Attitudes toward China's rise tends to shift from one extreme to another depending on the events taking place domestically. When the economy is booming, and Chinese corporations are expanding overseas, there tends to be stark warnings against China's rise. When the financial system fell into recession and social instability took hold, there was caution against the potential collapse of China.
Needless to say, both viewpoints capture part of the truth about China's rise. The growth of the dragon in recent years has not been without problems. The economic miracle took place in a country that is still in the process of nation building, over a vast territory in which the central-local tension has never been fully resolved, and under an authoritarian government that often fears its rule is under threat. So the prospects for China are perennially mixed. In short, it will need to resolve many of its internal problems before it can truly 'rise'.
The key question is does China's rise matter? No doubt it will alter the relative importance of other countries, but national prestige aside, a change in ranking shouldn't concern leaders in Washington and Brussels if China shares the same values as they do. In such a case, China's rise will strengthen, not threaten the existing security community. China's rise should matter, if it results in regional instability, or if China uses its status to promote a set of norms that we don't agree with.
Most of the recent research agrees that China has increasingly demonstrated itself to be a constructive player in regional affairs, largely out of the consideration of fostering a stable environment for its economic growth. It seeks to establish stable 'partnerships' with other 'great powers', and maintain a 'good neighbor' policy, as illustrated by China's engagement with the ASEAN countries.
A hypothetical question often asked is what will happen when China thinks it has grown to the point at which it can afford a war, perhaps over Taiwan or with Japan? Is it waiting for its 'uni-polar moment'? There is little doubt that China is determined to resolve the Taiwan question once and for all at some point. However, as China continues to lure Taiwan with its economic ties, it will only become increasingly difficult to use military means. For the future leader of a 'risen' China, a war so close to its coastal economic core hardly constitutes a viable policy option. I think that there is no such thing as a 'sufficient economic level' that, once reached, can allow the government to forgo further economic growth. The nature of economic growth is that it is continuous – the more you have, the more you ask for.
The second question challenges our faith in the relative merits of liberal democracy. A common concept since the end of cold war is that only a mature liberal democracy can provide the solid foundations needed for a great power. Without democracy, an independent judiciary, a free media and an active civil society, the government will not work effectively for the greater good of the country but will instead become obsessed with preservation of power and personal gain. It will result in the immense wastage of resources and misguided policies subsequently stunting the country’s development. If we believe this argument then the eventual rise of China needs not be feared – because only a liberal China can truly rise.
If we do not follow this line of thinking, and believe there is the possibility that China can rise without transforming into a liberal democracy, then we must rethink our own perspective. What is so desirable about liberal democracy when an authoritarian country can rise to the top of the global power league?
In the meantime, I think we should have faith in what we believe in, and try to direct Beijing in that direction. For the past ten years or so, the leverages of the west over China have been weakening, largely because of increasing commercial ties causing the leaders of the developed countries to become reluctant to criticize or pressure Beijing. Of course, forcing China to adopt democracy is simply not plausible, and is probably counter productive. However, we should note that many people – academics, policy makers and ordinary people – in China still take Europe and North America as the examples of an international standard that their country seeks to reach. The policy makers in Washington and European capitals should therefore avoid cultural relativism, and deliver a clear message to Beijing that China should adopt liberal democracy not because it is morally superior, but because it is the only way in which China can truly rise.
Man Tien Hang Tim holds an MSc in Internatonal Politics and is currently an independent journalist based in Hong Kong.
Related material from the Atlantic Community
- 8
October 1, 2009
Member deleted
The idea of the inalienable right of the individual as the raison d’être of the state forms the fulcrum for the liberal democratic state. To that extent, the idea of the transatlantic-community as the example to aspire for is understandable amidst Chinese populace. The idea of a civil society is not necessarily that of one which necessarily has to be in an antagonistical relationship with the state. Places where they are in such a relationship points to problems.
The ability to rise to a position of global dominance has very little to do with a liberal-democratic structure as history has proved with the former Soviet Union being a recent example of centralised democracy like China. There are many lesser states that would find such an emergence useful - for the simple reason that it allows them to justify their own colossal failures.
However, once one has separated the issue of desirability from ability and has spoken about ability - the necessity to speak about desirability comes to one's mind sooner or later. The concomitant rise of China along with its modernization drives pertains to its societal attributes too. One's physical environment has an impact upon one's cognitive-emotive world. The issue of desirability of liberal democracy would be the ability of the average populace to handle the idea of the freedom of the individual - for it entails a lot more than the mere physical idea of freedom.
Economic growth of China would present choices for its populace - including the idea of the choice for a particular idea of society and the kind of governance - as it perhaps already does. The point would be: can China handle economic and political freedom without falling into the problem-pits that many in the transatlantic world suffer from?
Could it be possible for China to envisage the Nordic model? I think that the Chinese leadership is pragmatic enough to understand the necessity of achieving a certain maturity: of an economic well-being and freedom before it goes for an equally mature political freedom. That is an old Chinese position and argument and so far China appears to be consistent with it.
But I do think that it would be a serious mistake to equate Chinese authoritarianism with the kind that religious authoritarianisms abound as tyrannies - the Taliban for example! Or even Pakistan. Just a passing thought about the comparison because of an earlier concern expressed before in this comment: of particular states/communities/groups wanting to bandwagon with the Chinese position over economic & political freedom as some anti-western position or statement!