Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Five Steps for Success in Afghanistan"

September 2, 2009 | 1 comment | Print | E-Mail Your Research

Think Tank Analysis: Five Steps for Success in Afghanistan

Christopher Lee Davis: NATO’s near-term priority in Afghanistan must be the implementation of the new strategy to which member-states agreed at their last summit. Time is of the essence since the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. The alliance-wide agreement offers new momentum to focus on five critical areas.

European and American leaders have recently made a priority of renewing trans-Atlantic goodwill. They have accomplished much in this area, particularly in their cooperation on Afghanistan. At their summit in April, NATO allies committed themselves specifically to a new, ambitious and comprehensive approach to the country. That was the easy part. The real test, however, will be how – and how fast – they can implement this new strategy. NATO must convert its pledges on paper into realistic contributions.

The alliance must turn to underappreciated resources to do this. The European Union and its member-states have been contributing substantially to civilian capacity-building efforts and the reconstruction of vital infrastructure (schools, water treatment and roads). These contributions are critical if NATO is to succeed in its mission. And they must continue.

But success will also require NATO to step back from its one-dimensional focus on the military aspect of the mission. The alliance must explicitly recognize the critical role for civilian efforts. And each member of the alliance must determine the assets that they can best contribute so that the alliance can simultaneously pursue military and civilian goals.

NATO leaders have already affirmed that a comprehensive and integrated mission is essential for progress. Europe needs to diversify its contributions and raise its military profile, and the US needs to determine how to best deploy its allies’ capabilities. These are the challenges for the months ahead. NATO has no time to lose. The next year is critical if the alliance wants to gain the upper hand in Afghanistan.

Opportunities for NATO to reverse Afghanistan’s current downward spiral exist if the allies can take advantage of their complementary abilities. This paper will recommend five areas on which the US and Europe should focus to do this. These recommendations are not intended to provide an exit strategy; it is too soon to tell how events will unfold. But they can offer options to reclaim the international initiative through joint effort.

Christopher Davis is currently a research fellow at the Bertelsmann Foundation.

Download PDF: VIEWPOINT Afghanistan August 2009.pdf

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September 22, 2009

Gesine Palmer

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The crucial thing in Afghanistan is to communicate to the people living there what "we" want there. It is as simple as that. All other strategic efforts are doomed to be barely self-referential and destructive, If NATO fails to explain to the Afghanistan people what they want there and to understand and respect, what Afghan people want, if we cannot arrive at a point where the people there accept foreign troops as their advocates against tyrannical forces - there is indeed no chance to win that struggle. To offer facilities, to show a way in which to hand these facilities over to the people for whom they are meant, to teach them how to teach, how to make use of rights, how to gain grounds against the tyranny of warlords and religious fanatics, to handle with strength those who jeopardize new liberties and orders, while encouraging those who try to build up more sustainable ways of production and economy - all these things are again and again to be stressed and to be put ino practice. If this is first priority and being communicated on the grounds and in the countries that is sending soldiers, motivation might rise again. Simply to try and fight the Taliban by military means cannot work. It must be attractive for possible Taliban fighters to change the sides. The attraction mus outgrow the danger of being punished and ill-treated as a traitor. A foreign military campp must be seen first as a secure and attractive place for Afghan people to learn and to maintain a living better than the one that might be offered by the Taliban or by warlords. This is, of course, utopian. But you don't develop new strategies without a vision of what the engagement SHOULD look like in order to be acceptable to the people living there AND to the states that are sending forces.