At a November 7 conference on peacekeeping organized by the United Nations Association of Germany with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, panelists argued that the ISAF, the NATO-led force in Afghanistan, could be reconstituted into a useful global peacekeeping force if there is a successful troop drawdown in Afghanistan by 2014. In a world where UN peacekeepers are constantly undermanned and ill-equipped (or forbidden by mandate) to handle larger “peacebuilding” missions that may require the use of force, a multi-national force that could be deployed around the world would be highly valuable. Both former UN peacekeeping officials and researchers noted that a reconstituted ISAF would be the ideal type of force to tackle global governance issues like African piracy. They could do the “dirty work” that the international community needs and that UN peacekeepers and regional organizations are not equipped for.
Is this a good, or even feasible, idea? Here are 3 thoughts for and against it:
Yes – Make the ISAF an International Troubleshooting Force
- They really are best suited for these types of missions
Ten years of developing best practices and an international command structure that countries know where they fit into has created a force that is much more coherent and reliable than the average ad-hoc coalition that takes on a UN peacekeeping mandate. It has experience with the realities of peacekeeping while also having the muscle to tackle situations where, as Kofi Annan once put it, “there is no peace to keep.” Furthermore, there are a wide range of technical and support specialists who have worked within the ISAF framework and could be called upon, something constantly lacking with UN-led forces. - It could be formally separated and distinguished from both blue helmets and NATO
Such a setup would require a formal agreement between the UN and NATO for an ISAF to be the functional arm of certain UN mandates. This would clearly distinguish it from traditional UN peacekeeping forces, allow it to transcend peacekeeping rules that restrict the use of force and mandate impartiality without risking the reputation of the blue helmets and their legitimacy in other operations. Similarly, it would formally separate it from the main NATO hierarchy and allow it to operate under UN auspices in areas of the world where NATO could not or would not get involved for various reasons. - It doesn’t take a lot
Would countries currently contributing to the Afghanistan mission see an interest in continuing to contribute to ISAF in other theaters? Some certainly would not, and some would be wary of putting troops in more dangerous situations than traditional peacekeepers, but there is also a consistent record from ISAF countries like Norway and Canada in contributing to international peace missions. It would also not even need to be a significant minority of the force; out of the current 130,000 troops, if even 5,000 were recommitted to peacebuilding missions, it would represent a major upgrade for missions where troops are often counted in the hundreds.
No – It’s Time to Go Home
- The UN is not a democratic organization
While there are certainly situations where NATO and the UN work together, a standing partnership may not be as agreeable as at first glance. The UN’s members are not a majority of democratic states, and many have interests contrary to or in direct conflict with the stated purposes of NATO and its operations. Could the political and ideological baggage be put aside even if it were a boost to international security? History tells us no. - The experience can’t be generalized
ISAF is functioning well in Afghanistan, but it is also based on executing defined mission goals (though goals perhaps not defined enough for some people’s tastes). Expecting to carry over many of the functionalities into different environments, situations, missions, and mandates is fitting a square peg into a round hole. Not only might this be ineffective, it could be a major disaster if such a force were thrust into a situation it was not designed for. - The rabbit hole – Isn’t 10 years quite enough?
Should we even be having this conversation? The American public is certainly tired of expensive foreign endeavors and European militaries are scaling back budgets significantly. There may be no funding, will, or interest in such a plan. And there is always the danger that with a standing force, missions will be invented for it to take part in, leading to a perpetual state of deployment around the world. No one wants to get stuck in such a spiral and enough blood and treasure has already been expended in 10 years; why pay, with both lives and money, more?
Jason Naselli is an editor at Atlantic Community and a recent MSc graduate in International Relations from the University of Essex.


