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February 3, 2012 |  3 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

Rodnie J. Allison

Indian Aerospace: Poised For Takeoff?

Rodnie J. Allison: India is finding increased leverage in the procurement of weapons systems from Western (specifically European) countries. This development could help deepen cooperation between India and the West. Case in point: India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition.

For many, the final details of India's Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition are of little significance. For those of us without a stake in Dassault Aviation, or the Eurofighter consortium, the real thrust of the deal lies in the expansion of strategic industrial and defense cooperation between India and the West.

In the realm of indigenous defense technologies, there is a considerable gap between what India's domestic industry can offer and what is expected of it by the nation's forces. According to Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony, "Our aim is to have a strong defense industrial base in India, because a country like India cannot indefinitely depend on foreign suppliers for the majority of our equipments. At the moment 65-70 percent of the equipment is imported; we have to reverse this trend."

Given the current economic and budgetary woes afflicting many Western states, India's timing for acquiring such technology could not be more opportune. New Delhi has found considerable leverage in procurement negotiations to modernize large portions of its currently outdated weapons systems-an estimated 50% of which are considered obsolete. Flush with cash from record GDP growth, the Subcontinent is now playing catch up via the acquisition of notable quantities of foreign defense technologies. In what can effectively be considered a leapfrog policy, the Indian defence industry is bypassing the substantial research and development costs associated with weapons development.

What India lacks in technology and domestic manufacturing capacity it makes up for with the ability to strategically focus capital. The International Monetary Fund in 2009 projected India's GDP would grow in real terms by more than 7.5% on average from 2010 to 2014. Furthermore, India's defence budget has grown by some 64% (in real terms) since 2001-reaching $36.3 billion in the 2011-2012 budget. News out of New Delhi indicates that India is on track to spend more than $100 billion on capital acquisitions in the 2007-2012 timeframe and $120 billion in the next plan period (2012-2017).

Given the economic downturn and subsequent Euro zone crisis, India is poised to take advantage of the weakened positions of many organizations within the technologically rich, and now capitally poor, European defense industry. Case in point: the MMRCA negotiations. With its new found leverage, India has become more confident to negotiate on its own terms in regards to technology transfers and industrial offsets.

For the MMRCA competition the Indian Request for Proposals (RFP) required that 60% of the aircraft's technology be transferred to India in four phases. The MMRCA contract places extraordinary demands on the winning vendor to supply not only manufacturing technology (including six-axis computer controlled milling machines and large-sized advanced forging and foundry facilities), but also design data associated with key technologies, such as engines, radar and early warning components. Only 18 of the 126 fighters will come directly from the vendor selected. After the subsequent transfer of technology, the remaining 108 jets will be manufactured by the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

In large part the indigenization of the Indian defence industry has been a constant battle complicated by corruption and ideological differences concerning the role of the state in weapons manufacturing. The state has refused to relinquish control of domestic defense research, development and manufacturing infrastructure; or to create the regulatory environment where one could sufficiently develop weapons technology. Indigenous defence production is largely dependent on the public sector accounting for around 86% of the indigenous market. As such it should come as no surprise that India is now the world's largest weapons importer making up 9% of the world's international arms transfers.

Should the West be worried about India's increasing clout? No - for two important reasons. First, there is the undeniable pull of aligned strategic interests over the medium to long term. This includes cooperation on China, Afghanistan and anti-terrorism and anti-piracy arenas. According to the Pentagon's February 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review Report, "As the economic power, cultural reach, and political influence of India increase, it is assuming a more influential role in global affairs. This growing influence, combined with democratic values it shares with the United States, an open political system, and a commitment to global stability, will present many opportunities for cooperation."

Second, as evident in the MMRCA competition, there is the continued reinforcement of anti-corruption efforts within India. Considering the publicity such transactions receive and the lasting maintenance and supply chain relationships they create; there is a significant opportunity to create positive institutional momentum within India. The sheer size, publicity and significance of such contracts will, in and of themselves, encourage a heightened level of transparency and accountability within the procurement process.

In the pursuit of building long term strategic cooperation, the MMRCA competition has thus far raised the standard for industrial, commercial and defense integration between the West and India. Only time will tell if these advancements will make the transition from prudent fiscal leveraging, on India's behalf, to a more permanent and concrete security compact between all actors involved.

Rodnie Allison is a recent Master of Public Administration graduate from the Dalhousie University (April 2011). He is currently with the Atlantic Council of Canada where he is exploring defense procurement as it relates to innovation and economic development.

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Unregistered User

February 3, 2012

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This is an interesting exploration of the potential for Indian-Western cooperation on defence technology.

However does the Rafale over Euro-Fighter choice not undermine this picture slightly? Although India's potential market is still very attractive to European defence companies, the consortium behind the Eurofighter (and likely the governments behind them) do not seem willing to bow to India's demands (on price and other issues), undermining the argument for India's increasingly strong bargaining position. In addition the Rafale deal can be explained as an act of almost desperation by Dassault and the French government, who have seen (and been humiliated by) the rejection of the Rafale by so many countries in the past.

In addition to this, Russia is currently undertaking several significant arms deals with India, including R&D programs. This must be not only of concern to the West in terms of the competition, but also that technology transfer to India becomes an increasingly contentious issue as there is the potential for this transferred tech to then bleed into joint Russia-India programs, or at the very least affect the development of these technologies (greater Indian understanding of the capabilities of the western tech leads to products more capable of adapting to this). India is unlikely to abandon Russian deals, as (quite logically) they do not wish to become dependent on any one source for their technological "leapfrog".

As a final point, surely this can only ever be a short term paradigm for relations, as if India is truly seeking to "leapfrog" then they do not plan to import such significant quantities of weapons forever. This is evidenced by their demands for the transfer of the capabilities to indigenously produce.
 
Joshua  Clapp

February 8, 2012

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Rodnie, I hope that the relationship does indeed turn into a more permanent security compact. What do you think about some of the points Oliver brings up?

Oliver, I am not so sure that India’s decision to take the Rafale over the Eurofighter necessarily undermines Rodnie’s argument. Couldn’t one also argue that India chose the Rafale not solely due to French desperation but also thanks to the strong links between France and India?

A few examples: France not condemning India’s nuclear tests and India already having French aircraft in its fleets. So while India appears to be rewarding a friend, it is also taking advantage of the weakened position of Dassault. I would say this example supports Rodnie's line of reasoning.
 
Rodnie J. Allison

February 8, 2012

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Oliver defiantly raises some good points. However, the intention of my article was to bring attention to the MMCRA competition and India’s increasing leverage when in procurement negotiations. Given the state of many Western economies, the considerable role the defence industry plays within these economies, and India’s penchant for foreign weapons, there can be no doubt of India’s enhanced negotiating position.

I am unsure how my contention that India has found increasing leverage is undermined by the Rafale choice. India went with what they thought would be the best deal. I am not privy to how EADS handled their side of the negotiations, but I can assure you that the fly away price combined with complications in dealing with EADS’s various stakeholders would have reduced the appeal of the EADS offer altogether - regardless of the strength of the weapons system or technology offered. The bottom line here is that India benefited from having EADS and Rafale undercutting one another knowing the magnitude of the contract within the economies of the competitors– hence India’s increased leverage.

In regards to the Russian point, I would agree that there are ample complications in the transfer of technology to third parties. However, the greater point here is that India chose to reject the Russian submission in the MMRCA competition. Regardless of the reason for this, it has to be considered a shift in the status quo of traditionally procuring Russian based fighters.

On the last point I would agree that the MMRCA technological stipulations are a short term solution to a long term problem. If India is indeed going to “leapfrog” its regional competition it will take much more than a state run behemoth (HAL) retaining the majority of the advanced contracts.
 

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