There has been recent concern that Western governments have focused too exclusively on the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, and have underestimated the danger posed by people like Anders Breivik and the contemporary extreme right in Europe. While some manifestations, such as the recent rise of the English Defense League or the resurgence of nationalist groups in Russia, deserve greater attention from public authorities, the risk assessment seem distorted.
A closer look at modern rightwing radicalism in Europe reveals a largely fragmented political family. Despite several attempts to create transnational platforms, even within the European Parliament, links remain tenuous and efforts to strengthen ties are often undermined by ethnic related conflicts or even territorial claims. At the same time, the culture of violence within far right activism is confined to a few pockets of militancy – mostly fringe groups connected to football hooliganism – often devoid of political motives. Although Breivik's concerns and ideology are shared by many extreme right organizations in Europe, the overwhelming majority does not advocate political violence and was quick to condemn his action as well as the taking of innocent lives.
The wave of concern following the events in Oslo apparently arises from the European dimension of Breivik’s manifesto, unambiguously expressed in its title. In addition to multiple references to other extreme right organizations and ideologues across Europe, Breivik’s continent-wide perspective was seen as evidence for the existence of a network of protest parties and (potentially violent) movements leaning on the edges of mainstream politics. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rather than an organized structure with clearly defined political goals, the European conscience in the contemporary extreme right's agenda is no more than an ideological myth.
Besides an anti-system nature – visible in the confrontational approach towards the democratic institutions – the emerging far right in Western Europe is also characterized by the celebration of national communities and the sense of belonging to those communities. The nation is regarded not only as a civic and territorial entity, whose members are submitted to a set of laws and institutions, but also as an ethnic community, whose cultural legacy was built throughout history and should be transmitted from generation to generation, prevailing over the individuals. Perhaps no one has put it better than Breivik himself in the manifesto sent out just before the attacks: “We are fighting for the right to view a nation as a cultural unit, not just a random space on a map.”
The ideal of ethnic homogenization within state borders seems, nevertheless, to transcend the traditional ultra-nationalistic framework. Despite the national vocation of historical fascism and the post-industrial extreme right, the new political family reclaims Europeanism of an ethno-cultural nature, based on the acknowledgment of a common civilization and heritage built over time. Unlike the years of the Cold War, when the communist shadow pushed the European radical right towards a pro-American alignment, contemporary right-wing nationalism has reclaimed the myth of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. This Europe is perceived as an alliance of nations based on a common ethno-cultural legacy and against the “Islamization” of Europe fueled by the increasing impact of immigration, the spread of multiculturalism and the alleged “Marxist colonization” of the Old Continent.
In the days following Oslo tragedy, the media were suddenly flooded with prophecies about the symptomatic nature of Breivik's action and the rising support for far right activism at European level. However, even if Breivik's attacks were shocking and brutal, he is a lone wolf, and the notion of an ethnically homogeneous Europe has no formal structure behind it. When global security faces the threat from Al Qaeda and its regional franchises, as well the emerging danger posed by transnational organized crime, failed states or the spread of weapons of mass destruction, it would be a serious mistake for the Western governments to turn their attention to such an illusionary enemy.
José Costa has a Master’s Degree in Political Science and International Relations from the New University of Lisbon, and his dissertation focused on the new extreme right in Portugal.



November 9, 2011
Regina Bakhteeva, University of Bologna, Silver Contributor (52)
My claim that the threat is neither minor is based on the premise that political violence is not the only thing that should make us concerned about far right extremists. Even if Breivik’s action was condemned by majority of them, it is hardly comforting. There are other instruments (not least discriminatory measures) at their disposal to make lives of those whom they consider as alien to Europe miserable. It seems to me unwise to leave the problem of right wing extremism unheeded just because at its current stage it has not reached the danger scale of other problems we have on our hands (the author mentions them). But if history is any guide, it might be too late to deal with it effectively afterwards.
On a bit different note, I am curious as to what the author implies by real Europe. The article states that “the myth of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals” has been reclaimed by right-wing nationalists. If according to the author it is the myth, then what is the reality?