The Kosovo war marked a turning point in European Union foreign policy. The need to recover from its ‘poor image' because of consecutive failures during the Yugoslav crisis and the necessity for an improved and coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) drove the EU to take a U-turn in foreign policy towards the Western Balkans. Additionally, the realization that the Kosovo conflict could pose a serious threat to the Union's peace and security forced the EU to change its position vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. EU foreign policy in this paper encompasses the totality of EU external relations. This broad perspective of EU foreign policy facilitates the identification and subsequent analysis of all the relevant actors involved in its decision-making process. Further, by examining the empirical evidence arising from several case studies and by adopting an eclectic theoretical approach this paper shows that the rationalist theories[1] in concert with the constructivist one can offer a satisfactory starting point to comprehend and explain EU foreign policy making towards the Western Balkans.
One of the major challenges to EU foreign policy (EUFP) since the demise of the Cold War has been a violent dismembering of the former Yugoslavia. The 1990s were characterised by consecutive failures in EUFP. Arguably, the EU's impotence in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis sprang from the rooted realist paradigm in the minds of policymakers. Consequently, the Yugoslav conflict exposed sharp divisions within the EU over the crisis. During that time, the EU lacked cohesion, determination and the tools to deal with the crisis. Since the Kosovo war, the EU has increased its capabilities for taking clear decisions on some policy matters, in particular when dealing with conflict prevention. Subsequently, the EU has developed a common policy towards the region, which encompasses foreign, trade and development policies within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). With the introduction of the Stability Pact (SP) and then Stability and Association Process (SAP) including the SAA with the enlargement prospect and the strict conditionality attached to the accession process, the EU gradually set its feet firmly on the ground. On the other hand, the inability of the EU to take a common position regarding the recognition of Kosovo's independence once again revealed sharp divisions among EU Members.
The paper aims to address the following set of questions. What characterizes the EUFP decision-making processes? Who are the main actors in EUFP decision making? Which theory or set of theories is most appropriate in comprehending and explaining EUFP-making towards the WB? Did the EU learn lessons from its failures during the 1990s? Why did the EU change its foreign policy towards the WB after the Kosovo war? What drove the EU to such a change? In other words, what might be the ‘raison d'être' behind such a change?
Chapter 1 reviews the current literature and sets out the limitations and the methodology of this research. Chapter 2 explores the theoretical argument and the concept of EUFP in detail. It begins by analysing the concept and the decision-making process of EUFP. The chapter then sets out the main tenets of the argument by exploring current debates on European integration and International Relations (IR) theories. Chapter 3 analyses the EU's role regarding conflict prevention before and after the Kosovo war as well as the reasons that forced the European Union (EU) to review its foreign policy towards the WB. The chapter argues that EUFP prior to the Kosovo war suffered from several weaknesses that led to its impotence in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis. Chapter 4 explores the ambiguity of the WB membership prospective and the principle of conditionality attached to it. Chapter 5 brings together the research findings and conclusions.
[1] i.e. theories of IR (neo-realist/neo-liberalist synthesis) and European integration (intergovernmentalism)
Rudi Guraziu is a Foreign Affairs Consultant - Specialising in the Balkans.
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