks the perpetuation of the Kim Family regime, hedging against a future U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula by maintaining stability in North Korea and boosting economic relationships with its Asian neighbors, notably South Korea. It is also in China’s nationalist rhetoric to respect the national sovereignty of other nations, refraining from interference or commenting on the political and economic affairs of those countries others will more openly chastise. Indeed, the international community should expect China to persistently support and promote the Six Party Talks, opting for peaceful "dialogue and consultation" rather than condemning the North’s nuclear program or attaching conditions to economic or humanitarian aid. China is certainly aware of the myriad security risks North Korea poses, recognizing the potential deluge of refugees that could flow across its border if the North ever collapses along with the massive chemical and biological weapons stockpiles that would need to be secured as a result. Although the Chinese would prefer a denuclearized Korean peninsula, Beijing has accepted the reality of a nuclear North Korea. Accordingly, China prefers stability rather than conflict and is not willing to sacrifice the little leverage it has to mollify global security concerns, such as the proliferation of nuclear technology to pariah regimes – namely Iran and Burma. It certainly seems that the norms of non-proliferation promoted by the United States and its European allies will take a backseat to other concerns for the foreseeable future, a major setback indeed.
Despite global remonstrations, an ascendant Beijing will continue to prioritize its own national interests rather than satisfying the common interests of the international community. Consequently, North Korea will continue its cyclical behavior of charm diplomacy alternating with brinkmanship behavior while China interjects or opts to use its leverage only when the interests of Beijing are threatened. Thus, the transatlantic community – through the voice of the United Nations – must continue to encourage dialogue with both China and North Korea in the hope that persistent diplomacy will yield denuclearization, and the façade of peace – perhaps only temporarily – on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, while maintaining the status quo in North Korea is perhaps a gamble for China, its perception of the long-term economic, diplomatic, security, and geopolitical benefits far outweigh the potential costs.
Bailey H Culp is a graduate student, majoring in International Security at the Univeristy of Denver, Josef Korbel School of International Studies.
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March 4, 2011
Member deleted
As the title suggests, if I were China, I would certainly follow the advices given on "Atlantic-Community" open think tank and pay very close attention to the criticism there, as well. And,
if I were China, I will be as subtle and as transparent as I possibly can in building my self-confidence, before I build mutual confidence, or both, simultaneously, in the same manner. In addition,
if I were China, I will abandon the ideology which prevailed in China for the last two decades or so, namely the ideology that "Anything that I do, I do it for money.". Also,
if I were China, I will listen very carefully to what Donald Trump has to say about China, airing now on Piers Morgan Tonight Talk Show, CNN, Live. Now then,
if I were China, I will state my opinions in languages understandable to the global community with a higher moral ground. For that,
if I were China, I will do my homework as hard and as diligently as possible on a global altitude. For the future,
if I were China, I will look at Brookings Institution's view into next century very carefully, and cooperate. On Africa,
if I were China, I will study very very hard on World Bank's publication "Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Role in it", along with key worlds in it, namely Transformation (internally and externally) – transformative in nature, Sustainable, Education, Health, Food, Women’s right, Climate Change, Infrastructure, Finance – access to, Private Sector – engine of growth, Goals – a 60% increase in per capita income ten years from now - along with continental share of world trade doubling to 8%, Sector by Sector Approach, Country by Country basis, Decentralization (WB offices in Africa), Investment/Business Climate Perception, Shocks (macroeconomic, natural, Idiosyncratic, and Conflict and political violence), safety nets, Good Governance, Public Sector Capacity, Accountability, Transparency, “Marshall Plan for Africa,” – aimed at relaxing the financing constraint to reach the MDGs (and beyond), South-South relationships, Harmonization – by greater transparency of information, Regional Solution, Fragile States Hubs, Client-driven focus (on development and results), Sub-regional Technical and Knowledge Hubs, Investment lending reforms (will shift the focus from inputs and internal procedures to outcomes, development effectiveness, implementation support, risk management and accountability, while streamlining and rationalizing portfolio management and improving WB's own “execution deficit”.), Internal Effectiveness, Results. W.r.t the internet,
if I were China, I will really delve into and find out what kind of internet contents are available there within China, albeit not being an Ah Q, before banning US President's or US Secretary of State's efforts etc. to communicate, and let it be known the US foreign policies to common citizens of the world in China. On democracy,
if I were China, I will be consistent in my demand domestically, within China, and globally, in the United Nations. On governments,
if I were China, I will keep my promises on the goals of the grand plan 2020, when the governments, local and central, will be replenished and trained to be able to connect to the international community. On words,
if I were China, I will honor Hu Jintao's declaration about a couple of years ago that "Whatever we said, were done.".
(Originally published on :
http://transpacificthinktanks.blogspot.com/2011/02/if-i-were-china....
for reference.)