RSS

November 29, 2010

Julia Grauvogel

Hey Salvador,

first of all I want to say that I find your approach focusing on soft power really interesting. However, there are a couple of aspects that were not quite clear in my opinion.

Could you tell me how you define a normative power? I know this concept in relation to the EU, which was characterized as a normative power by Ian Manners, because according to him the EU is able to "shape conceptions of the normal" in international relations and internally adhere to certain core values that are also promoted in the EU's foreign policy (among others freedom, rule of law democracy, human rights). Other have show that in respect to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU promoted legally binding targets and managed to convince some allies and other countries to follow that approach, thus one could conclude the the EU possessed (a certain degree of) normative power in that process.
I don't really understand in what respect the US is a normative power for you. Rather I believe that - especially in climate change - the USA's normative claim is rather limited, just because it does not seem to actively promote or even always adhere to some core norms in environmental politics and international environmental law (for example the precautionary approach and the polluter pays principle).

Moreover, I would like you to clarify how your demand for a "market incentive structure for Western multinational corporations operating in developing countries to adopt greener technology" is supposed to relate to the already exiting clean development mechanism that is supposed to enable projects of firms from developed countries in developing nations and already does so - what is exactly what you want to achieve with the market incentive structure.

I would also like to know if you really consider a global information campaign to lie within the responsibility of states (in my opinion it is rather an action taken by NGOs) and if you really think this will actually overcome the current deadlock of the negotiations. In my opinion such awareness and information campaigns as well as a considerable degree of grass root pressure is already existing (I was at COP 15 in Copenhagen last year and really impressed by the amount of small local as well as global NGOs and their campaigns which were present - in fact the conference center was in the end temporarily shut down because too many NGOs were accredited). I really believe that what is missing is concerted global action, but not just another information campaign.

In addition, I must say that I unfortunately do not really agree with your assessment of COP 15 in Copenhagen. Firstly I think that even though the level of awareness might have increased, I was already high before the summit - so that can be hardly characterized as a major achievement of the conference. Secondly, I don't agree that the summit only showed the wisdom of political realism. From my point of view, the summit did not only fail because states wanted to preserve their sovereign rights (the realist argument), but also because there was a lack of agreed upon knowledge regarding climate change, its effects and how to tackle it (as aspect highlighted by social constructivists) as well as a lack of adequate institutions (a question dealt with by neo-instituionalists). Last but not least I want to add that I am unfortunately less optimistic regarding the prospects that the US and the EU can act as one coherent actor in the future, given their diverging interests and identities.

I am sorry that this comment became so long, but I really like the idea behind your article so I would like to better understand you argumentation and I hope that your clarifications will help me!

Thank you in advance for your answers!
Best wishes,
Julia

November 29, 2010

Carlito II Seroje Reyes, DLSU, (5)

I think that it is very astute to frame the climate change discourse as a battleground of consciousness and goal sets. The acknowledgment of the diversity of viewpoints and the need to tread the path towards the need to streamline these ideas is the start of putting our words into action.
As state players, very influential ones at that, the US and EU have to be able to set their differences aside and finally find a balance of their interests with regards to climate change. They need each other to be able to get their agendas across. It is not important that the full make up of their stand be reflected from their forwarded agenda, what is important is that they have a clear agenda set. This will ensure mutual benefit and a stronger voice in the community. It is obvious that their soft power anyway can overpower others if they would only talk in unison. The best way to do that is by having a cohesive EU-US stand by having targets that are actionable as to finally disable the moves of the developing world to undermine this issue.
Also, since the writer also gave an incentive scheme for EU-US to gain support from important stakeholders, it will become more manageable to find a space of agreement for both superpowers to finally start winning the battle.
At the end, I think that this is a wise start, as any problem faced from the inside out: fixing identity first; knowing what is most important, strategic, the negotiable and the non-negotiable, would always stand the tides.

November 29, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Hello Julia,
Thanks for the comments you have posted here. I would be glad to address the substantive issues you have pointed out.

First, you are right that there is indeed a burgeoning literature in European studies about ‘normative power’ . However, I think you have to realize several key considerations. Although scholarly literature hasn’t tackled yet how the US is a ‘normative power’ in the same sense that it is understood in the case of the EU, one may still explore the idea how the current administration under Obama may have attempted (arguably) to refashion(?) and to rectify the failures of previous US foreign policy. Nonetheless, I wanted to point out that in terms of democracy promotion, such normative undertaking has been done by the, regardless whether it was a Republican or Democrat administration – far more ambitious and extensive than EU development aid and external cooperation policies. Whether US foreign policy on democracy promotion may be effective or not (or just or unjust) is another debate, the fact remains that the US is indeed a normative power in a lot of aspects, arguably even before the birth of the EU as a one coherent actor was conceived. I argue that the EU has to start realizing how it is significantly losing its relevance as a global actor in issues of global governance because of the internal divisions within it, plus its failure to see the indispensable value of engaging more actively with emerging regional powers in Asia, Africa and Latin America. More specifically, in the issue of climate change, the EU, despite some of its policy differences with the US, has to start finding a common ground and assert its climate change agenda by trying to renew its strategic partnership with the US. The EU can’t do it alone. It has to start engaging with the US which is the only Western power which the former shares a lot of interests with.

Apparently, a parochial sense of Euro-centrism in the Trans-atlantic cooperation is futile; that is, both the EU and the US must start reengaging with each other in this apparent crisis of global governance on climate change. As you may obviously have noticed, the US has strategically chose to deal with China rather than the EU as Europeans apparently have been dealing with internal differences.

Second, clean development mechanism may be true in paper but not always true in most cases. I admire you for your apparent optimism but in the realpolitik view of global politics, things are much more different from what they seem at the prima facie level. Coming from my exposure in developing countries in Southeast Asia and some other colleagues’ experiences in Latin America and Africa, many Western MNCs have tried to invoke their responsible and sustainable corporate practices in paper but many local communities and their environmental resources have been taken for granted. If you doubt such argument, probably you just need to take a look in CNN or BBC documentaries and see some journalistic documentaries on these. Thus, transatlantic powers have to start rectify such practices by their corporations and start re-engaging with the local communities in the developing world, in order to foster a sense of responsible partnership towards sustainable corporate and business practices.

Third, I think your query about state’s normative responsibility about global information campaigns is somehow tangential from the entire point of the debate. Nonetheless, let me answer such question. Despite the views that states are somehow unimportant in the age of globalization, (Western highly-industrialized) states still have the unmatched extent of material and non-material resources that no other non-state institution can arguably match. Global civil society, despite the value of them in upholding global deliberative democratic discourse, still has to cooperate with states in order to push their agenda in a more strategic and efficient manner. In fact, as you have pointed out the plethora of NGOs at the global level, the problem now is on how to make their different and, more often than not, conflicting positions on climate change much more appealing, understandable and reflective enough of the global realities so that any ordinary citizen may be able to grasp. Thus, both the state (EU states and the US) and the global civil society have the normative responsibility to undertake such global information campaigns. Perhaps it would be more strategic if transatlantic powers can cooperate with global civil society groups in finding a common ground in packaging their message on climate change to the wider public at the global level.

Finally, your view on my argument on how the COP15 exhibited important failures in global governance is somehow weak. At the discursive level, majority of the important actors from both the institutional and non-institutional levels agreed how COP15 signified a crisis in climate change governance. Perhaps you may just refer to the reactions not only of European leaders themselves but also how Americans and other BRIC/developing countries have just reacted after the summit. And if you’re only benchmark of success is “awareness” as you have clearly stated, then I guess there’s no need to have a lavish summit in the wonderful city of Copenhagen. In fact, when you said that “the summit did not only fail because….”, you already conceded that it has indeed failed. So, I don't see the rhetorical value of the double-faced concession that it was not a crisis of governance but it was successful SIMPLY because it raised awareness. In fact, I have acknowledge this benchmark of raising awareness in my article. More importantly, Western transatlantic powers now have to renew their strategic positions and find a common ground among Europeans and Americans to tackle this crisis of global environmental governance.

Again, thanks for your views and I really appreciate it. :)

Santino

November 29, 2010

Philip Strothmann, Free University Berlin, Gold Contributor (76)

Dear Salvador,

instead of focussing on the problems of the Copenhagen summit, I'm going to comment on your three policy proposals - sorry, it's gonna be a long one ;)

First of all you make a valuable point that due to the internal deliberation process during the negotiations the EU was relegated to the sidelines while China and the US took over the trajectory of the conference. I share your point that the EU's internal decision making process has to be more efficient if it seeks to act as one coherent actor as it should act. However, this is easier said than done bearing the institutional complexity of the EU in mind. To this end I believe that it is rather internal power sharing than western identity questions that hamper the EU to act as a normative power on the global level. Still, the EU has to regain its normative power and the way to do so is not only by having a common policy but through leading by example.

This brings me to the more crucial comment. While you focus on the EU and developing countries, you briefly refer to the US's own climate policy as if it were the same as the EU's: "With a cohesive EU together with the US, the Atlantic powers can push more of their agenda in climate diplomacy by aiming at specific targets rather than being pushed aside by developing countries that evade responsibility." This is a rather bold statement. First of all I doubt that there is a common EU/US agenda on climate change and second of all, speaking of evading responsibilities, it is the US that has and will continue to evade its responsibility.
Where the EU is undoubtedly leading on climate change actions (with great variations between its member states), the US is lacking far behind. While the EU has already implemented an emission trading scheme, the US is unlikely to have such a scheme on the national level anytime soon. It is in the EU's interest to see such schemes being implemented across other regions, in contrast to the US's. While there might be agreement on the 2°c target, the path and the actions the EU and the US are willing to undertake are quite apart from each other. To this end, when referring to the "The US" we have to take not only the current administration but rather more importantly the Congress as well into account! In terms of overtaking responsibility, the US has obstructed progress on international agreements on various occasions, has not signed the Kyoto Protocol or even taken on the national level decisive actions to tackle climate change. Its failure to act on climate change has and will continue to restrict the US to take a leading position within the climate change negotiations.

In addition, it is less a question of "starting" to cooperate with emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa but more importantly to enhance and intensify the many bilateral and multilateral programs and partnerships on clean energy and climate change technology as well as policy that are already in place.

With regard to market incentives, again I question your focus. While incentives to help developing countries to adopt green technology are certainly always useful, the EU's and US's priority again should be on greening their own economies first. This will help then to promote greening economies across the world. It is crucial to go forward first and showcase the success. A good example to this end is the german feed-in tariff that proved to be very successful and has been applied afterwards in various other countries to develop renewable energies and green technology.

Moreover, tax cuts as incentives for multinational companies to apply their own products in developing countries leaves not only the development perspective out of sight but moreover is not applicable within an EU context. Tac policy falls into the national domain and as such there is no mechanism to implement the proposed tax cuts. Moreover, instead of cutting taxes, both the EU and the US should drastically cut their subsidies (which falls into the EU policy domain) to industries that impact climate change. This would lead to a shift towards the use of climate friendly technology across a variety of sectors. Uniform and mandatory standards for all European and American firms operating in the developing world however would be nice to have but are unlikely to be implementable. Instead, the EU and US should support sector specific codes of conduct agreements such as the ones from the Global Reporting Initiative which have proven to improve companies conduct.

With regard to pressing for national legislation in emerging countries one should be careful to interfere into national matters. Moreover, it is a great misapprehension to believe that a) such regulations and laws are not already in place in these countries and b) that they would compel these countries' firms to adopt greener technology and lower carbon emissions. The overall problem is the weak implementation and enforceability of existing regulations, not the lack of the very same. This applies especially for India as well as to a lesser extent for China. Especially China however has - in comparison with the US - partly stronger environmental regulations. It is worth mentioning that China's coal-fired power station have on average nowadays a higher efficiency than the ones in the US due to a tight environmental regulation. Moreover, while China is reluctant to commit itself to specific targets within the negotiations, it is investing more into the renewable energy sector than any other country in the world and has tightened its regulations more and more due to national interests with regard to energy security and environmental protection concerns.

With regard to transatlantic led global information campaigns I don't think that a lack of awareness is the problem, but a lack of political will and leadership to act upon what science has told us for decades.

Taking all points together, neither is there a common US-EU agenda nor is the US on par with the EU when it comes to its moral capacity to demand other countries to act on climate change. The US can only lead if it leads by example - which it has not for years. Developing countries need assistance without question, but the assessment of their actions have to be fair and just.

November 29, 2010

Carlito II Seroje Reyes, DLSU, (5)

Santino,

With regards to Julia's comment I think that it is inconsequential whether it is the responsibility of the states or that of the NGO's to launch information campaigns. The questions is are they really enough? The mere fact that the grassroots in general have yet to have an agreed consensus on this issue, means that a lot has yet to be heard. Many might have been said, but have all been heard? So, a deeper much wider discourse is still on the loose. It is wise to have the influential voice of government in the picture.

Thus, it is in this light that I think, regardless of responsibility, states should still have an active effort to influence their people on what the state believes is right for them. This is parallel to the idea that, it does not necessarily follow that the state should stop its campaigns against rape or domestic violence just because there is a strong NGO for women that fight against abuses to women. Also, it is best to note that these two actors can co-exist in forwarding the message of taking care of the environment and its needs now.

It is a good point to note though that a concerted global action is needed. But, it does not mean that information available to individuals are enough, albeit effective.Especially that an added government support on this matter might even be what we need to reach your said goal. The possibility of increasing the rhetoric of the urgency of climate change can, not only make the grassroots aware, but change their psyche towards the problem: making them more pro-active. Eventually, enabling them to clamor to their governments that efforts must be made. Only then can we expect a concerted effort from the international community.

Also, I think that the incentive structure for the MNC's currently is still ineffective I agree with Santino that they skirt their responsibilities nowadays. So, a stricter more streamlined incentive structure is called for. And, I think the point of Santino is very much on target about that.

Though I would like to ask Santino concrete examples of what he was pertaining to as faults and possible successes. Meaning what is an example of the problem faced now? And, how do you think the future would be with your proposed model, do you have examples to back them up? I have ideas, but I would like to know yours.

Thanks,

Carlito

November 29, 2010

Ntambaazi Williams George, University of Osnabrueck, Germany, Silver Contributor (41)

Dear Santinino,(and Philip)

To me, your argument that the US and EU must devise a market incentive structure for western multinational corporations operating in developing countries to adopt cleaner technologies stands out. (This is also embedded in your proposal of empowering the developing world).

Apart from the tax reduction incentives you mentioned, there are also other several aspects of incentives which can be beyond the ones often emphasized. Positive incentives like extra rations and economic allowances can be used to elicit tremendous and sustainable cleaner technology outputs in the short as well as in the long run. Economic betterment in developing nations can surely be provided as an incentive.

For instance, if like energy prices which almost developing countries have very limited control skyrocket, we are severely affected. This doesnot only lead to state failure but also affects our economic standing due to uncontrollable chaos and unrests

Even though our collegue Philip Strothmann finds the issue of empowering the developing nations quite inapplicable in the EU and even US context, I believe such a point at this moment in time in face of a climate catastrophy deserves serious consideration. Developed nations will never achieve full greening of their economies as long as the developing nations are left behind. There are broad areas of agreement if we can only avoid overlooking the degree of compromise. Climate change affects us all.

As humans, we can only curb the day today climate challenge if we all own up, lead together and carry out more comprehensive research

Again thank you for the great ideas

November 29, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Dear Philip,

Thanks for the comments as well as appreciating my diagnosis of the problem on EU’s internal differences. Let me respond to the issues you have raised.

First, considering your concession on how EU’s internal problems are indeed considerable, I somehow see how it could be challenging for the EU to resolve its internal differences given its institutional complexity. Nonetheless, I see that this is one critical and indispensable way in order to renew transatlantic partnership on the most urgent issues of global significance. Moreover, I do think that both internal power sharing and ‘Western identity’ are the two decisive analytical lens through which we can see how EU’s normative power was gravely undermined. Thus, aside from the multifarious interests of stakeholders within the EU which somehow hindered its ‘actor quality’ in the global stage with its inability to forge a coherent and determined stance, I can see that the EU has to rethink its ‘identity’ wherein it should try to always re-engage the US whose unmatched hard and soft powers can always be helpful enough in making a stronger Western bargaining power.

Despite all the institutional inertia and internal problems that need to be hurdled both within the EU and US politics, I still think that the urgency of climate change (and its perilous effects, if left ineffectively addressed) must always be on top of the agenda in order to start resolving these internal political problems, no matter how difficult climate change governance could be.

More importantly, in response to your substantive point about the US and the ‘evading-responsibility’ argument, I think that the fact that the US chose to deal with China head-on is also because of the idea that China remains to be one of the top polluters at the global level (if not the biggest!). Thus, dealing with China becomes more of a strategic policy imperative. However, Atlantic powers (both EU and the US) can have a stronger bargaining power if they will try to make these top polluters from the developing world (China and India) to have more incentives in being re-engaged in sharing responsibility in global governance of climate change. Moreover, from a policy-analysis point of view, I don’t think that it’s really more of a help to pinpoint who’s evading more responsibility such as whether it is the US, EU or what not. In fact, if you apply a very extreme form of political realism, one may say that all actors in this issue are just pursuing their own crude political interests without regard to the ‘global good’ of addressing climate change. Nonetheless, assuming without conceding that there is indeed a common agenda between the EU and the US, I argue that by the time that the EU and the US realizes how grave and perilous the effects of climate change are, both of them will have to strike a common ground in order push big polluters to go green, at the soonest possible time (including the US itself!). Such realization can come from more bold, strategic, and extensive information campaigns (to be done both by the EU and US and the global civil society) on climate change that will push institutions to activate them in making bold policy interventions on this issue. This will also activate local congressional constituencies all over the United States to push their representatives at the US Congress to take stronger and determined laws in combatting climate change, requiring actions within the American homeland as well as all American interests (MNCs for instance and other non-state institutions) in developing countries who happen to be big polluters (China, India).

Fourth (and most importantly), let me respond to your point on “is less a question of "starting" to cooperate with emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa but more importantly to enhance and intensify the many bilateral and multilateral programs and partnerships on clean energy and climate change technology as well as policy that are already in place”. I believe that that the most quintessential factor why global crisis of climate change is now existent is because traditional powers such as the US and the EU failed to deal more strategically with other developing countries who happen to be the world’s largest polluters in terms of carbon dioxide emissions (China, India and Russia in the world’s top 5). Thus, as both EU and US are in this top 5, the more plausible and normatively-just policy approach is to make the burden of climate change governance much more strategically focused upon these big traditional stakeholders.

Also, tax cuts for the MNCs and the benefits therefrom should be redirected to scientific assistance and sustainable development practices in the local communities in developing countries where these Western MNCs operate (more focused perhaps in China and India being the world’s biggest polluters). I think this proposal is somehow complementary as well with yours which suggest to cut subsidies to those companies that have substantial carbon emissions. Such two-pronged approach would be more effective and plausible as well.

In reference to your comment “tax cuts as incentives for multinational companies to apply their own products in developing countries leaves not only the development perspective out of sight but moreover is not applicable within an EU context”, I just want to question your understanding of ‘applying their own products’. What I just meant by the benefits from tax cuts is for MNCs in developing countries to lead the initiative in sharing their technological expertise in sustainable environmental practices while still doing business. Many German companies (such as Bayer) are indeed doing such sustainable business practices, to a large extent, at least.

Finally, with regards to your last point on China and its environmental policy initiatives, I don’t think that the trajectory of this debate must be geared towards questioning who’s better and who’s not. I think that the world’s biggest polluters (EU,US, China, India and Russia) have a lot of things to learn from each other, considering their intricate and nuanced individual circumstances. However, since both EU and the US have the resources (hard and soft power) and the tenacity (in most cases) to facilitate this ‘learning process’ and the real business of global governance, these two transatlantic powers have to start immediately in cooperating with each other and lead such process. One has to remember that the most perilous effects of climate change are imminent and thus urgent yet well-thought policy actions are indeed necessary.

Though I find your advocacy of ‘leading by example’ as somehow inspiring, the political realism of global politics will not just make China, India and Russia suddenly follow EU and the US based on the these two Atlantic powers’ demonstrative examples on sustainable development. Thus, EU and the US must forge a common ground and cooperate and start negotiating with these other big non-Western polluters to share responsibility in climate change governance.

Again, thanks for the views you have shared. :)

Kind regards,
Santino

November 29, 2010

Julia Grauvogel

Santino,

thank you for your detailed response. Let me just clarify a couple of aspects I pointed out. Firstly, I did not suggest that the CDM works properly at the moment, I only wanted to underline that there is already a mechanism in place, so if you're suggesting a renewed approach, it might be helpful if you could highlight the precise relation it should have with the CDM: shall if replace it entirely, shall it supplement it and are you at the same time intending to reform the CDM?

Secondly, I don't doubt the importance of information campaigns in general, I was just suggesting that this might not be the biggest problem of the current climate change negotiations. Moreover, I can't imagine that the US administration, currently faced with domestic problems, internally divided and with different interests than the EU (as pointed out by Phillip) , will be at the forefront of a global information campaign together with the EU, when those two actors (if we even want to consider the EU as a unified actor) have different approaches towards tackling climate change.

Thirdly, I did not say that COP 15 was a big success because it created awareness, but I rather argued that I disagreed with your assessment of terming Copenhagen a success because of its awareness creating role - but that might have been only a misunderstanding. I totally agree that COP 15 exhibited important failures in global governance... I just got the impression that your essa was rather pointing out the achievments (for example the above mentioned rise in awareness) in an excessively positive way.

Thank you again for your answer! :-)
Kind regards,
Julia

November 29, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Dear Julia,

Thanks for the clarifications. :) I will just make my responses concise and straightforward.

First, I wish to discuss the point on the clean development mechanism/CDM (under Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol). Based on the 2010 report of the CDM, there has been an extremely significant decline of technology transfer projects from 2007-2008, onwards in countries such as China, India and Brazil as more develop countries have substantively reduced funding in the projects. I would most likely assume that this has something to do with the financial crisis during those years. Thus, should reform of the CDM be a critical question, I think renewal of political commitment for developed countries towards CDM and tech transfers must be maintained more than ever, especially for the world's biggest polluters such as those that I have mentioned. CDM may have triggered a lot of tech transfers in more than 80 countries (which is indeed a success!), but renewed commitment in targetting China, India and Brazil as the primary recipients should be one key priorities, considering their individual country's extent emmissions vis-a-vis the global share to the total carbon emissions.

Second, regarding the argument on the internal domestic problems of the US not being able to lead these campaigns, I think that the US will be be able to do as such if the EU tries to renew the climate agenda as one of the top global non-traditional security problem for trans-Atlantic cooperation. With the partnership of global civil society, I think that the US (together with a more unified EU) will be more than willing to lead these campaign considering its massive global information infrastructure and its whole panoply of global media outlets. Realizing the crisis of global environmental governance in Copenhagen, the Washington will be more than willing to lead these ambitious campaigns with civil society should the EU make the necessary efforts to forge a renewed trans-Atlantic cooperation.

Third, when you said that "your essa [essay, sic] was rather pointing out the achievments [achievements, sic] (for example the above mentioned rise in awareness) in an excessively positive way", I think that this was just an unfortunate misreading of the first half of the article as you may see:

1. "There were several achievements of the summit that are indeed note-worthy. Firstly, it has ultimately redrawn the contours of the global governance debate on climate change primarily among state actors. There is little apparent consensus on climate science as well a need for collaborative action. Furthermore, the summit created discourse and awareness among policy-makers within a macro-global context on the perils of a dramatically-changing climate. Also, there appears to be an agreement that ‘green growth' is the way to move forward, such that developed and developing nations have heralded their own low-carbon economic strategies.

2. Needless to say, the summit has once again reminded us of the classic wisdom of political realism in global politics. Specifically, countries - though recognizing how gravely important it is to curb the perils of climate change - committed to somehow cooperate at the global level yet maintaining their own sovereignty by evading any form of legal sanctions. As a good policy response is indicated by a clear declaration of specific targets, the summit has fallen short in explicitly avowing 50% emissions reduction by 2050......"

Thus, the first item shows some possible achievements of the summit while the second item demonstrates how, despite the above-mentioned successes, was still unable to meet the expected targets of the summit. Hence, I said: "As a good policy response is indicated by a clear declaration of specific targets, the summit has fallen short in explicitly avowing 50% emissions reduction by 2050". These two paragraphs of the article show a balanced and fair characterization of the Summit as I highlight both its successes and its failures. Obviously, despite all the miscellaneous successes of the COP15, it still exhibited more important aspects of the crisis in global environmental governance.

Best regards,
Santino :)

November 30, 2010

Philip Strothmann, Free University Berlin, Gold Contributor (76)

Dear Ntambaazi, Santino,

let me get back your comments.

First of all I would like to clarify that I'm not arguing against empowering the developing nations in the EU and even US context, but that despite focussing on developing countries both entities, the EU and the US should focus on there internal problems in order to gain credibility on the issue. Moreover, this is not a "pro/contra" argument but rather meant to ensure that both, actions on the domestic AND global level, are considered.

Santino, while I admire your optimism with regard to a high learning curve of the american public and politicians, I can't help doubt it as well as that the EU will overcome it complex structural problems - no matter what issue is on top of the entities agenda.

In addition I would like to clarify that I didn't not intend to pinpoint who's evading responsibility, but rather point to some realities. My China example was meant to illustrate that the often heard conception of "does China even have env. regulation at all?" is plain and simple wrong and with regard to the US my intention is not to point fingers but to change the perspective in order to understand arguments I've often heard from and in emerging countries such as India and China.

With regard to the information campaigns you propose, I really don't believe that it would help much. In the US the question has become less fact and tragically a highly ideological driven one and in such a situation people believe only what they want to believe. Moreover, while I'm always in for sharing knowledge and providing information, information is one, action a totally different side of the coin. Many know, few act, a tragic fact… ;) Moreover, in developing countries people - as hard as it sounds - simply have other issues to cope with. Climate change - even if it impacts their life - is not only too complex but more importantly too abstract for many to understand or to be willing to learn about it.

With regard to MNCs I still see no reason to support their business. It is them who benefit from not internalizing environmental costs into their products. Moreover, while there are some outstanding examples for good corporate responsibility, many fail. It is funny that you point to Bayer as being a good example as it is Bayer who finances for example Senator James Inhofe… (do I need to comment on him…?). You might want to take a look at this report and rethink your argument with regard to the behavior of MNCs: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2010/10/24... It's european MNCs that have funded climate change deniers in the US! In conclusion, while I would like to see the corporate world operate under voluntary agreements or guide them through incentives I have come to the conclusion that we rather need to use sticks instead of carrots.

Looking forward to your comment, Philip

November 30, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Dear Philip,

Thanks for the responses. :)

First, I acknowledge your concession that you don't argue against such argument on 'empowering the developing world'. I believe arguing against such notion is totally unpopular and obviously unreasonable (isn't it?) Nonetheless, let me examine your response: “but that despite focussing [sic] on developing countries both entities, the EU and the US should focus onthere [sic] internal problems in order to gain credibility on the issue”. Considering the institutional complexities of both political systems (EU and US) from a 'new institutionalisms standpoint, I don't think that credibility is something that is gravely hindering both systems to deal effectively with their engagements with the developing world in terms of sustainable environmental practices. In fact, in the case of the US, their long history of engagement with the developing world (even in unpopular foreign policies, which are too obvious to mention!) were carried out despite unpopular homeland support and a burgeoning budget deficit. Such policies, indeed, were carried as long as American interests were believed to have been being advanced; at least from Washington's point of view. Thus, the more strategic stance is to make sure that EU (despite its complexities, but relying on its purported 'do-good-always' 'normative powers'), along with key actors from the global civil society, has to package their argument that empowering the developing world and putting unprecedented political and actual financial capital in sustainable environmental practices is the way to go, and in fact in the best interests of the United States – at least from a non-traditional security point of view, if you wish (!). Now, when you said that it not about "pro/contra" argument but rather meant to ensure that both” are important, although earlier positing that US needs to “focusing [sic] on developing countries both entities, the EU and the US should focus on there internal problems in order to gain credibility on the issue” – I see here a blatant contradiction. How does one capitalize more efforts on level X than level Y but at the same time upholding the notion that both levels X and Y are critically important? Nonetheless, let me set the record straight – Transatlantic cooperation must be geared towards reaching out to developing countries (deprived of the technology and technical knowledge for sustainable environmental practices, relatively speaking) and at the same time within their homeland. Both levels (homeland and developing countries) are important and thus political capital and policy resources have to be strategically allocated both levels to achieve maximal optimization of intended policy targets.
Regarding your attempt to debunk the ‘information-campaign-as-not-really-that-helpful’ argument, I strongly contend that there is indeed an inherent, indispensable ontological value in pushing for a more exceptional scale of global information campaigns. In fact, the reason why climate change is now a top item in the global governance agenda is considerably because of the awareness created at the global level by key prime actors (e.g. global civil society, scientists, media etc etc). Even if one may say that it will not help much (which you have just asserted in your response), information campaigns are extremely important (as what I have argued in my article) in pushing national constituencies to act urgently and to execute actionable and effective policy responses within the framework of cooperative global governance. Using the new institutionalisms perspective (i.e. discursive, see Schmidt and Hay), discourses are one of the most powerful instruments in creating institutional change despite the long trajectory of path-dependent institutional inertia to any internal transformations. Thus, once information campaigns are carried out effectively, extensively and strategically at the global, national and local levels, the EU and the US can now have more political capital to push their agenda for sustainable environmental practices both within their homeland as well as in the key polluting countries in the developing world.

Let me also comment on your proposition that climate change “is not only too complex but more importantly too abstract for many to understand or to be willing to learn about it”. I certainly think that such reaction is unreasonably pessimistic. I don’t think everybody in this world has to learn all the sophisticatedly-nuanced scientific explanations to fathom how this climate change works – and nobody expects them to do so, unless one really does? (which I am sure, an average reasonable person wouldn’t). However, it is now the job of the states (Western state actors – EU countries and US; see Drezner on how important states are) and global civil society to carry out a carefully-crafted message on what this climate change is all about and what actionable, executable and effective schemes may be carried out at the individual level – complementary to institutional actions. Of course, such messages have to be stringently nuanced and contextualized depending on the target audience, may it be in China, India etc. From a rational choice perspective, once people realized that putting their own individual efforts towards climate change adaptation and mitigation makes perfect sense, then the entire problem of ‘they-don’t care, therefore they won’t act’ will then be no longer be a big quagmire.
One final blow to the response on MNCs - “while there are some outstanding examples for good corporate responsibility, many fail”. I think that one of the reasons why the older generation of policy-makers may have lost faith in doing ‘do-good’ and make-this world-a-better-place’ type of actions is because of a very perverse attitude that ‘many good things happens, but many bad things still do exist’; ontologically and phenomenologically speaking. I don’t want to go through the futile task of counting whether there are more good practices of MNCs in terms of sustainable practices rather than bad ones. In fact, some MNCs may be carrying out reforestation and sustainable environmental practices in one part of the country while destroying the environment several kilometers away from the location of their ‘do-good’ initiative. This thing really occurs in the real world. But, I still uphold that the more appropriate policy paradigm is to encourage a multi-dimensional incentive structure for MNCs to dramatically reduce their unsustainable practices and develop cleaner technologies, especially in the developing world. True enough, the example of World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the numerous initiatives it has undertaken have to be significantly replicated in several more instances in as much as we promote how important the role of the market is in being responsible corporate citizens doing sustainable environmental practices. Also, dismissing how important the carrots while holding only a stick could be the most disastrous policy response one may ever have - it must be a good, strategic and well-deliberate combination of incentives and disincentives; that is, upholding both carrots and sticks at the same time.

I hope the points proposed above are clear enough and I am indeed looking forward in moving on hearing from the views of the other entry articles in this competition. 

Thanks,
Santino

November 30, 2010

Philip Strothmann, Free University Berlin, Gold Contributor (76)

Dear Santino,

funny enough I think we're both arguing from two sides while in essence actually meaning the same thing with slight nuances in some areas. I think this is due to me explaining my points in brief, so let me give it a try to clarify some points I raised you pointed to in your answer :)

First of all I don't think that dismissing the credibility argument is an option as my point was meant slightly different. I didn't mean that due to a lack of credibility the EU and US cannot effectively engage with the developing world in terms of sustainable environmental practices from an assistance point of view. My point is rather that political stakeholders from the west will face strong opposition if they DEMAND action from emerging countries and have not done their homework. To this end, there's unfortunately still a misconception that donor countries can dictate political action in receiver countries. However I agree that both the EU and the US have to put "unprecedented political and actual financial capital in sustainable environmental practices" that should help emerging and developing countries to overcome the traditional development path.

Furthermore I don't think that I contradict myself when I argue that both levels, internal and global engagement, need to be addressed. I think we agree on this, while I put a stronger emphasize on the domestic and you more on the development perspective ;)

With regard to information campaigns, let me clarify that I'm not against it and I should have made my argument a bit more detailed. While I agree with pretty much everything you said, my reasoning for "don't believe that it would help much" is a time argument. I see the necessity to inform, I see the positive outcome of broadening knowledge, what I don't see is that it a) will be possible to carry it out the way you proposed (too many actors involved, complex issue, different target audiences) and b) will lead to political changes - IN THE NEEDED TIMEFRAME. If we've learned something from the past, then that knowledge dissemination takes quite some time. Accordingly my point is not that it's useless, but rather that it simply will take too long to achieve what you envision - with regard to mitigation, not adaptation!

Moreover, even tough you dismissed my complexity and abstract argument, that is the very argument I heard from so many people in India when I was working there and it is understandable, considering the living situation of many.

With regard to the MNCs I agree that I'm really sceptic. It's not that I don't see that there are several really good initiatives, I even worked with some. Still, my point is that if a company acknowledges its environmental responsibility, it should be ready to act without incentives. I believe that granting tax cuts as incentives is money spend that will reach a small portion of the right addresses while a large one will happily take it without acting in accordance with the objective. Economic incentives won't help companies to change their understanding of doing business, but this has to be what we need to achieve.

Having said that I would like to clarify my "carrots and sticks" conclusion. I don't dismiss the notion that incentives can help and should remain as a policy option, but I've come to the conclusion that the corporate sector has to be "guided" through regulatory "sticks" into the right direction because we need the entire industry on board, not just the ones that want to act right.

Finally, instead of just saying "but/no/maybe" I thought I put something more helpful on the table ;) I think one way that we haven't talked about with regard to encouraging action in developing countries is to rethink development assistance from donors across the world. It is hypocritical to grant loans and guarantees to developing countries for building coal-fired power stations while on the same side arguing for better environmental practices. Accordingly not only donor countries, but the IMF, the Worldbank and other alike institutions should introduce strict guidelines that seek to avoid the support of projects that have a negative impact on the climate and rather introduce subsidies for climate friendly projects - maybe through a more advanced CDM market.

In general, I think we've to come to a point, where every policy made is questioned with regard to its environmental impact. One small example: Just like many others, the German government provides guarantees to German companies that wish to export goods to countries were the payment is not guaranteed. Instead of providing these guarantees for the export of goods that would harm the environment/climate, the export of such goods should not be supported. That is a highly controversial issue as it would harm German companies' market reach, but if we want to act seriously and not only talk on the meta level, that's the way to go.

Thanks, Philip

November 30, 2010

Manuel Joseph Cruz Loquias, University of the Philippines, Diliman, (4)

Dear Santi (and to some extent Philip),

After reading the article and the above comments, here are some of my reactions as an ordinary person whose knowledge about environmental issues, politics, and issues came primarily from news in the internet. Please bear that in mind :)

1. Tax breaks suggestion: I find this suggestion really interesting. True, this might not be applicable to the EU. I would imagine though that this suggestion would be pretty attractive to the US, in particular, to the incoming Republican congress.

2. The difference between EU and US: I have to agree that my impression has always been that the EU is more committed to the climate change issue compared to the US, Philip's article pretty much highlights this. I think the scientists of today need to assert more their findings and conclusions, to finally dispel all this brouhaha that climate change is a fairy tale (which sadly, i surmise, that many people in the US believe).

3. What I like about your article Santi is the fresh perspective it puts on the table. It might be true, and yes, a bit pessimistic that, as Philip says - "Moreover, in developing countries people - as hard as it sounds - simply have other issues to cope with. Climate change - even if it impacts their life - is not only too complex but more importantly too abstract for many to understand or to be willing to learn about it." However, climate change, in any case, is a global issue, and should be dealt with in such a way. Of course, it would have been great if the US and EU were leading the charge (well EU seems to be), but I get a sense that this is not happening in the immediate future. Raising global awareness, as well as soliciting various solutions from different nations, should be a priority. In fact, if such a global awareness were to happen, I foresee that the US will then grumpily and suddenly succumb to pressure and take charge - they would hate for other nations to claim their title as "leaders of the free world".

December 1, 2010

Jan Schierkolk, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Gold Contributor (86)

Ohlala, looking at the length and number of your exchanges I cannot help but abandon my plans to be more concise… I hope I can at least keep reiterations of others’ points short, but a few of them are necessary because of apparent nuances between broadly similar views. Also, I’ll try my best to keep my response at least a bit organized after constantly having to amend it while reading all of your contributions…

However, at first something procedural: I see the real danger of us often drifting too far away from the actual texts and respective recommendations, thus bloating the process and depleting our anyways commonly scarce good of free time besides much studies and work, at least in my case (; - by the way I have to apologize for being a bit behind the discussion.

Learning from current climate negotiations and its dilemmas, we should especially try to curb endless reiterations of one’s own point wherever it is obvious that you won’t let yourselves be convinced by each other. I’ll try to not fall into that trap, so if you give me good enough reasons then I’ll admit I’m wrong, or that I didn’t get you right. And if we clearly and irrevocably differ, I’ll say so, too – and leave it at that. In short: let’s please be effective and productive in the sense of eventually getting to sound and coherent group policy recommendations WHERE WE CAN.

For instance, I’ll try to shorten this foreseeable book of mine by largely staying out of the (so broadly rather unproductive, in my opinion) discussion of whether Copenhagen was a failure or not. Let’s say way too much went wrong and the rest is classic Monday morning quarterbacking, unless DIRECTLY leading to policy implications for NOW.


So here we go:

I liked Santino’s piece, especially for its good diagnosis section. And stressing the centrality of identities hits on an important and in my opinion often neglected point. Further, stressing incentives is also good, because they are positive and thus positive change enabling. So as I said, overall a great contribution. However, as this exercise is especially about contrasting differences, I will do so in much more detail:

Identities and credibility are key, then one can convince others. You have made that point. However, sometimes you seem to deviate from it when you seem suggest also pressuring other states. Santino (correct me if I’m wrong). The option of using or even threatening with force will almost always loose out, be it by wasting resources, inhibiting cooperation, or distracting from climate change itself. Only those whose part in climate change is negligible anyways are weak enough to have to swallow their pride enough to actually take Northern or Western orders that bring about more than negotiations could. But then you can forget about the much referred to Western image, also vis-à-vis others. And: even if one could successfully pressures states, firms and individuals may not succumb and it is highly unsure even their own government could (or will want to) pressure them effectively enough.

I therefore share your in other parts expressed point of the need for co-equal cooperation with non-westerners - but certainly not using the much too drastic and historically tainted expression of the “white man’s burden”. Concerning this: asking Europe to assert “normative power” (after it got its act together) in the next sentence rightfully leaves one wonder about your interpretation of it, in any case. So even after Julia’s question and your clarification, it seems to me that its being restored by virtue of the EU acting more in unison for you suggests a definition of “normative power” closer to power over others, not to ability to persuade them. If I interpret you correctly, then I disagree, if not, then I apologize.

Again, please let us not argue for ill-defined pressure on other governments, also not pressure for certain legislation. Going further than Philip, I don’t only doubt the enforcement effectiveness of such approaches, but call them outright diplomatically counterproductive, at the very least if done overtly. Rather 1. create transparency and 2. take THEIR ambitions and use them: “you want to be global powers? The U.S. and the Soviet Union (rightfully or not) EARNED that status by defeating fascism. We are ready to admire and positively accept you as such, according to the measurable efforts you make in OUR common epic battle of climate catastrophe aversion”. How? I refer to my piece this coming Friday.


I’m glad that you touched on the centrality accepting non-Westerners’ new power in your recommendations, Santino. But that was already realized by all in Copenhagen, at the latest, and at the very least for the EU. The deal the world would later know was essentially struck late at night between the U.S. and the new kids on the block. So your recommendation for the EU here, too act in unison in climate issues is hardly new. I am also hoping for a strong environmental division of any new EU foreign service, and (naively) for little to no meddling of member states in ongoing negotiations under it if they are smart and disciplined enough.

If you say that the two-tier leadership of the EC and the Presidency cost the EU influence, I think this is only part of what happened. That argument is convenient for the two main climate easy goers U.S. and China to steamroll Europe on supposedly practical grounds. But their obstruction was already hammered out and pretty openly communicated in the ASEAN summit before Copenhagen, if I remember correctly. Bad enough they shouldn’t have gotten this fig leaf. Everyone, but especially the U.S., too, “evaded responsibility” to take the term you used for developing countries only. So I here agree with Philip. You are right, Santino, when I understand you as saying that blame games help no one (again, see my proposal on Friday). But the degree of delusion in the west about our own goodness in the front of boldly free-riding newcomers keeps us from here universally called for action at home.

Not to peddle conspiracy theories, but Western obstruction happens, too, but often in more subtle ways. For instance, the much (re-) propagated conventional view, and thus far here not criticized discussion premise that Kyoto lapsed is wrong. But it has made its way into the views of even the most well-meaning people. Why is that relevant? The KP’s numerous deficiencies, like not covering new major emitters, could theoretically have been fixed, and a new commitment period (the only thing that really lapses) could have been set. That, however, was inconvenient for those who probably won’t achieve current targets, or haven’t even ratified Kyoto. Now attention is unnecessarily split between COPs and MOPs. And so much valuable time was lost by untying the entire package again, instead of simply adding all the improvements that were on the table, like REDD+. This government-induced but in common policy discussions individually unintended collective hypocrisy was one of the things that made me seriously doubt our Western classic states’ ability to tackle climate change as it warrants being tackled, absent a real game changer. Therefore my digression to Copenhagen’s “failure” here.



About EU-U.S. divides: “the Atlantic powers“ as state actors will certainly not push „their“ climate agenda because they don’t have a common one. Even after your clarifications, I don’t quite see the inherent connection you seem to make between a strong unitarian EU external agency and more coherence with U.S. views and approaches. In climate issues, too, “Western identity” without qualifications and restrictions in my view is no good analytical category anymore since the cold war is over and interests increasingly diverge on many issues. This is not a political statement, I think the transatlantic bond is worth doing some serious soul searching for. But in our case, a more active EU would have laid open differences with the U.S., not bridged them. So here I concur with Julia and Philip, if I understood them correctly.


About another of Philip’s initial objections: Tech transfer is extremely important. Of course urgent action has to be pursued at home, at the very least to showcase successes. But neglecting active tech transfer even the slightest bit NOW would be dangerous, especially considering the MASSIVE investment choices that developing countries face NOW, with global, only very hardly reversible implications for decades. However instructive, compared to that especially the European exercise is almost one of fine tuning. Pardon the illustrative exaggeration. And thanks for clarifying, Philip.

About market incentives for Western corporations to operate in developing countries: Philip’s assertion that its regulation was (member states’ as opposed to EU-) national domain is a) a technicality which Santino’s concept, benevolently interpreted, would account for, and b) it is less and less true with post-Lisbon Treaty and currently crisis-induced rapidly progressing European economic integration. But on the development aspect, I agree: I don’t see how to effectively monitor those corporations absent something entirely new, Santino. So I’d need details. I don’t summarily vilify corporations, but crucially, they are usually just about the last actors who freely give technologies, decent wages, or human rights in environments where no strong institutions set rules, i.e. often in developing countries. This latter condition for me makes all the difference. And effective taming in their “home” countries currently looks ever less (and not more) likely, for instance if you look at recent re-interpretations of the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. Why are you so optimistic here, Santino, when your view on the same corporations in the CDM context is (rightly, I think) is much more sceptical?

In my view, enabling sustainable grass-roots indigenous development looks much more promising, both from economic and political angles. Again, see my proposal on Friday. One point in addition: it would be politically impossible with all the current fear of jobs shifted overseas in the West to actually incentivize our corporations’ activity abroad with taxpayers’ money. Lastly, tax cuts, just to have those sums mandated somewhere (even to clean tech development) are not technically not tax cuts but what a government does with its own revenues – which would make the proposal in this form pointless. Or, alternatively, do you advocate governments telling firms how to allocate the resources not withdrawn from them? This would seem hardly efficient.

Regarding CDM for our purposes: it really can’t be taken as a good reference for a workable system without need of (much) improvement, I am glad all of you seemed to have clarified this in some form or another (?). I agree with Santino, the CDM has actually slowed down in terms of technology transfer. But while much of that may indeed be indirectly related to the crisis, principal shortcomings still look unlikely to be resolved easily. CDM is concentrated on a few big recipient countries, AND most crucially, it is fraught with incentives to cheat (like on what improvements are additional, thus undermining its entirely logic). So I, too, would not more clarifications by anyone who takes it as a frame of reference.


About transatlantic-led CC information campaigns: Doubts here are not “tangential”, Santino, this is part of your recommendations which we are discussing. Firstly, why do you think we should spend money on this? This is a common trap for any specialist in his or her field, usually re-introduced to real world constraints by their parliament or finance ministers. So a cost-benefit-analysis, combined with one on political feasibility would be needed. Here is mine: of all things, spending money on something which would be perceived as mere PR measures because the rest of the world already thinks the West is betraying them by ACTING to slowly on our own emissions is not good value. Also, for effectiveness reasons I’d much rather see people in poor countries do that themselves, when they finally see we act on our big words. Stopping patronizing them begins with taking them for easily manipulable fools (not implying you do, Santino!! It’s just crucial to even avoid the possible impression). And domestically, again taking one of Philip’s points (which I agree with) further: federal GOVERNMENT-driven climate change campaigns, at least in the U.S., would be easy prey for those who already successfully spinned “Obamacare” as being about killing Babies and Grandmothers, further playing into far-right conspiracy theories. And their audiences are unfortunately exactly the people you need to convince, or at least placate. Also, getting back to my above argument: Congress looks unlikely to approve funds for any of this currently. So in my view this would have to happen from among civil society and academia, if at all.

I also partly concur with Julia about the ineffectiveness of government campaigns here. But NGOs are needed. Maybe just not all at the same conference, where they, let’s face it, also in no small part went to raise their own profile (and funds). By the way, great slip Julia (“I was already high before the summit”). Not a Freudian one, I hope. I am drifting into the fun section. Today’s favourite: point taken, but you want the West to reduce developing countries’ debts, Santino? Do you mean China’s debt, too, by that? Seriously, we’ll soon all have to plead for some debt relief, if what we want to relieve others of is not to be just payable in play money anyways. Forget this last paragraph, let’s enjoy this more, and please treat each other accordingly.

December 1, 2010

Jan Schierkolk, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Gold Contributor (86)

OK, and here goes a late night slip of mine: We should NOT take people as easily manipulable fools (;

December 1, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Hello Jan,

Thank you so much for taking the time in reading through the lengthy stream of exchanges and commentaries – and for the comments. :)

let me respond very briefly to some of the points raised earlier.

First, I just wanted to clarify that I don’t actually mean pressure in terms of “force”, as you may have phrased it. I only meant ‘soft power’ (Nye 1990, 2004) at the very first instance. This is the reason why I also invoked the term ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002). In principle, transatlantic cooperation must be embedded upon by a strong and strategic maximization of diplomacy and political assertion upon other relevant stakeholders in this global issue. Thus, I don’t see (yet, and hopefully not) the relevance of using ‘hard power’ or even ‘unreasonable usage of extreme force’ just to get things done, given the current circumstances. Moreover, I have a reasonable extent of optimism in the value of ‘political pressure’ as long it is done strategically and with a very strong case for doing such – considering that most institutional stakeholders involved here succumb to a sort of feedback system (refer to the Eastonian model of feedback system)

Second, the exercise of ‘normative power’ must be a responsible and inclusive type of execution. It must involve a ‘deliberative democratic’ type of dialogue and resolution with other stakeholders. Nonetheless, normative powers are, in principle, expected to provide general guidance and exemplary leadership; since the absence of leadership is always the classic problem of ‘collective action’.

Third, I think the proposal to make a united ‘EU’ as a normative power in global environmental governance is something novel, to a certain extent. As the other comments here may have rightly pointed out, the EU is one of the best (if not the best) exemplary regions on sustainable environmental governance ; arguably speaking, at least. However, EU has to overcome its internal political hurdles and its image perception to the world; and must also reawaken its strategic partnership with the US. In fact, if you may refer to the EU-funded study at the National Center for Research in Europe at the Uni Canterbury in New Zealand regarding perceptions about the EU in Asia-Pacific and beyond, the EU’s works on environment etc… are hardly known by the political and business elites of other regions. Thus, this says about a big gap between what is being done in praxis in Europe, and what is being recognized constructively and discursively beyond the European borders.
Fourth, when you said that EU must do some ‘soul-searching’ – I fully agree! Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that this soul-searching must be able to also see a common ground with the United States so that both Atlantic powers would make a difference in pushing for a united agenda at the global stage – sounds like a wishful statement, at least. :)

Fifth, regarding the debt issue, as you may know, many ‘poor’ developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Africa are somehow trapped in this vicious cycle of debt repayments to international financial institutions such that social welfare spending, sustainable development projects among others are a bit hard to implement (of course, you also have the variable of weak institutions etc.). More than that, for some poor developing countries who have a promising agenda for sustainable environment governance, things get harder with an immense debt reduction each year that the almost a third of the fiscal budget automatically goes to debt payments. Of course, this could be more appropriate in another discussion. But what I’m saying is that, from a rational choice perspective, this could prospectively be a good incentive especially for those countries with good environmental governance agenda. The task now is to identify them and be supported closely by transatlantic powers which may have the resources to do so. Sounds ambitious, but still possible. A lot of political will to be amassed first, indeed.

Finally, regarding this point: “Also, for effectiveness reasons I’d much rather see people in poor countries do that themselves, when they finally see we act on our big words.” Obviously, this is an issue of mutual exclusivity. I think that this can happen both by an execution of the EU and the US and later on (if not concomitantly) by developing countries, among others. So it's not really a question of who must do it, rather a question of who can do it given the favorable conditions.

Again, thank you so much and I am very grateful for all the insightful substantive points raised in this exchange. :)

Kind regards,
Santino

December 1, 2010

Jan Schierkolk, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Gold Contributor (86)

Hey Salvador,

thanks for your good clarifications. Won't go into detail anymore though, unless you wish.

Just one point, so that it's clear that that last paragraph was less serious: of course I think debt relief is important, otherwise many small countries can't even run their own affairs when a suffocating chunk of their budgets is used to service it. I was just noting on the irony that even "rich" countries are increasingly in that position, while some of the alleged poor are their creditors. 20 years ago, no one would have thought this...

Cheers,

Jan

December 2, 2010

Philip Strothmann, Free University Berlin, Gold Contributor (76)

Dear Santino, Jan,

actually in order to not further get lost in endless debates I'll be brief in answering Jan's comments on my answer :)

Let me be very clear: I do not and never stated that I'm against technology transfer. I think it is one of the if not the essential instrument to bridge the gap between developing/emerging countries and the developed ones. Only if we manage to find a workable mechanism to transfer technology we can ensure that developing countries don't take the resource-intensive and dangerous development path the west has taken! Moreover, encouraging technology transfer while maintaining as well a focus on domestic issues under the "leading by example" theme is not a question of priorities but a necessity to consider both at the same time. Moreover, these are two different policy levels that can however benefit from success in one or the other.

Furthermore, I didn't state that the EU has no regulatory power. Just like you said, the Lisbon treaty has given the EU a considerable strong position and I hope and believe that the european integration will continue. However, my point was directed specifically at the proposition to create tax incentives and if there is one domain the european member states will fight the longest for to maintain control over than that is the taxation issue!

Finally I think we all agree that the intention of the CDM system was great but that the mechanism has way too many operational flaws. While I would love to discuss options to improve this system, I guess we should focus on the initial theme of this competition and its articles, thus focus on the US and the EU.

Having said that I thank you both for your valuable inputs and look forward for further discussion on the remaining two pieces :)

All the best, Philip

December 2, 2010

Andrew Pua

Dear Santino,

I know nothing about climate change (and all the political and social nuances of it) which to others may be considered as a disadvantage but an advantage for me. There has been a lot of emotional baggage attached to this issue that it is easy to lose sight of what the issue is about. It seems more or less settled that climate change exists in some form. Not everyone will know about this unless it directly affects their lives. For most people, they still live to see another day. It also seems that we are directly or indirectly responsible for some part of the manifestations of climate change. What seems disputable is that everyone is talking about what they expect is going to happen instead of talking about the data. I am sure most of you have heard of Climategate. For me, all the talk that is going on in the debates is not going to be useful at all until both sides are given the chance to do some research, fieldwork, data analysis and simulations. The research has to be publicly available (and verifiable) for the interaction to be going somewhere instead of drudging up supposed responsibilities. There also has to be some ongoing research as to how much is every nation contributing to "solving" the climate change problem. Without this and some external verification, assigning responsibilities based on impressions of what nations do won't go anywhere at all.

Now, drudging up supposed responsibilities under the guise of international cooperation is more wishful thinking than reality. Not one nation could be expected to do what is has to do to combat climate change unless it is in their best interest. It would be legislating love to expect them to shell out funds to make everything work. Nations who rely on energy to fuel their economic growth are never going to stop using the "strategy that works". There will be a lot of deferral of responsibility. Setting targets may also be wishful thinking. Targets are always broken because there is always bargaining involved later on. There is going to be a lot of quid pro quos to make everything work out (I think you can observe this in the recently leaked cables). Just look at the euro situation now. We do not see it but I am sure there is a lot of bickering about who should shoulder the bailout. This stems not just from politics but from history. It seems that most nations (or at least their representatives) need to take some time to get over their good and bad historical experiences. Again, it is difficult to ask people to do something they do not want to do. It is even more difficult to ask people to shell out funds to do something that someone else should do. Pretty tricky business, I might say. You suggested that EU should revive its normative power. To me, this sounds like EU should, in good faith, be the first to extend a gesture of doing what ought to be done. I do hope this happens but given the current economic and financial scenario, this is highly unlikely. Finance first before environment, as some may say.

Next, you gave suggestions that involve incentives. You proposed to allow "substantial reduction in taxes for multinational corporations operating in developing countries to adopt greener technology". First, is this incentive large enough to matter? No one is talking about the marginal costs of adopting greener technology. It does not seem likely that adoption of greener technology will be instantaneous or will not disrupt existing production technologies. Research here on the part of economists and engineers may be more fruitful. Redirect the taxes to them instead. Second, how is oversight going to be implemented? This is very costly. What if these multinational companies get political support from corrupt governments? Third, how are the prices of goods from these multinational companies going to be affected? Not clear at all for now. You also proposed "introduction of uniform and mandatory standards". Why? Isn't the point of being in business adaptation which to me is they key to entrepreneurial thinking? You also proposed "reduction in developing countries' debts from international loans and radically increase development assistance". Here one needs to be reminded of the effects of foreign aid and the mistakes of the past. But the part of the suggestion that involves technology transfer may be a first step.

It seems a lot of the work may come from the "soft power" part of the policy model. I do hope that informational and educational campaigns can actually give people the chance to think about the climate change problem rather than using an emotional stranglehold accompanied by guilt-tripping. It might be nice to let children know about the climate change problem since children's questions are sometimes to the point that they confuse adults (especially those with preconceived notions). But I disagree with the use of any figurative or observable pressure (follow-the-leader or come-on-I'm doing-what-I-can-you must too strategies).

Overall, I agree that there is a problem. But measuring the problem must be the first step. I do not think that climate change will produce a sudden change in the environment, say the whole coastline suddenly disappearing. I also do not think that we have the ability to forecast what will happen to the environment in the future. I am placing my faith in the genius of human beings to adapt to the problem and be innovative and entrepreneurial. Note that people can always change their practices when the need for change is coming and tangible. We do not know if "it is going to be too late".

Best regards,
Andrew Pua

December 2, 2010

Alisson Zumpano, Universität Osnabrück, (3)

Dear Santino,

First of all I would like to congratulate you for your brilliant article.

I would like to add that I do not fully agree with you in what regards that COP15 was a demonstration of a pure realist theory. On the other hand, It would be ingenuous to state that COP15 reflected the purest example of the cooperation will of people and States.
In what regards the role of United States and EU, I agree that an unified position of these powers (as normative leaders) would be very significative in what regards reduction of carbon emissions.
However I must state that emerging powers are, in one way or another, delegitimizing the traditional leader's role and it would be such a challenge for the traditional leadership to diminish the influence of them.

Anyway, I liked the way you structured your ideas.

Very well done!

Best regards.

December 3, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Dear Andrew,

Thanks for the insightful comments you have posted here.

For the sake of brevity, I will make my points very straightforward. Let me just focus instead on your point about incentives.

Let me quote:
"Next, you gave suggestions that involve incentives. You proposed to allow "substantial reduction in taxes for multinational corporations operating in developing countries to adopt greener technology". First, is this incentive large enough to matter? No one is talking about the marginal costs of adopting greener technology. It does not seem likely that adoption of greener technology will be instantaneous or will not disrupt existing production technologies. Research here on the part of economists and engineers may be more fruitful. "

Response:
I think the incentive is large enough for MNCs to compel on greener technology and practices. And if I may add, the state must also strongly encourage (if not compel) these companies to redirect tax savings to research and development for sustainable environmental practices. I think this is a reasonable condition for companies to be incentivized. In fact, there are also benefits for the companies to adopt green practices ( brand imaging, reputation etc). Furthermore, when you redirect tax savings to R&D, this will then require the assistance of engineers and scientists that you might me be referring to. So your point as cited above fits perfectly within my policy framework, at least based on the justification pointed here. :)

To Alisson,

Thanks for appreciating the substantive points I have advanced in my article. :)


Kind regards,
Santino

December 3, 2010

Salvador Santino F Regilme, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Gold Contributor (77)

Dear Andrew,

Thanks for the insightful comments you have posted here.

For the sake of brevity, I will make my points very straightforward. Let me just focus instead on your point about incentives.

Let me quote:
"Next, you gave suggestions that involve incentives. You proposed to allow "substantial reduction in taxes for multinational corporations operating in developing countries to adopt greener technology". First, is this incentive large enough to matter? No one is talking about the marginal costs of adopting greener technology. It does not seem likely that adoption of greener technology will be instantaneous or will not disrupt existing production technologies. Research here on the part of economists and engineers may be more fruitful. "

Response:
I think the incentive is large enough for MNCs to compel on greener technology and practices. And if I may add, the state must also strongly encourage (if not compel) these companies to redirect tax savings to research and development for sustainable environmental practices. I think this is a reasonable condition for companies to be incentivized. In fact, there are also benefits for the companies to adopt green practices ( brand imaging, reputation etc). Furthermore, when you redirect tax savings to R&D, this will then require the assistance of engineers and scientists that you might me be referring to. So your point as cited above fits perfectly within my policy framework, at least based on the justification pointed here. :)

To Alisson,

Thanks for appreciating the substantive points I have advanced in my article. :)


Kind regards,
Santino