Through a look at the interpretations and interplays of cooperative security in the foreign policies of three main actors - the European Union, Russia and the United States - this work aims to demonstrate the limitations of cooperative security dealings in post-conflict situations. Focusing on discourse analysis, the construction of public image and perceptions' assessments, this study helps to shed light over why the gap between words and action is so wide regarding the specific case of cooperative security.
The case study chosen to illustrate these limitations is Kosovo, having undergone nine years of unsuccessful attempts to resolve existing crises in the region and efforts, despite the many difficulties, to build peace. Cooperative security has been mentioned numerous times in relation to this case, but year after year it seems to have been left behind other interests, based on the complex dynamics, and the interplays of interests and perceptions.
This research investigates the obstacles preventing the parties from being successful in addressing post-conflict cooperative security. Therefore, this work intends to grasp the reasons that limit and prevent cooperative security from being successful in terms of addressing post-conflict situations. It argues that the main constraints to post-conflict cooperative security are motivations (regarding political engagement), lack of political will and lack of tools in Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC).
Motivation is a crucial factor as it is the choice of the most powerful actors in IR: first, in the moment of choosing the object of intervention and second, when deciding the level of involvement in such intervention. These motivations are explained by geostrategic, political, economic and cultural interests that the actors are informed by.
The second limitation to post-conflict cooperative security is the political will (or lack of it) that actors use in this type of situations. Political will is analysed in the light of unsolved post-conflict situations such as the lack of security caused by periodical incidents - e.g., Gracanica, Kosovska Mitrovica, and Gorazdevac in 2003 (Xharra; Matic, 2003), in Kosovska Mitrovica (Kosovo compromise, 2009) in the first days of 2009. For the over nine year period after the end of the armed conflict, this study goes through an analysis of speeches that clearly demonstrate this will to solve crises, but that do not really transform into reality.
The last limitation examined in this work refers to the lack of tools when it comes to CIMIC. This includes lack of knowledge, lack of information exchange between the different entities involved (translated in poor communication between the civil and military sectors), cultural limitations and lack of professional training for carrying out collaborative work.
Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito recieved her MA in International Relations from the University of Coimbra School of Economics.
Related Articles from the Atlantic Community:
- Elizabeth Pond on Kosovo: Balkan Success Story and Future EU Member?
- Christian Mölling on Think Tank Analysis: Comprehensive Approaches to International Crisis Management
- Gaza War: Could Balkan History Show Way Out
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November 28, 2009
Member deleted
The author hit the nail on the head saying “As the situation in Kosovo since the end of the war has demonstrated, there is a gap between words and deeds.” I totally agree.
When international community started administer the province the aim was to build “standards before status”, on 2005 the task was seen impossible so the slogan changed to “standards and status”. Even this was unrealistic so Feb. 2008 “European”standards were thrown away to garbage and “status without standards” precipitately accepted by western powers. For international community I don’t see any success story with this backward progress.
In my article “Kosovo update” (http://arirusila.wordpress.com/2009/08/06/kosovo-update/) I concluded following:
“The outcome today is a quasi-state with good change to become next “failed” or “captured” state... Today’s Kosovo is already safe-heaven for war criminals, drug traffickers, international money laundry and radical Wahhabists – unfortunately all are also allies of western powers. Now Europeans realize they were hoodwinked into recognizing Kosovo’s independence on the pretence it would resolve problems and bring peace."
"From administrative point of view Kosovo is total mess-up. EU started its huge rule & law mission late 2008 under UN umbrella. Besides UN/UNMIK and EU/EULEX there is also other players twisting arms who is leading the international protectorate. There is European Union High Representative who simultaneously leads International Community Office wondering his role, same time Nato-troops (KFOR) tries to keep ethnic tensions moderate, OSCE do not know its role nor length of its mission’s mandate in Kosovo, EU delegation office, few influential foreign liaison representatives and of course sc. Kosovo government based to local tribes. It shows amazing creativity to establish this kind organizational nightmare in one tiny province and more amazing is that after nearly nine years of international administration and capacity building and squandered billions of Euros both the administration and the situation on the ground are beneath all criticism.”
The core of the problem from my point of view is that when a development program is made like desk plan in Washington or Brussels with some cooperation with state’s central government there always is a risk of more or less big gap between beneficiary needs and centralized aims. This has been the case in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina too.
Some more sustainable solutions could be implemented in Western Balkans. Withdrawal of Kosovo recognition can open real negotiations between local stakeholders with unpredicted but possible compromise can end one frozen conflict.
Both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo many local stakeholders see implemented rules illegitimate and foreign-imposed – and they are right. Internationally imposed solutions are not sustainable, to get real progress the inter-ethnic agreements must be made at local level.
More about this issue one may find from my article “Bottom-up Approach needed for multi-ethnic society” - http://arirusila.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/bottom-up-approach-needed...