As many European countries struggle with an increasing mountain of debt, an unlikely helping hand has emerged over the past few weeks. The Peoples' Republic of China has been investing heavily in indebted peripheral euro zone countries and buying up European sovereign bonds.
Concurrently, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton has signalled that the current EU embargo on arms exports to China, in place since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, should be rethought. It is not definite that the ban will be lifted as it requires the assent of all 27 Member States, but the timing of the announcement in conjunction with recent trade visits of Chinese officials to Europe raises questions.
Moreover, the New York Times reports that the United States is concerned that the EU may be considering lifting or modifying the ban, and "is watchful and concerned". From an American perspective, free access to high tech weaponry would give China far greater scope for projecting its power in the Pacific region, an area which has been traditionally under Washington's influence.
Dear members of atlantic-community.org,
Considering the gains that could be made for European industry, do you see the arms embargo on China being lifted in the short term and would you support such a move? Moreover, do you believe that there is a connection between Chinese help for struggling euro economies in exchange for lifting the arms embargo?
It is clear that this would upset decision makers in Washington. What do you think the consequences would be for transatlantic relations if the arms embargo is lifted?
Read related articles from atlantic-community.org members:
- Editorial Team: China Rising: Responsible Leader or Immature Superpower?
- Eoin Heaney: The Sino-Russia Border: Anatomy of a Problem Region
- Editorial Team: What Should Top the Transatlantic Agenda in 2011



January 13, 2011
Dries Belet, European Commission, (7)
The political economy of the arms embargo on China is clearly a key issue, and I thank for you this timely opportunity for discussion.
Ever since the PRC concluded its 'Strategic Partnership" with the EU, policymakers in Beijing have been clamouring for the embargo to be lifted. They have pointed out that the embargo is anachronistic (putting China on the same level as international pariahs like Zimbabwe or North Korea), and that China's human rights record has greatly improved since 1989.
Obviously things are not as simple. Lifting the embargo would give a crucial boost to the People's Liberation Army's capabilities in high-tech C4ISR systems (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), thus disturbing the regional balance of power in East Asia. The US is greatly concerned about this possibility -- after all, the United States has significant military commitments to its allies in Asia (which, despite boasting of its strategic partnerships with countries like South Korea, the EU does not). Moreover, it would also deprive the EU of a critical source of leverage in its relations with China -- handing over such a lovely gift to China without getting anything concrete in return does not seem like shrewd negotiating to me.
Hence, despite intense lobbying by European defence companies (who long for the juicy Chinese market) and pressure by Chinese diplomats, in my opinon the embargo will not be lifted anytime soon. At the time of the EU's last attempt in 2005, the American backlash was sufficiently severe to divide Member States completely; a similar outcome can be envisaged were the issue to be brought up again -- even though the brand-new European External Action Service is supposed to result in a unified foreign policy.
However, if the EU succeeds in setting out a clear strategy on the embargo and on the triangular EU-China-US relationship, an eventual solution of this dilemma might be possible. In my opinion, a potential lifting should be accompanied by three preconditions in order to be succesful.
Firstly, the EU should demand that, as a quid pro quo, China ratifies the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The adoption of this crucial human rights instrument would go a long way in demonstrating that China is serious about making progress in this field (in addition to softening the opposition from European NGOs).
Secondly, the EU should strengthen its code of conduct for arms exports. Once the code is sufficiently streamlined to make sure all destabilising sales of military equipment (and "dual-use" goods) to the PRC would be prevented, the arms embargo effectively becomes obsolete. In this way the embargo could be lifted as a symbol (hence improving EU-China relations) while in practice, arms exports would not increase.
Thirdly, European policymakers should act in close consulation with their counterparts across the Atlantic. At every step in the process of a potential lfiting, the EU should inform politicians in the White House and on Capitol Hill about its next moves (and be open for discussion). I do not advocate that Europe meekly follow the strong will of Uncle Sam, but rather that we try our utmost to assuage the Americans' concerns before moving forward with an indepedent strategy of our own.
Whether or not this proposed template is the right to follow, in any case the EU should get its act together and work on a coherent policy. If they want to avoid another 2005-style imbroglio over key strategic issues like the arms embargo, policymakers like Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy can even learn a lot from the Chinese, who are masters of the timeless art of diplomacy.
China is outstandingly proficient in the field of 'economic statecraft' - the use of economic tools in the pursuit of wider, strategic goals. As suggested by the editiorial team, Beijing is prone to employing its commerical and financial assets towards the furthering of its geopolitical interests. The buying of European government bonds (over other options such as US treasuries) should surely be seen in this perspective: it provides China with increasing leverage over Europe's future in addition to making the Chinese less dependent upon the US. A myriad of other examples of the PRC's economic statecraft exist: trade agreements with Taiwan, long-term investments in key African countries, the buying of stakes in Western financial institutions during the financial crisis, and so forth. If the EU wants to remain a force to reckon with on the global stage, it had better heed China's example.
Yours sincerely,
Dries Belet
Trainee in the European External Action Service (but writing in a personal capacity)
dries.belet@gmail.com