China was able to successfully explore and acquire new sources of energy supply on international markets. The proximity of immense energy resources and the cross-land transportation options via pipelines and railways made China's regional neighbors Russia and the Central Asia states more appealing than the volatile increasingly US dominated Middle East region. However, China quickly came to realize that alternatives are sometimes just the lesser of two evils. Because of its energy abundance, the Central Asian region became a battleground of conflicting national interests, not only between China and the US, but also between China and Russia. Although, apparantly, a more suitable energy partner due to its immense gas reserves and ideological common grounds, Russia's unreliability with regard to pricing, targeted volumes and delivery schedule as well as its competitive stance in Central Asia disenchanted the Chinese leadership.
Despite China's price sensitivity in relation to its energy imports from Russia and Central Asia, the import share from these sources is still too small that it could create long-term vulnerability. With 4/5 of China's imports coming through the Malacca Straits and a 60 percent share of oil imports from the Middle East, China encounters vulnerability only within its relations to the US. A potential Sino-American conflict over Taiwan or an invasion of Iran would have a devastating long-term effect on China's oil prices. Although economics on China's more affluent coast are starting to make LNG look attractive as an alternative source of energy supply, the dominance of the US Navy in the South China Sea would not alleviate, but further increase China's vulnerability vis-à-vis the US.
Considering these realities, it is inaccurate to speak of "an imbalance of power" in North Asia, at least under the current constellations in the international energy markets. China's potential inclusion in the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India as well as its commitment to expand its energy imports from Latin America and Africa indicate that the Chinese leadership is still seeking alternative energy supplies. Even if these projects materialize, however, it remains questionable if China's economic growth will allow the substitution of any of the existing energy ties, which would help China reduce its sensitivity in its relations to Central Asia and Russia as well as its vulnerability in its relation to the US.



November 16, 2008
amarjyoti acharya