Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Playing With Fire: Arming Tribal Militias Won't Work"

Playing With Fire: Arming Tribal Militias Won't Work

Abbas Daiyar: The US’ latest program to arm tribal groups in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban is based on flawed comparisons with Iraq. Prominent ethnic and tribal tensions will only flourish, entrenching instability and increasing bloodshed. The US and NATO must understand these realities and rethink the plan.

The new security program which has been launched against the Taliban in Afghanistan is labeled a "pilot program" by the US and is inspired by the relative success story of Iraq after Sunni militias were armed to fight Al-Qaeda. Americans poured weapons and dollars into this strategy and it finally worked. Military decision makers now compare the Iraq of two years ago with today's Afghanistan. War strategists believe arming tribal groups or militias will help reduce Taliban attacks, just as arming Sunni militias against Al-Qaeda did in Iraq. But the United States and NATO must understand that Afghanistan is not Iraq and the similarities between the insurgencies in the two countries should not be taken as justification for adopting a similar strategy.

The ground realities in Afghanistan are very different to those in Iraq. Divisions here are not merely sectarian; rather, they are ethnic as well as tribal and clannish. Arming one group to turn it against another will only exacerbate the situation. And as much as the Karzai government would like everyone to believe the contrary, the insurgency is not entirely comprised of hit-and-run Pakistanis from across the border. The "Taliban" in the South, the bastion of the insurgency, consists of the disenchanted Pashtoon tribal groups who feel left out. Old tribal divisions continue to play out in Afghanistan today: some Durrani clans call most of the shots, while the Ghilzai clans in the South feel marginalized. These are the clans that were the original Taliban, and the ones that today fuel the insurgency.

The new plan originally aimed to arm "local groups." If by local groups or tribes is meant the Durrani clans, this would fuel further resentment of the current establishment among the Ghilzais. Conversely, the arms given to Ghilzai tribes may end up being used against the government, the international forces and civilians of the different ethnic groups.

However, whether either the Durranis or the Ghilzais are armed, these tribal militias will essentially be autonomous, not under control of any recognized authority. This takes Afghanistan back to the pre-DDR and DIAG days, where hundreds, even thousands, of armed militia groups roamed free outside of government control. This new plan has the potential to reinvigorate warlordism, wasting the hundreds of millions of DDR and DIAG dollars that brought a great measure of stability to the country, particularly in the North and northwest.

After criticism and opposition from all circles, the Afghan government has postponed the idea of tribal militia and has established a new force called "Public Protection Police. " However, village youths from insurgent strongholds are to be recruited for the new force on the recommendation of community elders--tribal leaders-- which makes it closely resemble a militia-type force. Though the government says it would operate under the Interior Ministry, this remains under discussion.

The country's current relative stability may become history when the former Northern warlords see that not only are there no consequences to rearming, but that the government itself is arming their counterparts in the South. The US and NATO must understand that the new security plan will result in the creation of homegrown militias, more loyal to the insurgency than to the government. Before taking this "pilot program" any further, coalition war strategists should thoroughly study the tribal resistance against the Taliban in Pakistan's lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas that has become a stronghold of Taliban insurgents, giving tough times to Pakistani security forces.

The Pakistan Army applied the "pilot program" of tribal militias against the Taliban in FATA's troubled areas in 2003 and again in 2007. The Pakistan Army supported the tribal militias, called "Lashkar," against the Taliban. But the situation is getting worse there. The Taliban has almost defeated the Lashkars in the Bajaur, Swat, Dara Adamkhel, Mehmand and Aurakzai agencies. Hundreds of people belonging to such Lashkars have been killed. A recent example is Pir Samiullah, a prominent tribal leader of a Lashkar formed against the Taliban: in December, he and his 8 supporters were ruthlessly killed. The tribal Lashkar of Buner District of FATA killed six Taliban fighters a couple of months ago. The Taliban warned they would seek revenge and made good on their promise when a suicide bomber killed around 45 people a few weeks ago. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility, saying "the revenge wasn't yet over and every person in Shalbandai (Buner) would be eliminated for killing the Taliban members."

Observing the failed story of tribal militias in Pakistan's FATA, it can be assumed that the idea of a "pilot program" of arming local militias in Southern or Southeastern Afghanistan won't work. It will only further entrench current instability and revive three decades of civil war. The United States should understand that Afghanistan is not Iraq and reconsider the program.

Abbas Daiyar is a Kabul-based journalist writing for Daily Outlook Afghanistan, where he is an editorial board member.

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February 5, 2009

Ilyas M. Mohsin, PPP, Platinum Contributor (296)

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Abbas has hit the nail on the head. Being Kabul-based and a journalist, he knows the incredible importance of etnic, tribal, sectraian ties in the local society.
Since Afghanustan is proving a quagmire for the US, as it always does to a foreign force, multiple solutions are being propagated. General
Petraeus, the Centcom chief who won a breakthrough in Iraq using money as 'bullet', wants to try the same in Afghanistan. He may be a brilliant US general but new siruation that faces him is incredibly tough.
To start with Afghanistan, geographically, is not Iraq. The former has humbled foreign armies as a matter of history; the last one being the Soviet army. Second, the Afghan hates occupation, perhaps like Iraqis and others, but he has the advantage of history, geography, faith,tradition and character etc, of fighting the enemy even when he goes without food. The asymmetry of power cannot frighten him nor does the longevity of the struggle. No wonder, Sir Olaf Caroe, the last British Governor of NWFP and a great authority on the region, emphaised that the Afghan wars start only after they have ended.
Stratfor' new solution offered by Thomas Friedman appears to be the way out if the US wants to cut losses. Use of money may be a palliative but it would only incite more bloddshed on all sides.

February 5, 2009

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (503)

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Abbas Dayar names very important risks which are connected with arming Afghan militias. However, I do not agree that this idea is generally dangerous. The last example, the Lashkar, does in my opinion strongly speak for the programme.

It does not only matter that the situation in the provinces with the Lashkar is getting worse, but why it is getting worse. Does security deteriorate because the tribes started fighting between each other? It deteriorated because the Taleban fight the Lashkar ruthlessly. This is in fact a very good sign: it shows that the Taleban see the Lashkar as very serious threat to their power, and try the utmost to quell the native Afghan resistance against their rule as long as it is weak. In my opinion, the Lashkar could be the beginning of a movement which could end the Taleban's role as significant militia in the Afghan szene.

One thing must be clear: even if the Taleban are defeated, it is very likely that other tribes and warlords will emerge as new holders of power and continue the struggle. This is one reason why the western military engagement with its unclear goals is highly questionable. I do not think that this country can be pacified from outside, and foreign soldiers are probably more part of the problem than of its solution.

It is the Afghan government who bears final responsibility: if it manages to negotiate agreements among the tribes, this could lead to the defeat of the Taleban and other unruly warlords by militias like the Lashkar, which should be supported by the Afghan army and international troops. Peace should in the end be in the interest of the great majority of the tribes in Afghanistan. But if the government fails and only survives due to the support of outside powers, there is no point to continue the foreign military presence.

What I see as a major obstacle for success in the pacification of Afghanistan is the role of the foreign powers, especially the US, with regard to their refusal to accept orders by the Afghan government. If foreign soldiers do what they want, and are not held accountable for "collateral damage", the Afghan government will never succeed with uniting the tribes. In this context, it should be the Afghan government which decides and takes responsibility for the arming of militias, not foreign powers. Just pouring out weapons will certainly not make things better. But is must be made clear to the Afghan government that if it does not succeed within e.g. 3 years to achieve successed, the foreign soldiers leave.

February 8, 2009

Morgan Sheeran, Armed Forces, Afghan Veteran, blogger, Gold Contributor (106)

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As Mr. Daiyar pointed out in his article in Daily Outlook Afghanistan, the Afghan government already has a militia; it is the Afghan National Police. The ANP are problem-riddled, but most of them have never had the sort of mentoring and advising that has borne great fruit with the ANA, making the ANA the single most respected governmental agency in Afghanistan. The same type of effort will bear similar fruit with the ANP, but rather than execute that mission with all of our efforts, we would rather pay the equivalent of mercenaries to do the job. We can do a lot better than that.

The ANP are generally local men; the equivalent of a local militia. Local accountability must be improved, and the ANP should be encouraged to function as Arbakai, the enforcers of local council decisions. Where I saw this practiced in Afghanistan, such as Koh Band District, Kapisa Province, it was very effective and the community prospered.

Americans need to let Afghan forces take the lead in more operations, becoming force multipliers for the Afghans instead of the other way around. This will improve the image of the government and naturally minimize circumstances where the Americans over-apply their available firepower. When an air strike is requested and coordinated with the ANA or ANP, it is likely to be more necessary and the local situation is more likely to be taken into consideration.

Trying to export the Iraqi solution to Afghanistan promises to cause more problems in the long term than it will solve. Afghans such as Mr. Daiyar need to be listened to by strategists as they plan the readjustment of efforts in Afghanistan. They understand the quicksand that will be generated by such moves.

The major failure in all of this is the failure of NATO forces on the whole and the American Army in particular to truly grasp the principles of counterinsurgency and strive to first provide security to the population of Afghanistan. With all due respect to Mr. Mohsin, ISAF is not an occupation force, it is an assistance force. It is there to assist the fledgling Afghan government and an Afghan society to recover from 30 years of war which has destroyed so many institutions and capabilities. There is a classic insurgency in progress in Afghanistan, yet senior military leaders wish to resort to counter-guerrilla rather than counterinsurgent strategies. Limiting strategy to the kinetic fight in an insurgent environment has been demonstrated by repeatedly by history, such as the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, to be a recipe for failure.

Overwhelming force will never destroy an insurgency.

COIN is abhorrent to military officers raised upon the classic maneuver warfare model of the Cold War. There is tremendous resistance within the American Army to truly embrace the only doctrine which is applicable in this type of warfare, and in failing to commit to this discipline they have found themselves searching for solutions such as arming local militias. We should be calling upon NATO partners who are less willing to provide un-caveated military forces to provide more civilian assistance in governance instead of berating them for their national beliefs; finding ways to assist Afghans in ridding their government of corruption and enabling them to deliver services to their own people. The fact of the matter is that if NATO had been practicing sound counterinsurgency across the board for the past few years, the Taliban would be significantly weakened at this point, finding their movements restricted and the population less and less supportive and intimidated.

Mr. Daiyar is sounding the trumpet call, pointing out yet another blind alley that NATO is considering venturing into. He should be listened to very carefully, or we condemn ourselves to another COIN failing; trying to do what the population itself tells you is dangerous to them.

February 12, 2009

Patrick Edwin Moran, Wake Forest University, Platinum Contributor (201)

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Perhaps members of this community of ours can perform a valuable function by giving views of people such as Mr. Daiyar, Mr. Sheeran, and others who see the issues that may be obscured by the view from high status positions. After four years in Taiwan and then a two month visit to SE Asia in 1966, I came back to a very different country, one that was at odds with itself. I often wished that President Johnson could have sat down with people like the former British soldier who had dropped out after the end of the 12 year Emergency and had taken up residence as an ordinary citizen in Malaysia, or many other such people whom I had bumped into. I cannot think of any of them who failed to have an objective understanding of what was going on in the region. Instead, Johnson continued to play the game the way the opposition had structured it, and apparently he took advice from another class of specialists.

Becoming President opens up the possibility of being isolated from the real world. One factor is time pressure. Another factor consists of the President’s position at the delivery point of an organization that systematizes and summarizes information, but inevitably makes it extremely abstract. Under those conditions, it is difficult for one to have a feel for the real situations involved. Someone far away who is faced with the daily reality of some counterproductive activity we are conducting may not find a way of penetrating the White House insulation.

Some leaders have been renowned for their ability to keep an accurate mental image of the most salient features of their political environment. Others have been recognized for a similar ability that allows them somehow to penetrate the fog of war. But not much attention has been paid to nurturing these abilities, and augmenting these abilities artificially are probably beyond the reach of current technologies. Are there ways to hammer out an objective and vigorous body of informed opinion that can propagate through the fog? Or is something else needed?

February 12, 2009

Patrick Edwin Moran, Wake Forest University, Platinum Contributor (201)

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"giving views of people"
should have been:
"giving prominence to view of people"

May 23, 2009

Sam Stolzoff

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Gentlemen, as the security agreement requires that US forces withdraw from all cities to the rural areas, this brings a very serious shortcoming to light. First, we don't have a mastery of how the Iraqi tribal system works. Secondly, we are moving from the cities, where tribalism is weaker, to the rural areas, where it is stronger. As insurgent sanctuaries are generally in rural areas, they are engaging the tribes to coexist with and recruit from them.

It is imperative that we as Americans fighting the war in Iraq gain some mastery on how to interact with the Iraqi tribal system. When we are in harmony with the culture with which we coexist on a tactical level, it saves soldiers' lives, and it also is a powerful counter to insurgent information operations.

To that, please have a look at www.theiraqitribalsystem.com. It's not the answer to all questions...but it is the first more comprehensive treatment of the subject, with applied methodologies for leveraging the tribal data contained in the book for the purpose of establishing strong relationships with tribal leadership that are based on respect, humility, and trust.

If are able to fill the gap between what we think is intelligence and what causes cultural phenomena such as the insurgent groups in Iraq, we are will be well on our way to helping the Iraqis themselves towards state formation.

That's victory!

Respectfully,

Sam Stolzoff
www.theiraqitribalsystem.com

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Playing With Fire: Arming Tribal Militias Won't Work

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