The way that the United Nations was
originally designed explains why, today, China
alone has the leverage needed to quell North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
In failing to confront North Korea's
decision to move the world closer to nuclear conflict, the Security Council is
merely respecting the original intentions of its founders to allow each great
power a comprehensive veto over any international action that might precipitate
a world war.
When Great Britain
and the United States
developed the first plans for the UN in the early 1940s, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not agree on the composition
or role of the future organization's executive committee.
Churchill envisaged a UN membership divided
into three regions, with the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the Soviet Union each primarily responsible for peace and
order within one of the areas.
Roosevelt called his arrangement the four
policeman (Churchill's three great powers plus China). The leaders of the four most powerful
countries would work together to manage conflict across the international
community as a whole. They would decide
whether to respond, what type of action to take, and when to stop intervening.
Churchill and Roosevelt were able to
compromise because their fundamental interest was the same.They, and Joseph Stalin, wanted an absolute
veto over UN responses to security challenges. International activity that violated the sovereignty of an independent
state could only be undertaken by the United Nations as a whole if each great
power agreed to it.
Today's Security Council resembles neither Churchill's
nor Roosevelt's original vision, but the great
power veto remains. As a result, so long
as just one great power is uncomfortable with an international intervention,
the Council is paralyzed.
Up to this point, when it comes to North Korea, China has been that one great
power. Its interest in maintaining a
mutually beneficial relationship with Pyongyang
has prevented the Security Council from responding assertively to Kim Jong-il's
repeated provocations.
Unlike Beijing, Washington
long ago accepted that as the world's leading global actor its responsibilities
were broader than those of its allies and that smaller states would depend upon
it to act when no one else could. China's response to North Korea will serve as a
critical test of its readiness to assume that international obligations that
come with its increasing global prominence.
China must be convinced that North Korea's actions are sufficiently
grave so as to merit a global response, even if it risks escalating the
situation. A joint US-Chinese Security
Council resolution could empower the UN to tighten and enforce economic
sanctions that would eventually force Pyongyang
to tone down its rhetoric and cease its nuclear tests.
It seems, however, that the Chinese
continue to believe that their relationship with Kim Jong-il's communist regime
acts as a sufficient check on the ailing leader's military recklessness.
Until they feel differently, there is
little that President Obama, the Security Council, or the rest of the
international community can do to deter North Korean ambitions.
President Obama should continue to urge President
Hu Jintao to accept that there must be limits to national sovereignty and that government-sanctioned
nuclear proliferation breaches one of those limits. But just like Churchill and Roosevelt did in
the 1940s, Beijing
bases its foreign policy on its own interests. Unless Obama concedes, and China accepts, the power and
responsibilities that come with its newfound place in the global hierarchy, the
Security Council will remain impotent.
To the United
States and its allies, being forced to depend on China
must be disconcerting. But the ability
of a single great power to block aggressive international action is exactly
in-line with what the UN founders envisioned.
The problem, therefore, is not the Security
Council. The Council will have its
intended effect only when the great powers decide together that North Korea
should be aggressively punished for its actions. Chinese leadership is critical.
Dr. Adam Chapnick is the deputy director of education at the Canadian Forces College and assistant professor of defense studies at the Royal Military College of Canada. He was awarded a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council post-doctoral fellowship and numerous other literature prizes.
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March 2, 2011
John Hadjisky, Blogger, Platinum Contributor (324)
On the other hand, the ongoing situation in N. Korea is so horrible, there's plenty of blame to go 'round. For example, the UN General Assembly, and the UNSC, could make a habit of bringing up a binding resolution every year, or every month, or more often, and forcing China to veto it.