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The war involving Georgia has changed the political landscape far beyond the Caucasus. In addition to its recognition of the separatist provinces, Russia is about to reinstate the principle of “limited sovereignty” for Georgia. The West appears helpless – the United States is far away, its forces engaged elsewhere. The European Union has concluded a partnership agreement with Georgia but the European Neighborhood Policy is not prepared for a geopolitical conflict. To date, the EU has not acted as a power needing to protect its values and interests in the Caucasus but as a mediator in a conflict to which it does not want to become a party. Meanwhile, Russia is using its iron fist to secure its spheres of influence and punish contrarian neighbors.

It took western Europe a long time to acknowledge the dimensions of the conflict. There is a tendency to ignore discomfiting facts so as not to disturb good relations with Russia. On the other hand, those nations burned by Russian power politics have a heightened perception of the new, yet familiar, winds from the east. The Ukrainian author Yuri Andrukhovych, a determined European, fears that Russia “will rise again.” He feels that Russia is intent on revising the historic failure of 1991, the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He sees this as an analogy to Germany between the two world wars: the “Weimar Era” has ended for Russia. It wants to become an imperial state once again, to regain its lost power and territories.

What is at Stake

The EU approach to Georgia is important for the entire Central and East European architecture. Should the EU send a signal that it is willing to drop Georgia in favor of the “strategic partnership” with Russia, then this will be interpreted without fail as encouragement for Moscow’s revisionist ambitions, and as discouragement for those nations in Russia’s force field which have just become independent. As Foreign Minister Lavrov put it, “If supporting the bankrupt Saakashvili regime is more important to NATO than cooperation with Russia, it is not our fault.”

Europe must not succumb to this blackmail because abandoning Georgia would signify the end of a European “ostpolitik” aimed at expanding the sphere of democracy and market economies. It would signify the end of all hesitant attempts at building an independent supply line for oil and natural gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe, and the bankruptcy of all declarations of European values.

The EU should impress upon Putin and Medvedev that invading Georgia and cannibalizing its sovereign territory meant crossing a red line. Such blatant violation of international law, such a brutal approach to a small neighboring state is a challenge to the system of collective European security.

Europe and Russia

Seen from the perspective of Pan-Russian nationalism, the nineties appear to be nothing but a string of “humiliations” by the victorious West, a dark era of loss of power and territory. Today, however, bolstered by its huge profits from the export of natural resources and its strong position as an energy great power, Russia’s temptation to turn back the wheel of history is growing – while the United States is weakened by the Iraq debacle. The primary goal of integration into the West has been superceded by that of rebuilding Russia as a petro-military great power. Russia wants to have its cake and eat it too: to keep the West out of its neighborhood while dealing with it profitably.

How should the EU interact with a Russia vacillating between the desire for international recognition and cynical power politics? Trying to isolate Russia would be foolish and illusory. The goal must remain to integrate Moscow into a joint network of security and economic cooperation, including the prospect for NATO membership. Such an offer to a democratic and cooperative Russia must be earnest and credible. Simultaneously, Europe must not avoid conflict when its values and interests are threatened by Russian policy.

Such should be the guiding principle for the European approach to Russia: as much cooperation as possible, as much willingness to face conflict as necessary. Not every conflict is useful and necessary at every moment. Hence the deployment of a missile defense system in Central Europe at all costs is not currently essential. But this does not apply to the Russian intervention in Georgia: this is not a conflict the EU can shy away from.

Ralf Fuecks is Co-President of the Heinrich Boll Foundation.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Hall Gardner: Redefine the Concept of Independence
• Askarbek Erkinovich Mambetaliev: Kyrgyztan's Lessons from the Russian-Georgian War
• Christoph Bertram: Russia, the West, and the Make-Believe Strategists