There seems to be an ever present vogue within international relations when it comes to how to deal with States that are considered at odds with the excepted view of what a State should be. Whether it be Iran and nuclear ambitions or Zimbabwe and political rights, the International Community and the international press congress around the idea of sanctions. We hear of smart-sanctions and the like; strategically geared to hurt those in power, and not the normal citizen. Yet, looking back over the course of post-war history it is difficult to see discernible examples of where sanctions brought about the desired regime change.
Jacek Pawlicki, writing in the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, in his January 31st article claimed that the EU should stop pussy-footing about and start imposing real and punitive sanctions. Pawlicki claimed that the sanctions should be installed regardless of the side-effects (translated on eurotopics.net as: “even if this means that parts of the country are reduced to poverty”). The journalist then went on to clarify that: “The impact of these measures could be softened by lifting visa restrictions for ordinary Belarusian citizens or by providing numerous grants for young people or financial backing for independent media.”
The shear absurdity of this premise begs the casual reader to take stock and confirm that they have not inadvertently entered a dream-state. It only takes a cursory look at the history of sanction use to see that when employed non-specifically sanctions not only have little effect, they do indeed worsen the situation. Take Cuba for example; over forty years of a US embargo have not brought the pro-western outburst and collapse of the communist regime we assume they were intended to bring. Sanctions have allowed a dictatorial regime to justify itself as the defender of the nation against the “harsh imperialists”. Iran is yet another example where sanctions have had little effect and can be argued to have increased the patriotic fever in the country.
Sanctions no matter how “smart” invariably damage the ordinary citizen. Leaders, by the very nature of their position, manage to side-step such effects. In the process of damaging the "average Joe”, sanctions increase a feeling of isolation and a need for a strong leader in troubled times. Therefore sanctions can have the direct opposite of the desired effect. Pawlicki's call for a lifting of visa restrictions seems a heartless joke in comparison. The knock-on effect of such sanctions and visa restrictions could be a deluge of poor hungry refugees leaving behind a bitter and trust less country to stick to its guns.
The EU should embrace Belarus and use positive tactics to attract ordinary Belarusians to “convert”. Lukashenko still has a large following of ordinary people and it is these that must be won over. Poland's cultural program (BELSAT TV broadcasts etc...) has far more potential for change. It is only with a true grass-roots change that any real democracy can be forged.
Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters holds an MA in American Studies and is currently doing a PhD in International Relations at the University of Łódź.
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February 12, 2011
Basia A Bubel, NYU, Platinum Contributor (190)
I'm not very familiar with the situation in Belarus or the E.U.'s concerns with its government. Pawlicki's position seems one of annoyance and impatience. What are the reasons for that? I agree with your suggestions of positive tactics.