RSS

There has been a lot of speculation lately about the direction the unrest in the Arab world is currently heading towards. Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, and/or even Saudi Arabia, all are frequently cited as (potential) revolutionary hotbeds that are likely to be the next domino to fall.

Surprisingly, there is one important country missing in this list; that is, Morocco. There seems to be a general consensus among analysts that Morocco is an island of freedom and tolerance in comparison to most other Arab regimes in the region, and that therefore a similar situation as in Tunisia or Bahrain is not likely to play out. Ece Ozkan also argued on atlantic-community Why Morocco Won't Go the Way of Egypt.

As opposed to the ruler of Bahrain whose support revolves traditionally around the Sunni minority of Bahrain's population, Morocco's king, Mohammed VI, enjoys large support from different segments of the Moroccan population, thereby transgressing social, sectarian and ethnic cleavages.

Unsurprisingly, until now nobody in Morocco seems to be calling for the ousting of Mohammed VI from power, as opposed to the revolutionary movements in Egypt and Tunisia, who saw the removal of their leaders as a part of the solution. Furthermore, in comparison to most other Arab states, Moroccan citizens live in relative freedom. As a consequence, most analysts believe that the foundation for a revolt in Morocco is less apparent than for example in Egypt, Tunisia, or Yemen, and that therefore Morocco will remain largely unaffected by the regional unrest.

This projection is however based on a rather rosy depiction of the current situation. Morocco is indeed more tolerant than most other states in the region, but if the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt turn out to be successful in bringing about real democracy, Morocco's project of political liberalization is likely to fall behind to other countries in the region, thereby putting its commitment to democratic values to the test.  

The Moroccan government could hitherto defer the process of democratic change by referring to the cases of neighbouring Algeria or Iraq. As such, the general assumption in Morocco (just as much in the Arab world) was that change and stability were mutually exclusive. The Egyptian and Tunisian cases have however demonstrated that change does not necessarily result in chaos, and that stability is not exclusively guaranteed by authoritarianism.  

Until recently, King Mohammed's undemocratic rule was in part obscured by his popularity. Political liberalization did therefore not come at a high price. Many Moroccans believed that Morocco was on the right track in terms of economic progress and political liberalization, and that in order for things to become better the king should be allowed more time to complete his policy of bringing about economic prosperity and political freedom. Anno 2011, the social-economic situation is still deplorable and the political repression remains worrisome - although the latter has eased under King Mohammed's reign, Morocco's literacy rate still bungles around 56 percent (which is the lowest in the Arab world), the country is suffering from huge economic inequality (which happens to be the highest in the Arab world), in which corruption has become more widespread and has also become institutionalized over the years.   

The recent upheavals in the Arab world, however, have done away with the notion that change will come with time. The Moroccan government will have to start to make serious efforts to drastically improve the conditions of the Moroccan citizens at immediate effect (both economically as well politically) if it wants to prevent the disparity between the Moroccan people and its government to reach dangerous levels.

This is easier said than done, as nearly everyone around the king's inner circle benefits from the current system, and more importantly, they are very powerful and would likely try to thwart any move that could hurt its interests. King Mohammed is therefore facing a dilemma: a continuation of the status quo could put him on pars with other leaders in the region, whereas change could lose him the support from Morocco's powerful elite. However, the latest developments in the region have shown that popular support is much more important in order to survive.

Unfortunately, however, there are currently no signs that the Moroccan government is willing to allow for change, with the Moroccan king dismissing most of the protesters demands and to whom he referred to as "demagogues". Consequently, the risk that now looms on the horizon is that disenfranchised groups will seek political change without government consent, thereby putting them at loggerheads with the state and its monarchist backers. Morocco could in effect then become a divided nation given the equilibrium between the supporters of the Moroccan government and its opponents, which is likely to end up in a dangerous stalemate.

The assumption that Morocco is a beacon of stability in a sea of regional hotbeds rests on the wrong premise - i.e. that the political and social configuration of Morocco is equal to the period prior of the regional upheavals. Instead, more and more Moroccans start to believe in the need for concrete change of the system and that now is the time to do so. But more importantly, what Moroccans have learned from the Egyptian and Tunisian experience is that political meekness is not likely to induce the government to take steps towards meeting the people's (legitimate) demands. Change is edging its way across the Arab world, and Morocco is not exempted in this regard. How this change will affect Morocco ultimately depends on the king's readiness to adapt to the changing situation.  

Ghassan Dahhan is a political scientist based in London.