he volatility of the global economy since 2008 has altered the dynamics of international political relations and heightened global security threats. Virtually every EU state has had to tighten its budgetary belt. At the same time, the world has undergone momentous changes characterized by revolutions, terrorist attacks and civil wars across the globe.
In this uncertain climate, how can European states maintain a high level of national security in conditions that require cutting costs? How can European defense ministries effectively and efficiently protect their citizens from a broad range of modern threats? There are several ways to solve this complex problem – or at least, to reduce unfounded costs.
First, EU and NATO countries should reduce the number of costly expeditions they undertake. The decision this year to intervene in Libya, where NATO poured in millions of dollars each day, is a case in point. The results of such expeditions do not justify the costs. The two interventions that NATO has undertaken – Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011 – have been heavily criticized not only for their human and financial toll, but also for their failure to bring about lasting, positive change. As its overreliance on the United States in Libya has made clear, NATO is ill-equipped to take on such massive overseas operations, especially in an era of tight budgetary constraints. The Alliance should severely limit the criteria it uses to justify any future military interventions abroad.
The second way to achieve “security despite austerity” is to find diplomatic and economic resolutions to conflict situations. Refusal to conduct direct combat operations in favor of a frank discussion of problems at the round table will reduce defense spending significantly. The question raised here, naturally, is whether this will delay the negotiating process, deepen potential crises and lead to the escalation of a conflict. This case requires tough diplomacy and clear and justified use of economic sanctions.
Sanctions are a proven method of achieving what military means often cannot. To pick one of many examples, during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36, one of the greatest hindrances to Mussolini’s Italy was the League of Nations’ imposition of heavy economic sanctions in the form of blockades on oil, coal, metal and other vital materials. In hindsight, if the sanctions had been levied earlier, Italian military operations in Ethiopia may never have even begun. Similarly, tougher economic sanctions enacted earlier on Libya may have weakened Gaddafi’s army effectively enough to render a full-fledged NATO intervention unnecessary, saving lives and billions of dollars.
Finally, to balance the costs of security with the protection of citizens, EU and NATO members should engage in dialogue and build new alliances with non-NATO states. Engaging with partner states would help reduce tensions in regions prone to conflict and limit potential threats through the close cooperation of national militaries. This partnership should extend to all levels of government, from heads of state to ministers and local specialists. NATO maintains an ongoing dialogue with the Arab League and with Russia (where Russia allows ISAF forces and equipment through its territory en route to Afghanistan), but these should be deepened and expanded to other states in conflict-prone regions. NATO and its partners should take part in regularly occurring summits and conferences to maintain open dialogue and effectively transform well-meaning words into concrete actions.
These are just three recommendations for how European states can improve security as funds allocated to defense ministries are reduced. Europe must let diplomacy play a greater role in resolving international conflicts and administer a stricter policy of economic sanctions against states posing an international threat, as well as a more thorough assessment of the cost-effectiveness of combat operations and the results of those operations.
Nevertheless, some question remain: could these relatively restrained military policies survive an often arduous diplomatic process with partner states that do not always see eye-to-eye? And should NATO states resist future military involvement as a rule, even in the face of a human rights disaster like the one that provoked NATO to intervene in Benghazi? Only one thing is certain: under the current economic conditions, the Alliance cannot afford its emphasis on ambitious, interventionist hard power that has guided its external relations to this point.
Aleksandr Blagin graduated from Yaroslavl State University in Russia with an emphasis in the Contemporary History of Europe and North America. He is currently earning his postgraduate degree in the field of Cold War History.
Related articles from Atlantic Community's "Security Despite Austerity" theme week:
- Christian Mölling: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense
- Nikolas Gvosdev: A Modest Proposal for Pan-European Defense
- Robert Helbig: Beyond Pooling and Sharing: Open Europe's Markets
- Andrew Dorman: European Defense in an Age of Austerity
- Dmitri A Titoff: Open Markets, Better Arms
- Jason Naselli: US Should Invest in European Militaries
- Christopher M. Schnaubelt: Can Lower Budgets Produce Greater Security Efficiency?



September 14, 2011
Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)
Meanwhile, the new Gulf Security regime backed by the Saudis should be backed by America.
Meanwhile NATO remains, as this author intimates, focused at home and not worry about peripheral engagements like Libya, irrespective of its outcome (which is still, ultimately far from clear).