Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

March 3, 2011 |  8 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

China's North Korea Gamble

Bailey H Culp: Despite persistent pleas by the transatlantic community, Beijing will likely choose to do little to change the belligerent behavior of North Korea, instead preserving its own long-term economic, security, and geopolitical interests.

 

Stopping the proliferation of both nuclear materials and technology along with promoting the denuclearization of rogue states have long stood as pillars of the transatlantic alliance. Yet despite the stalwart efforts of the United States and its NATO allies, North Korea has become a significant transatlantic threat due to its persistent proliferation of nuclear materials along with its production and international trafficking of illicit drugs, currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals. Today, the U.S. government is realizing that it must promote many of the long-held norms of its transatlantic alliance in its global diplomacy – most recently, trying to convince China to elevate denuclearization to a higher spot on its priority list.

During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington in early 2011, North Korea was, not surprisingly, a hot topic on the Obama administration’s agenda. President Barack Obama stressed the regional and global threat North Korea will continue to pose while encouraging China to take a tougher, more constructive stance towards its northeastern neighbor in the year ahead. However, despite persistent pleas by the United States and its allies, Beijing will likely choose to do little to change the behavior of its communist-ally, instead preserving its own long-term economic, security, and geopolitical interests. Thus, a patient Beijing will continue to make gossamer promises to an anxious administration in Washington, prioritizing stability and the satisfaction of its own goals on the Korean peninsula rather than capitulating to those of the international community.

Although China has more diplomatic and economic sway over North Korea than any other member of the international community, it also has the highest level of allegiance to its historical ally. The Chinese are not willing to sacrifice both their leverage and the status quo in exchange for tougher policies that would upset or marginalize the already precarious Pyongyang regime. Therefore, Beijing’s ultimate goal is stability on the Korean peninsula. Further, the Chinese have promoted economic interdependence with North Korea, investing in the development of mass mineral projects located in the northern portion of the country – investment they are not willing to lose as a result of reunification or potential collapse of the North Korean regime. China recently announced it will invest around $10 billion in North Korea over the next few years, an obvious attempt to bolster the failing economy and incentivize its neighbor to mitigate its brinkmanship tendencies.

For geopolitical reasons, China seeks the perpetuation of the Kim Family regime, hedging against a future U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula by maintaining stability in North Korea and boosting economic relationships with its Asian neighbors, notably South Korea. It is also in China’s nationalist rhetoric to respect the national sovereignty of other nations, refraining from interference or commenting on the political and economic affairs of those countries others will more openly chastise. Indeed, the international community should expect China to persistently support and promote the Six Party Talks, opting for peaceful "dialogue and consultation" rather than condemning the North’s nuclear program or attaching conditions to economic or humanitarian aid. China is certainly aware of the myriad security risks North Korea poses, recognizing the potential deluge of refugees that could flow across its border if the North ever collapses along with the massive chemical and biological weapons stockpiles that would need to be secured as a result. Although the Chinese would prefer a denuclearized Korean peninsula, Beijing has accepted the reality of a nuclear North Korea. Accordingly, China prefers stability rather than conflict and is not willing to sacrifice the little leverage it has to mollify global security concerns, such as the proliferation of nuclear technology to pariah regimes – namely Iran and Burma. It certainly seems that the norms of non-proliferation promoted by the United States and its European allies will take a backseat to other concerns for the foreseeable future, a major setback indeed.

Despite global remonstrations, an ascendant Beijing will continue to prioritize its own national interests rather than satisfying the common interests of the international community. Consequently, North Korea will continue its cyclical behavior of charm diplomacy alternating with brinkmanship behavior while China interjects or opts to use its leverage only when the interests of Beijing are threatened. Thus, the transatlantic community – through the voice of the United Nations – must continue to encourage dialogue with both China and North Korea in the hope that persistent diplomacy will yield denuclearization, and the façade of peace – perhaps only temporarily – on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, while maintaining the status quo in North Korea is perhaps a gamble for China, its perception of the long-term economic, diplomatic, security, and geopolitical benefits far outweigh the potential costs.

Bailey H Culp is a graduate student, majoring in International Security at the Univeristy of Denver, Josef Korbel School of International Studies.  

 

Read related articles from atlantic-community.org members:



This article was submitted for the atlantic-community.org's competition: "Empowering Women in International Relations." It coincides with the 10th anniversary of the UN Resolution 1325 which calls for increasing the influence of women in all aspects of peace and security.
The contest is sponsored by the U.S. Mission to NATO and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

You can find out more about the competition here.
  • 9
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
 
Comments
Member deleted

March 4, 2011

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
If I Were China


As the title suggests, if I were China, I would certainly follow the advices given on "Atlantic-Community" open think tank and pay very close attention to the criticism there, as well. And,

if I were China, I will be as subtle and as transparent as I possibly can in building my self-confidence, before I build mutual confidence, or both, simultaneously, in the same manner. In addition,

if I were China, I will abandon the ideology which prevailed in China for the last two decades or so, namely the ideology that "Anything that I do, I do it for money.". Also,

if I were China, I will listen very carefully to what Donald Trump has to say about China, airing now on Piers Morgan Tonight Talk Show, CNN, Live. Now then,

if I were China, I will state my opinions in languages understandable to the global community with a higher moral ground. For that,

if I were China, I will do my homework as hard and as diligently as possible on a global altitude. For the future,

if I were China, I will look at Brookings Institution's view into next century very carefully, and cooperate. On Africa,

if I were China, I will study very very hard on World Bank's publication "Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Role in it", along with key worlds in it, namely Transformation (internally and externally) – transformative in nature, Sustainable, Education, Health, Food, Women’s right, Climate Change, Infrastructure, Finance – access to, Private Sector – engine of growth, Goals – a 60% increase in per capita income ten years from now - along with continental share of world trade doubling to 8%, Sector by Sector Approach, Country by Country basis, Decentralization (WB offices in Africa), Investment/Business Climate Perception, Shocks (macroeconomic, natural, Idiosyncratic, and Conflict and political violence), safety nets, Good Governance, Public Sector Capacity, Accountability, Transparency, “Marshall Plan for Africa,” – aimed at relaxing the financing constraint to reach the MDGs (and beyond), South-South relationships, Harmonization – by greater transparency of information, Regional Solution, Fragile States Hubs, Client-driven focus (on development and results), Sub-regional Technical and Knowledge Hubs, Investment lending reforms (will shift the focus from inputs and internal procedures to outcomes, development effectiveness, implementation support, risk management and accountability, while streamlining and rationalizing portfolio management and improving WB's own “execution deficit”.), Internal Effectiveness, Results. W.r.t the internet,

if I were China, I will really delve into and find out what kind of internet contents are available there within China, albeit not being an Ah Q, before banning US President's or US Secretary of State's efforts etc. to communicate, and let it be known the US foreign policies to common citizens of the world in China. On democracy,

if I were China, I will be consistent in my demand domestically, within China, and globally, in the United Nations. On governments,

if I were China, I will keep my promises on the goals of the grand plan 2020, when the governments, local and central, will be replenished and trained to be able to connect to the international community. On words,

if I were China, I will honor Hu Jintao's declaration about a couple of years ago that "Whatever we said, were done.".

(Originally published on :

http://transpacificthinktanks.blogspot.com/2011/02/if-i-were-china....

for reference.)
 
Elias  Gladstone

March 4, 2011

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
This is a very timely and well-argued article. However, far from seeking the "perpetuation of the Kim Family regime", US diplomatic cables, recently leaked by Wiki-leaks, indicate that Beijing has become increasingly frustrated with the Pyongyang regime and favours a Korean peninsula unified under Seoul's control.

There is a generation gap within the Chinese leadership regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. While the old guard still want to protect their fellow communists from ‘imperialism’, a new generation of leaders in Beijing regard North Korea as a liability. China wants to be seen as a responsible member of the International Community and North Korea's nuclear tests damaged Beijing’s diplomatic prestige. North Korea's recent transgressions have only deepened this rift. Policy-makers should continue to work constructively with China, appreciating that the level of engagement with international norms displayed by Beijing through the Six Party Talks is historically unprecedented.
 
Unregistered User

March 4, 2011

  • 0
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Elias,

I have read the cables you are referring to, however I don't think they represent the opinions of the entire PRC government, but rather the opinions of a few diplomats. Further, just because Beijing favours a Korean peninsula unified under Seoul doesn't mean they want this anytime in the future or they really expect reunification to happen.

While North Korea is at times a liability, I think China is trying to incentiize its neighbor with increased economic investment -- see article below -- and proactively reduce the number of future provocations. Indeed, North Korea's nuclear tests damaged Beijing's international image, but rembember that China itself never condemned the DPRK's sinking of the Cheonan -- an action that is damaging to China's reputation in itself.

Nevertheless, thanks for your comments.

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/26/20110226003...
 
Elias  Gladstone

March 4, 2011

  • 4
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Bailey,

It is certainly true that the cables don't represent the opinions of the entire PRC government, they do however confirm the assertions of analysts such as Gregory J. Moore, that a new generation of leaders in Beijing no longer view North Korea as a strategic asset. While Beijing did not explicitly condemn the Cheonan sinking, this incident will have strengthened the position of China's younger leaders in internal debates.

China's primary motivation for pumping huge sums of money into the North Korean economy is arguably to prevent the regime from collapsing, which as you have mentioned would lead to a refugee crisis and unsecured nuclear facilities. Given South Korea's ultimately unsuccessful attempts to economically incentivise Pyongyang, it would be somewhat surprising if Beijing were now to adopt the same strategy.

Regards,

Elias
 
Elias  Gladstone

March 5, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
P.S. see Gregory, J. Moore (2008). “How North Korea threatens China’s interests: Understanding Chinese ‘duplicity’ on the North Korean nuclear issue,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8:1

http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/1/1.extract
 
John  Hadjisky

March 9, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Well written, I particularly enjoyed the phrase "gossamer promises". It is also refreshing to find the China-N. Korea relationship explicitly connected to China's blood-soaked, Communist heritage.

I wonder, how much leverage is really produced by ongoing Western humanitarian and financial aid? This aid has failed to prevent N. Korea from going nuclear (indeed, it perhaps has facilitated it, since many forms of aid are fungible), and has failed to prevent N. Korea from committing repeated acts of war against S. Korea, and has failed to meaningfully reduce the suffering of those truly in need.

If the author is correct and China is indeed committed to maintaining her N. Korean "ally" (that's far too polite. "Client" would be more accurate, no?), then it follows that China will provide whatever aid is needed to prevent N. Korea from collapsing or threatening war.

Why not end all Western aid to N. Korea?
Tags: | North Korea |
 
Elias  Gladstone

March 10, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
@ John Hadjisky

"Why not end all Western aid to N. Korea?"

Because this would lead to the instant implosion of the DPRK regime, rather than a managed transition towards a unified Korean peninsula under Seoul's control.

There are two reasons, as Bailey has argued, why an implosion rather than managed transition would threaten transatlantic interests.

First, on a regional level, this would cause a humanitarian crisis, with mass migrations, refugee camps etc. Aside from being a tragedy, this would also cost a great deal, be a logistical nightmare, and complicate future attempts to forge regional stability.

Second, because this would leave unsecured nuclear facilities in North Korea, both US forces in the South and Chinese forces would race to secure these sites. Without a bilateral framework providing rules of engagement should US and Chinese soldiers cross paths, this could also be catastrophic.
Tags: | North Korea |
 
John  Hadjisky

March 11, 2011

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
@Elias Gladstone:

The collapse and the other things you mention would only happen if China does not provide aid in place of ours. Why wouldn't it? It has historic ties, and it has a national interest in preventing a N. Korean collapse.

As far as I can tell the Chinese already provide some aid. So they could simply provide more. No doubt, they would be unhappy about having provide additional aid to replace our aid, and they would try to call our bluff. But, if we make clear that we are resolved not to continue to aid the regime (very little of our aid actually gets to the people), it seems the Chinese would have no choice but to provide whatever aid is needed.

At least if we try this, it will be something new, as opposed to more of the same.
Tags: | North Korea |
 

Create Comment

Type the characters shown in the image below into the textfield.
Captcha

What are tags?

Community

Jobs / Internships

Call for Papers

Atlantic Events

Partners

User of the day

Anna  Przybyll
Anna Przybyll
"A wise old owl lived in an oak The more he..."

Poll

Should NATO intervene in Syria?