"A lot of the problems we face, fifty percent at least
if not more, is psychological. Substance is important,
but fifty percent of it is how you approach it, how you reach out to people,
and how you understand where they are coming from."
Mohammed El Baradei, former director of the IAEA, about Iran.
Winston Churchill once said that "the further backward you look, the further forward you can see" and this holds especially true in the conflict about Iran's nuclear program which cannot be understood without considering the historical context in which it is situated. Understanding the factors of Iranian nuclear politics is the key for any strategy that is aimed at effectively influencing the cost-benefit-analysis of the political leadership. Propelled by a highly traumatized relationship with the United States that continuously feeds a vicious circle of mutual suspicion and distrust, Iranian leaders are preoccupied with the fight for international legitimacy and recognition as an independent and equal partner to the West.
Foreign interference by the United Kingdom and the US, as in case of the nationalization of Iranian oil production in 1951, or the overthrow of democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 still shape Iranian self-perception to a great extent. Against this backdrop, the pursuit of the nuclear program has been instrumental not only to streamline domestic politics toward national unity, but also to restore national pride throughout the political establishment, including the opposition. Hence, the question is not so much about diminishing cohesiveness of the non-proliferation regime or a shifting power balance in the Greater Middle East, but Iran's quest for sovereignty, modernity and control over energy resources.
Triggered by Iran's lack of compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this struggle has become one of the most pressing issues in international politics and has sparked an intense debate in the West about the right strategy to prevent Iran from going nuclear. Accused of secretly acquiring nuclear breakout capability in order to accomplish and consolidate its drive to regional hegemony, the Obama administration and its transatlantic partners adopted a two-track approach consisting of unconditional engagement and sanctions, in order to halt Iran's illicit enrichment activities. Not taking the psychological dimension of the conflict into account, this approach --as others before-- will ultimately fail despite the increased pressure on the Iranian economy and its people. At the same time, pundits and politicians in the U.S. --Europe remains regrettably silent-- are discussing two other policy alternatives that completely ignore the crucial importance of the psychological aspect of Iranian nuclear politics.
The first option would be a targeted military strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure carried out either by the US or Israel. Hardliners in both countries are pushing the US to attack Iran based on the argument that "the US must do what Israel can't, because if it doesn't do it, Israel will" (Paul Woodward). If such a highly dangerous and difficult operation were to be successful, it would throw the entire region into chaos, provoke terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens by Iran's proxies Hezbollah and Hamas, endanger international stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, jeopardize the global economic recovery as oil prices would eventually soar and, most importantly, set back Iran's nuclear program for only two or three years according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
The second option would be containment of a nuclear Iran that comes as a light version of a multilateralization of the nuclear fuel circle and a strong inspection regime --an option that is supposedly favored by Obama but would actually reward a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty violator-- and the more hazardous version of deterrence by the U.S. and its regional allies that would also include a limited nuclear war in order to maintain a credible threat of force. Resting on the assumption that Iran, as a revolutionary power, is analogous with the former Soviet Union, containment --against a resource-rich country-- in both forms entails enormous political risks at home.
What is needed is a face-saving alternative for the political leadership in Iran rather than increasing the pressure on a decision --to halt and suspend the nuclear program-- that could not be made even by a reformist leadership. A viable way out would be the adoption of a clear and transparent road-map toward the gradual normalization of US-Iran relations, the fundamental requirement to address Iran's desire to become a respected member of the international community. Based on the principle of concrete reciprocity, such steps would include a clear avenue for Iran to evade US sanctions, achieve the unfreezing of Iranian assets by the US Office of Foreign Asset Control and an assurance that the military option is taken off the table --and with it the goal of regime change in Iran from outside--. On the Iranian side such steps would include a nuclear swap deal for the fuel of the Tehran Research Reactor which would account for two-thirds of the country's already enriched uranium, an assurance to positively influence Hamas and Hezbollah to refrain from attacking Israel, and a commitment for a closer cooperation against Sunni extremists such as Al Qaeda.
Even though these proposals seem fairly provocative, some were already agreed upon in the Declaration of Algiers in 1981 and again offered by the Iranians in 2003. Such a process would tremendously increase political leverage on other issues of mutual concern, such as combating terrorism in Iraq or drug trafficking on the Iranian border to Afghanistan. The end of the combat mission in Iraq and the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan announced for next year will already ease the most pressing Iranian security concerns and could be presented of signs of good will by the US.
In contrast to all previous approaches, this strategy of concrete reciprocity would on the one hand make it easier for Iranian leaders to justify any concessions to their respective electorate --and better protect them from accusations by political opponents-- and therefore decrease the likeliness of Iranian intransigence, since they could argue that the US had to move as well. But on the other hand, and even more important, it would avoid further alienating those parts of the population that are essential to shift the electorate toward the reformists once more. Due to the lack of foreign investment through sanctions, widespread corruption and incompetence, the ongoing downturn of the Iranian economy will further vex the middle class and the local tradesmen (bazaaris) thus increasing the incentives for the political leadership to ease sanctions for the sake of their own survival.
Moreover, considering the fact that over thirty percent of Iran's population is under the age of thirty, the West cannot afford to lose this generation which will constitute the next political leadership. They currently are unable to take the TOEFL (English language test) because of financial sanctions which prevent them from studying abroad. Avoiding political fatalism among the young generation is crucially important in order to encourage political change.
Otherwise, theirs and other dissident voices will not be heard in the ongoing power struggle between President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei which will determine whether Iran turns into a full-fledged military dictatorship controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In this case, engagement in the face of concrete reciprocity will be too late as this military-industrial-political consortium has certainly no interest in better relations with the US.
The power balance in the region has not yet shifted in favor of a nuclear Iran. There is still enough time left to initiate a trust-building process based on the recognition of Iran's demand for international legitimacy. In this regard, Germany as a major trading partner with Iran could use its reputation to support and encourage a rapprochement of US-Iran relations. Even an outreached hand by the US President has to come with the acknowledgment of the psychological dimension of the Iranian nuclear program. Given the disastrous consequences of a further escalation of the conflict, it is worth breaking new ground before policies that fail to look backwards jeopardize the future.
Sascha Lohmann is a student of Political Science at the Free University Berlin.
This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the U.S. Mission to Germany.
Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Iran's Nuclear Program" here.
- 11
October 27, 2010
Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (708)
I still have the opinion that you assess the character of the Iranian regime and the opposition movement wrong. In the discussion of my paper I have mentioned the reasons why a dialogue-policy will fail.
It is simply not in the interest of the regime, caused by a totalitarian dynamic.
For this reason I want to make remarks in more detail to characterize the Iranian regime:
"Iranians living under the mullahs' dictatorship or in exile are wondering if any insult or threat from the mouths of Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will ever convince the West to abandon its fantasies of a dialogue with the leaders of the Islamic Republic." ( Fatiyeh Naghibzadeh and Andreas Benl)
The Iranian Constitutional dictatorship seeks to establish Islamic rule. With a backward-looking religious ideology and power of modern technology, a power system is maintained, which is a new form of totalitarian dictatorship. (Wahied Waghdad-Haqh).
When Khomeini came to power, promoting the destruction of Israel became a state program. At no stage this principle of the totalitarian dynamics of the Islamic Revolution was shaken (up to the June protests, I believe) - in no case among the so-called reformists. I have already quoted Rafsanjani. From these quotes are hundreds, from all the eminent figures of the political establishment. Anti-Zionism is at the heart of the Islamic revolution.
Another key point is to export the revolution to the outside - see the promotion of terrorism in neighboring countries (Iraq, Afghanistan), construction and promotion of Hezbollah and Hamas. Hence, not least terrorism on a global scale (Buenos Aires, Vienna, Berlin). As Ayatollah Khomeini said: "We have not made the revolution in order to fill our bellies. It's about Islam. "
The current regime and its internal power sources are a result of this revolutionary process. Here I've addressed the characterization of totalitarian movements, from Hannah Arendt.
From these benchmarks, trade and better relations with the West are possible: In fact if and only if the objectives of the Islamic Revolution can be achieved with it. Those in power have certainly shown that they can be pragmatic in these goals. You could always count on the gullibility of the Europeans and parts of the U.S. administration (even partially under Bush). As I have said that the regime draws its power from outside sources. Inside, it exists only by force and has no more legitimacy. This is not just the case since June 2009, but since 1979 there is such a long history of protest by the women for instance.
Given the long history of oppression of women, mass executions (1979 and 1989), execution of homosexuals, a massive terror program to the outside - yet the acquiescence of the West: We have misunderstood the character of the regime for so many years. The violent suppression of the protest shows this abundantly clear.
In this respect we can learn primarily from the Iranians:
In conclusion I quote Iranian journalist Nasrin Amirsedghi:
"I have no reason to be ashamed for the misdeeds of the Iranian regime. It is because I've never praised them. On the contrary, I even had to leave in 1980 at the age of 24, the land of my childhood in night and fog in an adventurous way to save the life and limb of my daughter. Even then I was aware of what disaster would enter the gates of the world. Instead, I am ashamed of the Europeans, who are […] beginning a long overdue debate about the hostility of the Iranian regime. They have looked away all the time, while for 25 years people´s culture was taken hostage and violation of human rights in the most brutal way in the name of Islamic law was the daily method. Where did you hide all these years? " (the author´s translation)
There is no official contact person for a "trust-building process". If we do not recognize this, we will continue with the mistakes we have made since 1979.