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A lot has been written lately about Germany’s new foreign policy or the “New Germany” as it is sometimes called. What is clear is that we can witness important changes in German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

One has to wonder whether we are about to embark on a period of German self-exclusion from NATO and even from the European Union. NATO does not mean a lot to Germany anymore, because the country is surrounded by friends and it becomes harder and harder for German politicians to explain to their electorate why German interests are defended in Afghanistan. In the European Union Germany has become the main break to further integration and innovative solutions to the financial and economic crisis. Merkel finds it hard to make it understood that bail-outs for Greece, Ireland and Portugal (and most likely Greece again) are of key importance for Germany as the strongest economy in the EU and the Eurozone. Merkel also fails to mention that these bailouts come with a rather high interest rate as loans and not as often portrayed in the German media, as free gifts. In the long-term, Germany as the main provider of financial assistance, will not only benefit from a stable Euro-currency but also from interest-repayments.

Merkel also fails to build coalitions with other key EU actors on this issue and is known in France as “Madame Non” and in Europe as conservative and short-sighted due to her reluctance in the current crisis. Once again it seems as if Merkel is more interested in what is good for Germany in the short-term than what is good for the EU and consequently Germany in the long-term. The question Merkel will have to answer very soon is if these two questions can be distinguished.

And then there is Libya. While France and the United Kingdom demonstrated early on their willingness to intervene to stop the bloodshed in the country, Germany was first reluctant, then against intervention of any kind and is currently not sure of its own position. When the UN Security Council voted on international action against Colonel Qaddafi, Germany abstained together with countries such as Brazil, China and Russia. While these are certainly important countries in a changing world, was it really in Germany’s interest to vote different from all major Western and European allies? There are many reasons why Germany did not want to participate in military action in Libya probably the state of its military resources being one of the main reasons, but the self-isolation makes it hard for Germany to take part in important international decisions. This is particularly important for two areas:

1. Germany still hopes to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council as the result of a fundamental reform of this institution. While there is little doubt that such a reform is needed, there is also little agreement on the actual nature of such a reform. However, Germany’s self-isolation in Libya has not strengthened its case for a permanent seat, in particular not in those capitals that see Berlin as a key ally.

2. European Foreign and Defence Policy has been completely re-organised as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. Baroness Ashton is now the face of the EU in foreign affairs and the European External Action Service is slowly but persistently taking shape. However, because Germany as a key country in Europe failed to engage properly with the revolutions in the Arab World in general and Libya in particular, Europe missed the chance to make Libya its own problem and demonstrate that it can respond and that it has learnt its lesson from the early 1990s but also from the Iraq War. Instead Europe once again is divided in a key foreign policy issue that is after all a fundamental European problem (colonialism, refugees, oil etc.).

German foreign policy in the past focused on EU and NATO integration. These were cornerstones even after unification. However, important changes have taken place and Germany more often than not prioritizes its own national interests. These however remain undefined and unclear. Consequently, German foreign policy makers face two important issues, first to define German interests in the 21^st century and secondly to analyze if German interests today are really so different from the past 60 years. Is Germany not anymore interested in a strong NATO alliance to provide international security and in a strong European Union that can act as a cornerstone of a new multilateral world order? What, then is the alternative?

Dr. Soeren Keil is Assistant Lecturer at the University of Kent in Canterbury and Seasonal Lecturer at Canterbury Christ Church.