RSS

December 6, 2011

Glen Forbes, ForbesWallace Ltd, (8)

Sir,
The nature of the relationship between NATO and EU will remain a most complex matter long into the future, I am afraid to say.
It is not simply a matter of agreeing what is the security standing between the two, it is the underlying political wrangles of those Member States who do not have a presence in both organisations.
Without treading into the quagmire of the Greece-Cyprus-Turkey issue, the matter of Malta, Finland and Sweden, to name a few, and their lack of cooperative agreements with NATO constrain the EU's ability to appropriately integrate in any given security operation. This can be found in the EU's very first maritime operation, Op Atalanta - the mission to protect humanitarian provision to Somalia (it's main objective), and the deterrence of piracy off the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean..
From a public perspective, the safety and security of persons is paramount, but lack of a common aim, a common method of communication, or a common Command, has seen either a duplication of effort and even of capability to overcome the differing, and at times, competing aims of both organisations in a common operation.
It is difficult to see how CSDP can remain an isolated 'pillar' when so many security matters cross over (Kosovo, Afghanistan etc).
Clearly, the non-European Member States of NATO will have their say in any agreements with the EU, but as you rightly point out, equality in burden sharing will be a key issue. A short time ago, the U.S. SecDef urged NATO's European members to cooperate on much-needed defence spending in order to "not hollow out this alliance". The previous SecDef had warned of NATO becoming a two-tiered alliance divided between "those who bore the burden of defence spending and those along for the free ride."
With that viewpoint, the EU CSDP and the spread of European forces between the two organisations, not forgetting the economic constraints, the fuller transatlantic political cooperation and NATO-EU security arrangements have much to sort out in their own houses before such aims can be achieved.

December 6, 2011

Jordan Becker, United States Army, United States Military Academy, West Point - Opinions expressed on atlantic-community.org are my own, and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense, Silver Contributor (53)

Sir -
I very much appreciate your comments on the paper. I agree with many of your concerns regarding the constraints that domestic and intra-EU politics place on transatlantic cooperation.
Needless to say, this is a complex issue that is unlikely to be "resolved" in the near future!
My very best,
Jordan

December 7, 2011

Lawrence Efana

You have written a paper that reflects where you are. It is a very good paper indeed. I think you have words of gratitude from many, even if not openly expressed, for making available its copy through the PDF. I imagine that many will be keen to share aspects of your analysis and its contents.
You have written a paper that reflects where you are. It is a very good paper indeed. I think you have words of gratitude from many, even if not openly expressed, for making available its copy through the PDF. I imagine that many will be keen to share aspects of your analysis and its contents.

It has been stimulating to rush through the analysis, perceptions and especially the figures (graphic expositions). The analysis and perceptions belong, but surely your "Burden sharing proxy measure": the approach further underlining your "Purpose-built Burden Sharing Index", abbreviated "BSI" is an innovation and a breakthrough in this area of study and research. You have done an enormous work likely to gear and re-orient young "transatlantic" researchers, even if they will differ from you on substance: the contents of analysis and perceptions, both of which also contain elements of the theoretical and factual ingredients. You have successfully framed and interpreted history and situate NATO as an alliance and Europe as an emerging equal power unit in it. The narratives of the complexity suite the purpose of your paper. But the complexity itself is an opening through which many will ponder, try to breakdown and evaluate or rate differently in the process of responding hence communicating on the scope, weight, cause, effect, and so where all - individually and collectively are at present. As a European of 2nd order, perhaps it is not me who should first comment. Nevertheless my love for all people and challenging papers/analysis would not let me think twice, even so let us go on with the good work, if people agree.

The statement to reflect your writing purpose is: " The European security community must decide whether they want to exist as one part of an overall Transatlantic security identity or to project power independent of NATO. Further EU defense integration can only occur when these two notions have been reconciled." In other words, to begin with there is a general statement, followed-up by a conditionality on what you think the problem is. Luckily indeed, your own PDF comes at a time we noted the following with some gratitude, that during the Meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, the NATO allies brought the Alliance's strategy up to date with a new Strategic Concept. That is, that as the allies prepare for their May 2012 summit in Chicago, they must decide how the goals set in the Lisbon Strategic Concept can be met when financial realities on both sides of the Atlantic will reduce resources available for defence efforts. As of now it means that the Eurozone may remain in danger of collapse, and the United States is partially paralysed by political "gridlock" as it faces national elections in November 2012. Nothing much to say counterpoises and yet one argument shades light on the other, in spite of the freshness of Libya as the case you intensively use for your conditional argument and inference. In any case what to fancy good and necessary to trade carefully is: avoiding to "jack-up" the tempo of political gridlock here and there.

The new concept: "Smart Defence", was unanimously agreed upon, aware of most of the shortfalls making much sense in terms of your statistics, figures and graphic expositions, which focus specific factual issues of "burden sharing gaps", evidencing that in the long history of NATO as a military alliance brought about by the accident of history itself, that the United States has nearly been the sole one to carry greater burden. The message is true, but it is also clear that some would think it so relatively conditionally. Your series of tables reflect historical junctures: a) 1949 - 1959; b)1959 - 1969; c) 1967 - 1991; d) 1992 - 1997; e) 1998 - 2001; f) 2002 - 2010 ---- all of which initially had NATO alliance challenges in a narrow focus first, but expanded later in the process in line with other burdens of the US foreign policy challenges and empire-like driven policies - the worst of which meant she had to assume the role of world police. Thankfully however, the latter is what the present administration has tried to rethink and come to terms with on the "quality" in carrying such a burden! What that means for increasing questions of "the political mindset" is a part of the battle front also behind the political gridlock --- perhaps in America as in Europe! The question in that respect is: how is NATO to be reformed alongside ongoing innovations in the process and concept of security in this difficult time of mounting challenges, without making it or the cultural extensions - membership and partnership] in defense the culprit as debates, dialogues, transformations and transitions are rigorously and conditionally underway?

If your paper is to garner sympathy for US and strengthen the efforts to balance viewpoints, it is all right. There are some summary tables and graphic figures: 1998 - 2008; and the most comprehensive: "1949 - 2009" for it. These go a long rather well to show how US, on average topped on the theme of burden carrying, especially during economically favorable times, followed by France and Germany and the others. You have been sufficiently explicit and chronological with the accounts, showing also where dips took place and the overall situations with European NATO allies in comparison with individual national totals. These came more plainly in the range of earlier graphic figures. That is, the burden gap summary figure [across all]: 1949 - 2009, is illuminating on the theme of sympathy for the US. Here you show the statistics above and below the 4% [average] benchmark to help appreciate arguments about burden gaps distribution. Between NATO membership and partnership, it is a pleasure to grapple with your constructed equation beyond BSI, leading to the well thought out concept: PROTECTION RATIO], one enabling the inclusive role of ISAF and NATO success to be more contextualized as a sign of progress in spite of differences. In fact, European integration, considering the economic crisis and the political roles of both Germany and France might also benefit from information constructed from the graphs.

The lessons of Libya, as arm of the critical conclusions featured in the 'conditional' opinion and the role of France - further tied to lessons of the eras that the country deserted NATO, might be proportionally over-sensitively constructed - if we assume the idea of a new world meaningful. There is no doubt that the failure of Libya's leadership to understand events of the Arab spring, which in North Africa, began with Tunisia, then Egypt and later Libya itself, leaves many questions and anxieties. It was no bad policy strategy for the US to play cool in Arab country. It was no bad global effort for the UN to come in on 'no-flight zone' as a resolution on Libya. All of which, for Southern Europe especially, created hopeful proofs of endeavors in the face of alarming numbers of people fleeing the conflict zones of North Africa. Friends and foes alike wanted to help the Libyan leader, but to no avail. He judged all wrongly because of lust for power, so failed to take heed. NATO's entry in the phases seen seemed excusable even for many who do not see wars and killings as the solution. It is the big accident of our worldly experience. And now that one can say glamoring for empire building is futile, unlike in the old days that France went wild with that, holding fast on its African colonies, testing the atom bomb in the Sahara and in its Southern colony islands, the situation is relatively different now. There must therefore be other ways of addressing excesses and motives behind actions, considering how France returned to NATO and the teamwork with Germany for Europe to emerge in future as equal member, working to reform, upgrade rationality and its effectiveness.

The 2nd world war and history of European economic community, then its eventual growth into some form of political union as components of the way we try to understand words like "transformation and transition". Both in this respect, often open windows to construct, just as has been done in the paper] the history, cause and effect - if for nothing but lessons and finding wanted paths to sustainable progress and peace. These are challenges that put our meanings in constant need of overviews and so gain insights to implications to avoid dramas. Both concepts are to be traded carefully, in this case between two friendly entities, with one having units that must be further built-up at a time both also share some common problem: the financial crunch and burdens of transformation and transition. I am not academic with these things or diplomatic, but frank about them!

The paper commented on has words that capture the mind and show sensitivity to reality of situation and I quote parts: "STRONG ENOUGH TO IMPRESS AND WEAK ENOUGH NOT TO THREATEN". NATO in its membership relationship and partnership formation is a psychological epitome of it, as time changes and things are not the same as they once used to be --- the real time to test who friends are and what they are made for in the name of goodness and sanity! If transformation and transition with the NATO membership frame would have to be equated in the perception of Europe in the context "European actors attempt to take lead in a conflict scenario", that type of perception is likely to convey the feeling that the notion of like-minded friends is out of place. Put simply, there is a political divide that is growing and getting extreme! It is a perception begging for dysfunctional status, intent on one or the other form of authority --- one likely to play down understanding and democracy, or reduce than upgrade incentives for cooperation and continuous effort to reform and define "common values", etc.

Evolution of European Defence Community (EDC) and Western European Union (WEU), whatever the defense significance, should be to the glory of modernization and unity rather than threat scenario. It is the way that achievement to date----and they are many] are to be measured in the way the alliance can be proud of to use as grounds for more reform will. There is no more Warsaw Pact. Transatlantic cooperation if it has not yet done so fully is on the edge to give peace to Europe. That has been possible because of understanding and positive approaches as well as watchful eyes, all of which lead to cap "detente" with flexible responses, dressing and making democracy gradually more acceptable and economic values to work for greater balance! Thus, while finding the resources is a case in point and sharing for the purpose of supporting reformed cooperation and its military logic, it seems that many might buy into one of the observations in Becker's paper: "....... contends that the relationship ought to be allowed to evolve in an "ad-hoc" fashion as opposed to seeking some kind of "grand bargain" tied to definition of common interests as criterion for flexibility". It is one way to configure and nullify statue-driven control and or decision taking the form of grand bargains.

I am not arguing that burden sharing idea is not called for, because it is called for. Rather with the history of CSDP and perceptions of European defense identity, I seem to think it fair to worry about over-driven perceptions and its dangers for carefully working together to reform and lift NATO as a military cum peace machinery to the level of the UN control. Burden sharing arguments lifted out of its past history, might gain fruitful hearing through the UN so unnecessary to drown its arguments because of transatlantic political will problems and frustrations. Politics is increasingly scaring so better to deal with it at that level on the issues. NATO surely has much to take in the bag in 2012 for the conference in Chicago - current US President's home state!

December 14, 2011

Jordan Becker, United States Army, United States Military Academy, West Point - Opinions expressed on atlantic-community.org are my own, and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense, Silver Contributor (53)

Thank you very much for these comments. I think there will be some interesting observations to make in the realm of burden sharing over the next couple of years, and some good data points might come out of Chicago.
Best,
Jordan