Notwithstanding
NATO's efforts to create a stable, democratic, and secure Afghanistan, the
country remains unstable and highly insecure. Both the Afghan National Army and
the Afghan police forces are poorly organized, underfunded, inadequately
equipped, and prone to corruption and defection and therefore unable to
guarantee security.
The radical Islamic
Taliban regime has maintained influence in several regions of the country,
hindering reconstruction programmes and democratisation. Violence is still
omnipresent as the insurgency has increased its attacks on coalition forces and
adopted tactics, like suicide attacks and roadside bombings, previously
witnessed only in Iraq.
Initiatives to prevent hit-and-run actions by insurgents that are believed to conduct attacks against coalition forces from across the Pakistani borders, have increased tensions between Kabul and Islamabad. Furthermore, these initiatives encouraged Baitullah Mehsud, a prominent regional leader of the Taliban in Southern Waziristan, to call for a jihad against the international military presence in the Afghan-Pakistani border region.
Increased violence led President Hamid Karzai to negotiate with the Taliban, offering them amnesty and government positions in return for recognizing and adhering to the Afghan constitution in order to improve the security situation. So far this rapprochement has not produced any significant changes.
During the NATO Summit in Romania's capital in April this year, the alliance's member states pledged a long-term commitment to the mission in Afghanistan, that had, by then, largely turned into a forgotten conflict. However, member states perceived this long-term commitment as a political statement rather than an honest vow that implied practical commitments to the organization's efforts in the vulnerable country and emphasised the importance of enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility instead.
At a moment that casualties among coalition forces in Afghanistan were increasing, the European Union expanded its current mission that provides for the training of Afghan police forces with an additional 200 police and law-enforcement personnel, as well as legal experts. Both Germany and France remain unwilling to dispatch their troops to the more dangerous eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding statements that the United States, Great Britain, and Australia - the latter not even a NATO member - will expand their current military presence in the war-torn country, the Canadian government announced to withdraw their troops from the unstable Kandahar province in 2011.
In the wake of the member states' unwillingness and the absence of substantial and long-t erm commitments to the ISAF mission, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. As a consequence, reconstruction efforts are frustrated and systematically sabotaged, and too often left unfinished. Rising civilian casualties, often due to NATO air strikes, have increased discontent with the international military presence among the Afghan population and provides the fundamentalist Taliban with a large pool of potential recruits to engage in the insurgency's resistance efforts against NATO forces.
If Afghanistan is indeed perceived to be NATO's most important mission, all member states should act accordingly and transform their previously made political statements into substantial contributions. Failing to adequately address the daunting challenges that confront present-day Afghanistan will seal both the fate of the Afghan people and the fate of history's most successful military alliance.
Djörn Eversteijn holds a BA in European Studies and is currently a research trainee at the University of Amsterdam.
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Interview with Hussain Haqqani: Pakistan's New Commitment to the War on Terror
- Marek Swierczynski: NATO is Trapped in Afghanistan
- Obama Stresses Security Policy with McCain




September 15, 2008
Bernhard Lucke, BTU Cottbus, Gold Contributor (82)
- there is no agreement on NATO's mission in the alliance. Should it focus on strategic control by occupying important territories, or remain a purely defensive force? Who is the enemy of NATO: terrorists, or old powers like Russia, or emerging powers like China and Iran? Without clear mission and vision of the future, it is hard to agree on a strategy
- regarding the strategy, NATO might already have reached or crossed the limits of its military strength. The US are bogged down in Iraq and over-streched in Afghanistan, and her allies are reluctant to fill the gaps in the front. Although superior western forces dominate the battlegrounds in the Near East, we win Phyrrus victories since we lose the hearts and minds
-since NATO is wasting its strength in Afghanistan, there is little or no potential to counter other powers in other areas, e.g. Russia in Georgia. Even more, the "war on terror" in the Near East made NATO dependent on the support of Russia and other powers. But keeping Russia's back clear from Muslim fighters does not necessarily help preserving western influence in former Soviet territories
Afghanistan might indeed be a litmus test for the future course on the alliance. The half-hearted actions of the European partners reflects not only the strong public opposition in their countries, but also ties to the Muslim world which shall not be cut. I see only 2 choices of NATO:
- A): the member states of the alliance follow US leadership with full commitment, which means sending large troop contingents and lots of money for recontruction of the country. (As we have seen during the last 7 years, reconstruction alone will fail if it is not supported by force!) If the alliance decides to stay in Afghanistan, this is the choice to make, and - I agree with Djörn Eversteijn - it is probably better than the present half-hearted approach. But it is unlikely to happen, because:
- public opposition might bring an end to European governments chosing this option
- Afghanistan is highly unpopular among soldiers so it might be necessary to draft people, which increases public opposition
- such a commitment will be so costly that the Alliance will likely enter a war status even if no war is declared
- risks of failure are very high, if the mission is not doomed from the beginning
- the benefit for European partners will be minimal, even in the case of victory. They will sacrifice their remaining sympathies in the Muslim world, while strategic control of that country serves mainly US interests
- increased fighting will most likely create more terrorism, even if Afghanistan can be brough under control
- B): NATO re-defines its strategy and withdraws from Afghanistan. This is always portrayed as opening the gates to evil and leading to a new terror state in Afghanistan. However, I don't think things are black and white: still we have the option of designing a real withdrawal strategy, which may replace western forces with local tribal leaders and allow some stabilisation of the country from within.
This should have been done from the beginning - and that it was not done is in my opinion due to the unrealistic idea of changing the country quickly towards western standards. And of course, we wanted these military bases, secret camps, and the gas pipeline.
Going on with the occupation of Afghanistan, be it half-hearted or with full commitment, is likely to end with failure. The half-hearted approach might even survive longer, since public resistance is weaker.
Therefore it is time to withdraw now, as we still have options to plan and control this move, than to wait until we will be forced to leave from one day to the other. The latter will bring the power vaccum with all negative consequences outlined by Djörn Eversteijn.
It was a bad idea to declare Afghanistan - the occupation of a foreign country which did not directly attack a NATO member - a collective self-defence case. We could have eradicated the terrorist camps, removed the Taliban, and let Afghans govern themselves - as it was portrayed in the media at the beginning. But as it seems this was not the true story: now we find the alliance calling for a full occupation of the country. So it is no wonder that many voices ask whether hunting terrorists was ever the reason for invading the country.
Thanks to Afghanistan and Iraq, the US are losing hearts and minds not only in the Near East, but worldwide. Having NATO member countries participate in the Afghanistan war makes the treaty a stakeholder in this process of erosion of sympathies. Probably there is no issue in transatlantic relations which could be more important.