Europe’s armed forces are confronted with a difficult road ahead. With few exceptions, the majority of Europe’s economies are struggling in the midst of economic recession whilst their governments are confronted by the increasing cost of social provision in a continent which is generally ageing.
The situation is further complicated by the lack of agreement about which direction Europe is or should be heading. There is no agreed single vision or even a basic agreement over what constitutes Europe. As a result Europe’s future is contested - is it, for example, inevitably going to decline as power in the international system increasingly moves eastwards to the Asia-Pacific regions? Linked to such an argument, will it continue to integrate and ultimately be unified or has the European project come to a grinding halt?
These trends are impacting on Europe’s militaries in a number of ways.
First, as the internal divisions within NATO over Libya have confirmed, there is a fundamental real disagreement amongst the European nations about what Europe’s future is for, what its priorities should be, who its allies are and who its potential foes are. Is, for example, the greatest threat to Europe a resurgent Russia as a number of states currently argue? Or is it from terrorism? Or is it the economic downturn? Or is it something else? The answer to this basic question is fundamental for Europe’s armed forces. But with little chance of an agreed answer the various states of Europe are all looking in different directions.
Secondly, all the European states are united in making cuts to their armed forces as part of the process of remaining within their steadily reduced defense budgets. Few of the European members of NATO manage to spend the target of 2% of GDP with even the United Kingdom having to count spending on operations in Afghanistan as a means of reaching the 2% target. Such reductions look ill-advised if the threat is a resurgent Russia but insufficient if it is economic recession. What does appear to be clear is that the downward spiral in relative spending looks set to continue and we can expect a new NATO target of 1.8% of GDP or less in the not too distant future.
Thirdly, with declining defense spending the logical route forward would appear to be one of burden-sharing and defense rationalisation. However, with high levels of unemployment across the continent the protection of defense related jobs has become even more prominent and efficiencies look less and less likely.
So what, if any, are the alternatives? If the risks are low then in a sense there does not need to be an alternative. Individual states can chose their own priorities whilst pretending to conform to the promises they have made as members of the various security organizations. The result will be an overall reduction in Europe’s defense capabilities as more and more states elect to relinquish certain capabilities such as armored warfare. The danger is if such assumptions prove incorrect at which point it might be too late unless the United States can be persuaded to continue to subsidise European security.
Alternatively, states acting in partnership – whether bilateral, trilateral or multilateral – could seek to militate against the risks they identify by undertaking defense offsets. Put crudely one state might provide an amphibious capability whilst another state provides a heavy armoured force. If this option is chosen the majority of states will almost certainly seek to focus on the maritime and air dimensions hoping others will provide the land dimension. Thus the NATO idea of shared risk looks likely to be further undermined and inevitable raising question marks about the continued transatlantic engagement.
Whatever approach is selected it seems inevitable that Europe’s armed forces look set to continue to suffer significant cutbacks and from a lack of investment. This will inevitably mean a reduction their involvement across the globe. The question that follows is at what point does the United States disengage?
Dr. Andrew Dorman is Professor of International Security in the Defense Studies Department, King's College London, based at the United Kingdom's Joint Services Command and Staff College and an Associate Fellow in the International Security Programme, Chatham House. The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command & Staff College, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense or any other government agency.
Related articles from Atlantic Community's "Security Despite Austerity" theme week:
- Christian Mölling: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense
- Aleksandr Blagin: Europe's Choice: Diplomacy or War
- Nikolas Gvosdev: A Modest Proposal for Pan-European Defense
- Robert Helbig: Beyond Pooling and Sharing: Open Europe's Markets
- Dmitri A Titoff: Open Markets, Better Arms
- Jason Naselli: US Should Invest in European Militaries
- Christopher M. Schnaubelt: Can Lower Budgets Produce Greater Security Efficiency?
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